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ABSTRACT
in order to address the environmental concerns raised by the existence of a 
continent-wide free trade zone, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Canada, United States and Mexico created an environmental side 
agreement, the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC)
NAAEC established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a 
trilateral body created to help the NAFTA Parties achieve the goal of free trade 
while at the same time avoiding or lessening environmental industrial 
degradation.
Although imperfect, the NAAEC embodies several processes that were 
innovative. The key innovation is the Citizen Submission Process that allows 
citizens and NGOs to make submissions asserting that a Party is failing to 
effectively enforce its environmental laws. This is a tremendous advance, which 
for the first time in the history of such agreements allows for public participation 
in the enforcement of environmental law.
The main focus of this thesis is a discussion and critique of the Citizen 
Submission Process. In order to situate the discussion in the appropriate context, 
the thesis has six parts.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between trade and the environment is an important and 
sometimes controversial topic. When Mexico became involved in negotiating a 
free trade agreement with Canada and the United States, interest in the topic 
grew. Of particular importance to many of those involved was to ensure that the 
agreement included an effective process whereby citizens would have real input 
and influence in the workings of the agreement, given the obvious public 
importance of the issues involved.
The tripartite negotiations ended in the historic agreement, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement1 and two side agreements, one of which was the North 
American Agreement For Environmental Cooperation.2 This agreement created a 
trilateral commission, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), 
comprised of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.
The CEC established two processes for resolving environmental disputes. The 
Dispute Resolution Process is exclusively for the use of the Parties, and the 
Citizen Submission Process allows citizens and NGOs to make submissions 
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. This
1 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government 
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) (hereinafter NAFTA).
2 North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, Canada, Mexico, United States, 13 
September 1993, 32 I.L.M. 480. (Entered into force 1 January 1994) (hereinafter NAAEC).
1
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is a tremendous advance, which for the first time in the history of such 
agreements allows for public participation in the enforcement of international 
environmental law.
The main focus of this thesis is a discussion and critique of the Citizen 
Submission Process. In order to situate the discussion in the appropriate context, 
the thesis has six parts. First, I will describe the origins and historical context of 
the NAAEC by reviewing the events that led to the creation of NAFTA. In 
addition, this section will describe the relevant environmental aspects or 
characteristics of NAFTA and attempt to discern the connection between NAFTA 
and the creation of an environmental side agreement, the NAAEC. Second, I will 
provide a review of the NAAEC itself, identifying its goals, and how the CEC is 
organized, followed by a critique of its effectiveness. Third, the Dispute 
Resolution Process is reviewed and discussed; recommendations for 
improvement of the process are suggested.
The next chapter provides an analysis of the Citizen Submission Process. This 
includes an analysis of the process itself to determine its strengths and 
weakness and also a review of three important decisions to provide a context for 
discussion. Penultimately, I put forward a critique of the Citizen Submission 
Process and make proposals for its modifications so it will be better able to 
ensure the fair and full enforcement of the environmental laws of the three
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
Parties. Finally, there is a brief review of all the submissions filed before the 
Secretariat as of October 2001.
As an environmental lawyer in Mexico, I was involved in several of these matters, 
two of which were significant files, namely the Cozumel Pier Project and the 
Abandoned Lead Smelter in Tijuana. From Mexico’s north border of the Rio 
Bravo (or Rio Grande as it is known in Canada and the United States) to 
Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala, Mexico faces many daunting 
environmental problems. It was my work for the Mexican government which 
initiated my interest in the role of the public in environmental matters.
This thesis is only a modest contribution to the area of environmental law. It is 
important to the extent that it highlights the significance of citizen involvement in 
environmental protection and the need for changes to existing agreements to 
allow greater and more meaningful public participation. The environmental 
problems of Mexico in particular, and North America in general, are exceptionally 
complex. Solutions to the thorny issues which confront these countries and their 
people will not be solved by the government and industry alone, but will require 
the active participation of the general public.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1. NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
1.1. North American Free Trade Agreement: Historical Background.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect on 
January 1, 1994. This agreement establishes a set of rules for trade between the 
United States, Mexico and Canada. NAFTA is another treaty arising from the 
change in the international environment generated since the end of World War II 
that established a system to regulate the growing trade and financial markets 
promoted by the so-called Bretton Woods System.3
This Bretton Woods System created the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund and led to the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).4 The GATT, as an “international contract” between governments, 
helped to create the environment necessary to promote international trade 
among its contracting partners.
As a result of the growing number of treaties that created trade relationships and 
free trade zones and agreements, in January 1989 the United States and 
Canada established their own regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA).5 The FTA 
was the first step that the Reagan Administration took to create a commercial
3 J. Jackson,” The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations” 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) at 2.
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, [hereinafter 
GATT]
5 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, January 1 1989, Can, T.S. 1989 3 [Hereinafter 
FTA]
4
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trading zone in North America. By the spring of 1990, American President 
George Bush and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari started official 
negotiations to create another free trade zone between Mexico and the United 
States.6 Canada’s Prime Minister Brian Mulroney asked to be included in the 
negotiation of what would become the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
The FTA had established the framework for NAFTA, which entered into force on 
January 19947 Many provisions of NAFTA were almost identical to those of the 
FTA, such as the chapter dealing with investment and anti-dumping rules. 
Nevertheless, several major issues such as the environment, labour, and market 
disruptions surrounded the debate over the NAFTA agreement and fuelled 
controversy. During the FTA’s negotiations the environment was not as important 
an issue8 as it was during NAFTA’s negotiations.9
The main concern of all environmentalists was Mexico, since Mexico faces 
severe environmental degradation. Years of rapid population growth and 
industrialization, without adequate environmental investment and enforcement,
6 J. Holbein, “The Administration of Chapter 19 Bi-national Proceedings under NAFTA”, (1997) 5 
U.S.-Mex. L.J. at 57.
7 NAFTA supra note 1.
8 The FTA paid little attention to the questions of environmental protection. Nevertheless 
Canadian environmental groups did raise many of the same questions that were asked later in 
NAFTA negotiations, but apparently with little effect. Pearson, S. C., “ The Trade and the 
Environment Nexus: What is New Since ’72? In Robert F. Housman, Durwood Zaelke et al. ed., 
Trade and the Environment Law, Economics, and Policy, (Washington DC: Island Press, 1993) 
23 at 29.
9 Johnson P. M. & A. Beaulieu, The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing 
the New Continental Law, (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996) at 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have left a legacy of polluted waters and large quantities of improperly stored 
waste. One concern raised by opponents of NAFTA was that increased trade 
would lead to further environmental degradation in Mexico, as companies would 
move their operations to Mexico to avoid strict environmental enforcement in the 
United States.
It is important to note that before the NAFTA negotiations started Mexico already 
was a member of the GATT and already had trade relationships with several 
countries around the globe. Possibly in anticipation of further free trade 
negotiations, Mexico had initiated under President Miguel de la Madrid an 
intensive transformation of Mexican legislation that included international trade, 
foreign investment and the environment. By March 1988, Mexico enacted its first 
serious environmental law, the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la 
Proteccion al Ambiente10 and by 1992 the Mexican environmental legislation 
included regulations for hazardous waste, noise pollution, air pollution, 
environmental impact, the National Water Law and its regulations, the regulations
10 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion al Ambiente, published in the Diario Oficial 
de la Federacion January 28 1998. (Hereinafter General Law)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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on the Transportation of Hazardous Materials and Waste11 and more than 52 
Mexican Official Standards or NOMS.12
Despite these efforts by Mexico to create an environmental legal framework as 
well as to create a bi-lateral network with the United States, many American 
NGO’s still had reservations and the debate brought forth a range of issues 
including:
• Fears of pollution spilling over into the United States from increased 
Mexican industrial activity;
• Concerns that the high standards of environmental protection achieved in 
the United States after many hard fought legislative and legal battles 
would be compromised in the NAFTA negotiations and reduced to that of 
Canadian or Mexican standards;
• Distress over the perceived lack of opportunities for the environmental 
community to shape the trade policy development process; and
11 Mexico's principal environmental law is the General Law of Ecological Balance and 
Environmental Protection, which has been in effect since 1988. The law provides a general 
framework within which all states laws and federal regulations must comply, including regulations 
governing air pollution, hazardous waste and materials transport, environmental impact 
assessment and motor vehicle emissions. These regulations are implemented via media-specific, 
quantitative standards called Mexican Official Standards (NOMs). There was a major revision to 
the General Law in December 1996, which provided for decentralization of enforcement, 
increased sanctions, more citizen participation, and information dissemination on government 
plans and programs.
These standards, that are largely based on U.S. standards, establish the maximum quantities 
allowed for any given pollutant and/or the way such measures should be taken. Bustani, Alberto 
& Mackay, W.P., “NAFTA: Reflecting on Environmental Issues During the First Year”, (1995) 12 
Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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• Questions about the rigor of Mexico’s environmental standards and 
enforcement program with fears of a “pollution haven” emerging south of 
the Rio Grande .13
As noted by Esty14, the above concerns were approached in several ways, 
especially by the U.S Environmental Protection Agency, which created a Trade 
and Environment Committee under its national Advisory Committee on 
Environmental Policy and Technology. The Environmental Protection Agency 
addressed concerns by performing a comprehensive environmental review of the 
prospective NAFTA that included an analysis of the possible environmental 
effects of closer trade relationships.
Esty also noted that other concerns, such as the possibility of encouraging 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures, 
known as the “pollution havens". Another concern he expressed was the 
possibility of downward harmonization of environmental standards. Esty’s 
position was that both concerns should be addressed in the NAFTA treaty itself15 
or by creating a trilateral environmental side agreement.
In order to persuade the Congress to renew fast-track authority for the free trade 
agreement, the Bush Administration issued a formal response to the
13 Esty, C. Daniel, “ Integrating Trade and Environmental Policy Making: First Steps in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement" in Robert F. Housman et al supra note 8 at 48.
14 Ibid.. at 49-51.
15 It is important to mention that many of those concerns are part of any free trade agreement 
between developed and developing countries and are part of the battle between trade and the 
environment. See especially Johnson supra note 8 at 35 -75  for an interesting discussion of this 
subject regarding trade and environmental issues for the 1990’s.
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environmental concerns that had been raised by the House of Representatives.16 
President Bush committed to a final trade agreement that would address 
environmental issues, including measures that would permit the United States to: 
(1) exclude products that did not meet its environmental standards; (2) implement 
environmental standards that were stricter than those of the exporting country; 
and (3) comply with international environmental agreements, such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora and the Montreal Protocol, regardless of the potential inconsistencies 
between those agreements and the trade and investment regulations 
established17. With this plan, the Bush Administration tried to address the 
environmental concerns expressed by the Congress and NGO’S in a parallel 
track separate from the actual trade negotiations, and the three parties agreed to 
do so.18
As a result of the commitments by President Bush, in October 1993 three 
institutions were created to help deal with the extensive environmental problems 
on the U.S.-Mexico border as part of the NAFTA implementing legislation 
package that was prepared for submission to Congress. Two were created 
under the La Paz Agreement between the United States and Mexico.19 First, the
16 See Response of the Administration to Issue Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a 
North American Free Trade Agreement as mentioned by Moreno, I. S, Rubin J. W & Smith R. F III 
et al, “Free Trade And The Environment: The NAFTA, the NAAEC, And Implications For The 
Future”, (1999) 12 Tul. Envt’l. L.J. at 414.
17 Ibid.
18 Housman, Robert, “The North American Free Trade Agreement’s Lesson for Reconciling Trade 
and the Environment", (1994) Stan. J. Intn’l. L. at 381. (Hereinafter Housman Free Trade)
19 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Mexico 
Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) to coordinate the efforts 
of Mexico and the United States on the border region. Second, the North 
American Development Bank (NADBank) to provide loans and loan guarantees 
to projects certified by the BECC. Third, the International Water Boundary 
Commission (IBWC), which focuses on water rights and infrastructure serving the 
border region.
However, the debate over how President Bush addressed environmental 
concerns during the negotiations continued. As noted by Audley, many 
environmentalists thought that President Bush ignored environmental concerns 
when he developed his agenda for trade policy. His critics charged that he first 
resisted the link between trade and the environment, then relegated the 
environment to parallel tracks not tied to the trade negotiations, and finally 
cloaked NAFTA in “green language” in the final days of the negotiations.20
Despite the critics, by the summer of 1992 the NAFTA discussion concluded and 
the three countries signed the agreement that came into force on January 1, 
1994. Nonetheless the debate over the environment continued to have political 
repercussions in the United States, and was far from over.21
American Development Bank, signed in Washington, D.C. Nov. 16 1993; at Mexico, D.F., Nov. 
18,1993, 32.1.L.M 1545 (1993).
20 Audley, John, “ Why Environmentalists Are Angry about the North American Free Trade 
Agreemenf in Robert F. Housman, Durwood Zaelke et al, supra note 8 at 192.
21 Ibid.
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1.2 Integration of Environmental Issues within NAFTA.
1.2.1 Introduction
After the discussions between Canada, the United States and Mexico about the 
creation of a free trade zone were concluded, the three countries reached an 
agreement that not only addressed trade but also the environment. The NAFTA 
has been declared the “greenest” trade agreement ever22 It is the first trade 
agreement to recognize the relationship between trade and the environment. 
Unlike the GATT and FTA, which contain scant reference to the environment23, 
NAFTA recognizes the environment as a key issue in its Preamble and also in 
Chapters 1, 7, 9 and 20. In this section of the thesis, I will analyse the 
environmental issues addressed in the Preamble and various chapters of 
NAFTA.
1.2.2 Preamble.
The preamble establishes the intentions of the Parties in signing the agreement 
and three of its clauses are expressly concerned with the environment:
22 Van Pelt J. L., “Countervailing Environmental Subsidies: A solution to the Environmental 
Inequities of North American Free Trade Agreemenf, (1994) 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. at 123.
23 The Preamble of the GATT is limited to economic and trade objectives and its text does not 
specifically refer to the environment. Nevertheless the environment is recognized indirectly in the 
general exceptions in GATT Article XX (b) and (g). These provisions grant exceptions from GATT 
obligations for measures which are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life of health” or 
which are related “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption”. On the 
other hand, the FTA is focused on economic objectives with the exception of a reference to 
“preserving the Parties flexibility to safeguard the public welfare" that may include environmental 
protection. Articles 603 and 609 refer to the environment as a legitimate domestic objective for 
standard related measures or procedures.
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‘The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican 
States and the Government of the United States of America, resolved to:
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation...
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws
»25
By explicitly recognizing the relationship between trade and the environment and 
promoting sustainable development, the NAFTA parties agreed that the 
environment is an important aspect of the trade agreement26 and that they took 
into consideration this relationship before entering into the agreement.
24 Despite that NAFTA mentions "sustainable development” there is no definition given in NAFTA. 
For that we must look in the Declaration of Principles of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development where “sustainable development” is defined as: " development 
[which] must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of 
present and future generations”
NAFTA supra note 1 preamble. Declaration of Principles of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, Principles 1 and 3 at 8 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992).
26 Despite this, some argue that talk about sustainable development is more rhetoric than a real 
commitment to such a principle since NAFTA does not contain any Article for setting aside funds 
for environmental concerns or infrastructure improvement that would assure protection of the
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However, some authors suggest that the general provisions of the Preamble are 
not enforceable and the experience with other trade agreements has shown that 
dispute settlement panels rarely rely on them.27 Nevertheless, according to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, preambles can be used as a 
legitimate basis to interpret an agreement28 By mentioning the relationship 
between trade and the environment, NAFTA’s parties took a step in the right 
direction.
1.2.3 NAFTA’s Relationship with International Environmental Treaties.
Many environmentalists lobbied for the creation of an important exception in 
NAFTA regarding its relationship to other important international environmental 
agreements.
Neither GATT nor the FTA addresses their relationships with any other 
international environmental agreements. This is understable, given the fact that 
the GATT was created in 1947 and at that time environmental issues were not 
important issues of the day.29 Recognizing that it was necessary to protect some 
international environmental agreements from trade challenges, NAFTA Article
environment for future generations, see especially Bailey, James E., “ Free Trade and the 
Environment -  Can NAFTA Reconcile the Irreconcilable? (1993) 8 Am.U. J.lnt’l. L. Pol’y. at 847
27 Johnson supra note 8 at 67.
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 23 May 1969,in force January 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S.331. Article 31 recognizes the preambles of international treaties as a legitimate basis of 
interpretation.
29 Thomas, C. & Tereposky, G.,” The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on Environmental Co­
operation: Addressing Environmental Concerns in a North American Free Trade Regime”, (1993) 
27 J.W.T. 6 at 9.
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10430 established its relationship with environmental and conservation 
agreements as follows:
“1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the 
specific trade obligations set out in:
a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as 
amended June 22,1979,
b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 
29, 1990,
c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at 
Basel, March 22, 1989, on its entry into force for Canada, Mexico 
and the United States, or
d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, 
provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective
30 However, in part 1 Objectives at Article 102 the parties establish the general objectives of this 
agreement but do not include or mention the environment.
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and reasonably available means of complying with such 
obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least 
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement.
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to 
include any amendment to an agreement referred to in paragraph 
1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement”. 31
The agreements set out originally in Annex 104.1 are the Agreement on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Border Area (better 
known as the La Paz Agreement32) and the Agreement Between Canada And 
The United States Concerning The Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Waste*3. As stated in Article 104 section 2, the Parties may agree in writing to 
modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to an agreement referred to in 
paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement.
Based on Article 104 (2), the Clinton Administration was able to obtain the 
consent of Canada and Mexico to modify and include in Annex 104.1 the 
Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birdsi34 and the Convention Between 
the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game
31 NAFTA Article 104.
32 The 1983 La Paz Agreement Between Mexico and the United States on Protection of 
Environment in the Border, 14 August 1983,22I.L.M. 1025.
33 The Agreement Between Canada And The United States Concerning The Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed October 26,1986, T.I.A.S. No. 1109.
34 Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birds, between the United States and the United 
Kingdom (on behalf of Canada), August 16,1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.I.A.S. No. 628
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Mammals.35 Nevertheless, there is a concern from environmental groups36 about 
the possibility of including other agreements because it is necessary that all 
Parties agree, and apart from formal negotiations there is no other mechanism to 
modify annex 104.1.
It is important to keep in mind that NAFTA is an international agreement focused 
on trade; therefore NAFTA’s main goal is to achieve the free flow of goods and 
investment between the three parties. Thus it is necessary to prevent the 
creation of any artificial barriers for trade, including those that use the 
environment as a pretext. One of NAFTA’s great achievements is establishing a 
process to resolve disputes concerning trade and the environment. As 
established in Article 2005, in any dispute where the responding Party claims that 
its action is subject to the exception of Article 104 (when a Party is trying to 
comply with its commitments with one of the international environmental 
agreement established in Annex 104.1.37) and requests in writing that the matter 
be considered under NAFTA, the complaining Party may, in respect of that 
matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under 
this Agreement.
35 Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and 
Game Mammals, February 7,1936, 50 Stat. 1311, T.I.A.S. No. 912.
36 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 399.
37 NAFTA Article 2005.
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This Article is an advance since it is the first attempt of any trade agreement to 
try to avoid the problems that the infamous Tuna Case brought to international 
trade relationships.38
Nevertheless, there are still some concerns from environmental groups and 
some authors39 that real environmental measures may be jeopardized because it 
is net clear what “choice among equally effective and reasonably available” or 
“least inconsistent’ really means. There is also concern about giving to a panel of 
trade experts the power to determine if other international environmental 
agreements are well invoked or correctly interpreted.40
1.2.4. Investment and the Environment.
One of the main concerns of the Canadian and American labour unions and 
environmentalists was that many investors would relocate their facilities to
38 The US imposed an embargo on tuna fish on Mexico, Venezuela and other countries. The 
embargo was imposed based on the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) that prohibits the 
importation of tuna caught using fishing techniques resulting in the incidental killing of dolphins in 
excess of US standards. Mexico challenged the US embargo through the GATT, in what is known 
as the Tuna I case, arguing that the MMPA requirements for harvesting of tuna fish, as well as 
the methods used to calculate such compliance, were a violation of GATT obligations. Mexico 
argued that the MMPA violated the national treatment obligation of similar imported products 
established in Article III and Article XI that prohibits quantitative restrictions, and that there were 
not any environmental exemptions pursuant Article XX. The Tuna I panel determined that 
because the MMPA import prohibitions were targeted at protecting dolphin life and health in 
waters outside the US jurisdiction the exceptions to Article XX B could not be applied since the 
US regulations did not meet the conditions set out in the exemptions, and implied that the 
extraterritorial application of the law was against its GATT obligations. The decision generated 
several critiques from environmental NGOS since in their view trade relationships were give 
greater consideration than the environment and protection of animal life. Their impression was 
that GATT rules were not environmentally friendly. See Rueda, Andres, “ Tuna, Dolphins, Shrimp 
& Turtles: What About Environmental Embargoes Under NAFTA?” (2000) Geo. Int’l Env. L. Rev. 
647 for an interesting discussion about the Tuna I and Tuna II cases.
39 See generally Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 10.
40 Ibid. at 10-12.
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Mexico due to its lower environmental standards and the lack of enforcement41, 
which leads to lower environmental costs. It is worth mentioning that one 
important aspect of this issue is not the possible differences in the levels of 
legislation, standards and regulations, since many of the Mexican Official 
Standards (NOMS) are based on American and Western European standards. 
The real problem is the lack of enforcement42
In order to avoid the possible advantage of Mexico in this issue, taking into 
consideration a proposal from Canada43, the three parties created what is known 
as the “Pollution Haven Clause" in Article 1114 section 2 as follows:
“Article 1114: Environmental Measures
41 This concern is obviously more economical than environmental, which left some people with a 
feeling that many “ so-called” environmentalists were hypocrites since they were not really 
worried about the environment but the loss of jobs. The perceived problem began with the 
creation in Mexico of the “maquiladora” program by the late 60’s that opened several facilities in 
the U.S.-Mexican border. However, as mentioned by Moskowitz, the environment was not really 
an issue in the Mexico- U.S. relationships as he notes that “ many maquiladoras and other 
industries left tons of hazardous waste in Mexico. However that was not a priority in the bi-lateral 
relationship. Perhaps this is because drugs and immigrants come into the United States while 
hazardous waste go out”. Moskowitz, Adam L. “ Criminal Environmental Law: Stopping the Flow 
of Hazardous Waste to Mexico", (1991) 22 Cal. W. Int’l. L.J. at 159.
42 As a result of my experience as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I had the opportunity to 
face the reality of enforcement. For example, in the State of Quintana Roo located in the Yucatan 
peninsula, one of the main problems the environmental authorities faced was the lack of boats 
that would help them to reach many areas that are covered by lakes, rivers, swamps and the sea. 
By March 2000 the PROFEPA state delegation had only two boats to cover the whole region, in 
Mexico City and its metropolitan area where there are more than 10,000 industries there are not 
enough environmental inspectors and some of them are not well trained. On December 1998 one 
of the environmental inspectors that was performing an environmental audit in one of my client’s 
facilities was a veterinarian and he told me that he did not know the law but that working, as an 
inspector was the only job he could get.
43 Housman in Trade and the Environment supra note 8 at 396-397
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2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. 
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer 
to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention 
in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that 
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a 
view to avoiding any such encouragement” . 44
This provision is an advance in recognizing that differences in environmental 
standards between trade partners can create artificial advantages to the Party 
with the least strict legislation, similar to a jurisdiction with low taxes. However, 
some authors believe that this provision still has its flaws45, since the 
consultations between the parties are not binding and the lack of enforcement 
still creates an advantage to Mexico. Another critique is that this Article preserves 
the status quo but46 does not encourage addressing the actual differences in the 
level of protection and therefore the differences will force the parties to 
harmonize standards to the lowest common denominator.47
44 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 1114 (2). Emphasis added.
45 Hustis, Brenda S., “The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement”, (1993) 28 Tex. Intn'l. L. J. at 593.
46 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 397.
47 Bailey supra note 26 at 849.
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Despite these concerns as mentioned by Johnson and Beaulieu48, this pressure 
to lower environmental norms is not possible. On the contrary, it will be an 
upward harmonization since NAFTA Chapters 7 and 9 include provisions related 
to the upward harmonization of the parties Sanitary and Phytosanitary49 (S&P) 
and standard related measures.50
Section (1) of Article 1114 establishes the right of every Party to create its own 
level of protection and legislation stating that nothing in Chapter 11 “shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any 
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental concerns.”51 Recognizing the sovereignty and the intrinsic 
differences between the parties, NAFTA allows every Party to maintain and 
create its own legislation and level of protection.52
1.2.5 Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures
In NAFTA’S Chapter 7, the agreement recognizes the liberty of every Party to 
adopt its own Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.53 Article 712 establishes
48 Johnson supra note 9 at 111 -118.
49 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 714 (1) the parties should undertake “to the greatest extent 
practicable” equivalence in their respective S&P measures without reducing the level of protection 
of human, animal or plant health or life.
50 Ibid. Article 906 (2).
51 Ibid. Article 1114(1).
52 Mexico initiated several legislation reforms in the late 1980’s, including reforms on International 
Trade, Foreign Investment and the Environment.
53 S&P measures are defined in NAFTA supra note 1 Article 724 as follow:
“sanitary or phytosanitary measure means a measure that a Party adopts, maintains or 
applies to:
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that one of the basic rights and obligations of each Party is to establish its own 
S&P measures to protect human, plant and animal health or life, even measures 
more stringent than an international standard, guideline or recommendation.54 
Despite the liberty of every Party to establish its own S&P measures, such 
measures are limited in several ways.
First, any S&P measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory way between 
its goods and like goods of another Party or goods of any Party and like goods of
(a) protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising from the 
introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease,
(b) protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks arising from the 
presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-causing organism in a food, 
beverage or feedstuff,
(c) protect human life or health in its territory from risks arising from a disease-causing 
organism or pest carried by an animal or plant, or a product thereof, or
(d) prevent or limit other damage in its territory arising from the introduction, 
establishment or spread of a pest,
including end product criteria; a product-related processing or production method; a 
testing, inspection, certification or approval procedure; a relevant statistical method; a 
sampling procedure; a method of risk assessment; a packaging and labelling requirement 
directly related to food safety; and a quarantine treatment, such as a relevant 
requirement associated with the transportation of animals or plants or with material 
necessary for their survival during transportation. “
54 NAFTA Article 712 :
“1. Each Party may, in accordance with this Section, adopt, maintain or apply any 
sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health in its territory, including a measure more stringent than an international 
standard, guideline or recommendation.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, each Party may, in protecting 
human, animal or plant life or health, establish its appropriate levels of protection in 
accordance with Article 715."
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another country.55 This must be done in order to comply with the national 
treatment and most-favored nation status that are the two bases of any free trade 
treatment since GATT.
Second, every Party shall ensure that every S&P measure adopted or 
maintained is applied to the extent that such a measure does not constitute 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.56 Article 712 section 5 establishes that in order 
to prevent any S&P measures constituting an unnecessary obstacle, every Party 
shall apply the measures only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate 
level of protection and taking into consideration “technical and economic 
feasibility of the measures”.57 However, these requirements are not defined.
Also, to adopt any S&P measures, as established by Article 712 (3), all parties 
shall ensure that any measure that it adopts, maintains or applies is:
a) based on scientific principles, taking into account relevant factors 
including, where appropriate, different geographic conditions;
b) not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it; and
c) based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances.”58
55 Ibid. section (4) ." Each Party shall ensure that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it 
adopts, maintains or applies does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between its goods 
and like goods of another Party, or between goods of another Party and like goods of any other 
country, where identical or similar conditions prevail.”
56 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 (5).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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This Article recognizes the problematic relationship between S&P measures and 
science, since many standards created or applied are created more as disguised 
protection for trade than protection of the environment or human life or plant 
health as established by NAFTA’s Article 712.59 Nevertheless, there are still 
some phrases such as “scientific principles” that are not defined.60 It is important 
to mention that the relationship between science and environment has not 
always been good and in some cases the relationship has had disastrous 
results.61
As established by Article 715 section 1, in establishing any S&P measure all 
parties shall undertake a risk assessment and in conducting a risk assessment 
each Party shall take into account:
a) relevant risk assessment techniques and methodologies developed by 
international or North American standardizing organizations;
b) relevant scientific evidence;
c) relevant processes and production methods;
59NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 section 6:
“No Party may adopt, maintain or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure with a 
view to, or with the effect of, creating a disguised restriction on trade between the 
Parties.”
60 Madnick, Michael, “NAFTA: A Catalyst for Environmental Change in Mexico", (1993) 11 Pace 
Envt’l. L. R. at 382.
61 To review an important case where the relationship between science and environment resulted 
in several criticisms see the EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
(Complaints by the United States and Canada) (1997) WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Appellate 
Body Report).See note 65 and accompanying text.
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d) relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods;
e) the prevalence of relevant diseases or pests, including the existence of 
pest-free or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence;
f) relevant ecological and other environmental conditions; and
g) relevant treatments, such as quarantines.
In undertaking risk assessment, the parties shall take into account not only the 
risk but also the economic factors62 and the need to minimize negative trade 
effects.63 If relevant information is unavailable, Article 715 section 4 allows the 
parties to adopt provisional S&P measures.64
62 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 715 (2) “ a) loss of production or sales that may result from the 
pest or disease; b) costs of control or eradication of the pest or disease in its territory. “
Ibid. section (3):
” a) should take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects; and b) 
shall, with the objective of achieving consistency in such levels, avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in such levels in different circumstances, where such distinctions 
result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good of another Party or 
constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.”
64 Ibid. section “ (4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) through (3) and Article 712(3)(c), where a 
Party conducting a risk assessment determines that available relevant scientific evidence or other 
information is insufficient to complete the assessment, it may adopt a provisional sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure on the basis of available relevant information, including from international 
or North American standardizing organizations and from sanitary or phytosanitary measures of 
other Parties. The Party shall, within a reasonable period after information sufficient to complete
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Finally, Article 713 recognizes that the International Standards and Standardizing 
Organization plays a role in the creation of new S&P measures, but that despite 
the standards created by international organizations, every Party has the liberty 
to create its own S&P measures that are even higher than those international 
standards. Each Party is free to use existing standards as possible guides.65
These Articles raised some concerns for environmentalists since many of the 
concepts are not well defined. The concern is that ambiguity in the language may
the assessment is presented to it, complete its assessment, review and, where appropriate, 
revise the provisional measure in the light of the assessment.”
65 Article 713. International Standards and Standardizing Organizations
“1. Without reducing the level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health, each 
Party shall use, as a basis for its sanitary and phytosanitary measures, relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations with the objective, among others, 
of making its sanitary and phytosanitary measures equivalent or, where appropriate, 
identical to those of the other Parties.
2. A Party's sanitary or phytosanitary measure that conforms to a relevant international 
standard, guideline or recommendation shall be presumed to be consistent with Article 
712. A measure that results in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from 
that which would be achieved by a measure based on a relevant international standard, 
guideline or recommendation shall not for that reason alone be presumed to be 
inconsistent with this Section.
3. Nothing in Paragraph 1 shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or applying, in accordance with the other provisions of this Section, a sanitary 
or phytosanitary measure that is more stringent than the relevant international standard, 
guideline or recommendation.
4. Where a Party has reason to believe that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure of 
another Party is adversely affecting or may adversely affect its exports and the measure 
is not based on a relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation, it may 
request, and the other Party shall provide in writing, the reasons for the measure.
5. Each Party shall, to the greatest extent practicable, participate in relevant international 
and North American standardizing organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, the International Plant Protection 
Convention, and the North American Plant Protection Organization, with a view to 
promoting the development and periodic review of international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations.”
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create another disastrous result such as occurred in the Hormone Case.66 The 
ambiguous text of Article 107 does not help in determining if a Party took into 
consideration technical or economic feasibility concerns before creating and 
applying its S&P measures. This will leave to the arbitration panels to determine 
if a Party considered these matters and if the decisions were right or not.67 
Leaving this to the arbitration panels may create contradictory and inconsistent 
decisions among the panels.
By requesting that any S&P shall be based on a “risk assessment” NAFTA is 
adopting a policy of scientific proof to create proper S&P measures. Some S&P 
measures are based on a precautionary approach, such as the zero tolerance 
policy on carcinogenic pesticide residues in processed foods or drugs. However,
66 In the Hormone Case a WTO Appellate Body dealt with a complaint from Canada and the 
United States against the European Community (EC) relating to an EC prohibition of imports of 
meat and meat products derived from cattle, which had been treated for growth promotion 
purposes with either natural hormones or synthetic hormones. This EC directive allows 
importation from third countries of meat and meat products from animals to which these 
hormones have been administrated but only for therapeutic and zoo technical purposes. The 
Appellate Body decided that the EC import ban was inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) because it was not based on a risk 
assessment and, the level of protection compared with substances similar to hormones were 
inconsistent. The Appellate Body decision was criticized because it created serious obstacles to 
the ability of governments to establish their own appropriate level of risk. Also the possibility of 
establishing high levels of protection and even precautionary measures was put at risk by placing 
limitations on the use of “minority” scientific opinions to justify protective measures. See Report 
of the EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Complaint by the United 
States) (1997), WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R/USA (Appellate Body Report) See also Quick, 
Reinhard and Andreas Bluthner, “ Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of 
the Ruling in The WTO HORMONES CASE”, (1999) 2:4 J. Int’l Economic L. and Wagner, J. 
Martin,” The WTO”S Interpretation of the SPS Agreement Has Undermined the Right of 
Governments to Establish Appropriate Levels of Protection Against Risk”, (2000) 31:3 Law & 
Policy in International Business for interesting discussions about the case. Also see Vermulst, P., 
Mavroidis, P. & Waer, P., “The Functioning of the Appellate Body After Four Years, Towards Rule 
Integrity”, (1999) 2:4 J. W. T. for another point o view of the WTO decision in this case and other 
cases.
67 Housman, Robert & Orbuch, P., “ Integrating Labour and Environmental Concerns into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and Look Ahead”, (1995) 8 American U. J. 
Intn'l. L. Pol'y. 749 at 740-741 (hereinafter Integrating Concerns) as well as Bailey supra note 26 
at 852.
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by recognizing that any S&P measures should have a basis in scientific proof, 
some zero tolerance measures may be challenged.68 Another concern is that 
some S&P measures can be phased in over periods of time, taking into account 
its partners exports interests. Before the measures come into play, people’s 
health and the environment may be at risk.69
1.2.6 Technical Barriers to Trade
Similar to the S&P measures, chapter 9 of NAFTA recognizes the liberty of each 
country to create, maintain and apply its own standards for the protection of 
human, animal and plant life or health and for the protection of the environment 
and any other measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation, including 
measures to prevent the importation of any good that fails to comply with such 
measures.70 In the creation of these measures each Party has the right to 
establish its own level of protection in accordance with the requirements of Article 
907 (2).71
Article 907 (2) contains similar requirements to those discussed for the S&P 
measures. In establishing a level of protection that it considers appropriate and 
conducting an assessment of risk, a Party should avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
68 Ibid. at 741 -743.
69 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 (5) “ Where a Party is able to achieve its appropriate level of 
protection through the phased application of a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, it may, on the 
request of another Party and in accordance with this Section, allow for such a phased application, 
or grant specified exceptions for limited periods from the measure, taking into account the 
requesting Party's export interests.”
70 Ibid. Article 904 (1).
71 Ibid. Article 904 (2).
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distinctions between similar goods or sen/ices72 where the distinctions: (a) result 
in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against goods or service providers of 
another Party; (b) constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties; 
or (c) discriminate between similar goods or services for the same use under the 
same conditions that pose the same level of risk and provide similar benefits.73
In developing the risk assessment, Article 907 (1) establishes that a Party may in 
pursuing its objectives take into account: (a) available scientific evidence or 
technical information; (b) intended end uses; (c) processes or production, 
operating, inspection, sampling or testing methods; or (d) environmental 
conditions.74
These provisions are also a point of concern for environmentalists75 due to the 
lack of clarification in determining how the “scientific evidence” will be measured 
and who will measure such evidence or what the definition of “environmental
conditions” will be.
Finally, the parties recognize the following as legitimate objectives for protection:
72 As recognized by the Article 904 (3) Non-Discriminatory Treatment “ Each Party shall, in 
respect of its standards-related measures, accord to goods and service providers of another 
Party: (a) national treatment in accordance with Article 301 (Market Access) or Article 1202 
(Cross-Border Trade in Services) and (b) treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like 
goods, or in like circumstances to service providers, of any other country. Unnecessary Obstacles
4. No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure with a view to 
or with the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between the Parties. An 
unnecessary obstacle to trade shall not be deemed to be created where: (a) the demonstrable 
purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective; and (b) the measure does not 
operate to exclude goods of another Party that meet that legitimate objective.”
73 Ibid. Article 907 (2).
74 Ibid. Article 907 (1).
75 Housman “Integrating Concern” supra note 67 at 743-745. See also Bailey supra note 26 at 
854-857.
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(a) safety;
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or 
consumers, including matters relating to quality and identifiability of goods 
or services; and
(c) sustainable development.
As a corollary to this section, it is worth mentioning that the parties to NAFTA 
establish the basic rules, not only to create S&P measures to protect human 
health and reach sustainable development, but also to establish the process by 
which such measures should be created. The main goal of such a process is to 
prevent the creation of false barriers to trade.
1.2.7 Dispute Settlement
Chapter 20 includes provisions relating to the avoidance or settlement of all 
disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement, except for 
matters covered in Chapter 11 (Investment), Chapter 14 (Financial Services) and 
Chapter 19 (Antidumping and Countervailing Duty final determinations). When 
general disputes concerning NAFTA are not resolved through consultation within 
a specified period of time, the matter may be referred at the request of either 
Party to a non-binding panel under Article 2008.76 According to Article 2005 
paragraphs 1,2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising under NAFTA and
76 Ibid. Article 2004.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
GATT, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement, may 
be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party.
The dispute resolution Panel should be comprised of five members, two selected 
by each Party and the Chair selected by the first four panellists. The panellists 
are selected from a roster, however a Party may suggest a panellist that is not a 
member of such roster.77 Every Party has the right to submit written submissions 
within 20 days after the panels are selected. The parties also have the right to 
attend a hearing before the Panel and submit supplementary written submissions 
within 10 days after the hearing.78
If the parties agreed to do so, a scientific review board may be selected to 
present a report on the information that seems appropriate. Ninety days after the 
panel selection has been completed, the panel should present to the parties an 
initial report of the panel’s decision for their comments and review. Within 30 
days of the panel presentation of the initial report, a final report should be issued.
Because of the ambiguity surrounding the precepts of the S&P and standard- 
related measures, the parties agreed to establish special rules for dealing with 
these measures. The protection of S&P and standard-related measures is an 
advance over GATT and previous agreements.79 If the parties disagree on the
77 Ibid. Article 2011.
78 Ibid. Article 2012.
79 See Esty supra note 13 at 54.
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definition of a standard, they must resolve their dispute according to the dispute 
resolution process established in Chapter 20.80
Another important feature of the provisions is that if any dispute arises regarding 
environmental, health or safety standards, the complaining Party bears the 
burden of proof. 81 In addition, any Party may request the panel to seek 
information and technical advice that it deems appropriate.82 However, the 
agreement is silent on the level of burden imposed by NAFTA to the challenging 
Party (prima facie or reasonable doubt).83
As noted by Bailey84 and Housman85, in Article 2015 the dispute settlement 
process recognizes the role that science may play in this type of dispute by 
establishing the following:
“Article 2015: Scientific Review Boards
1. On request of a disputing Party or, unless the disputing Parties 
disapprove, on its own initiative, the panel may request a written report of
SO Ibid. Article 2005 3. “In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding Party 
claims that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation 
Agreements) and requests in writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the 
complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement 
procedures solely under this Aoreement.Temphasis added]. See footnote 75 and accompanying 
text.
81 Ibid. Article 723.6.
82 Ibid. Article 2014.
83 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 409.
84 Bailey supra note 26 at 859-861.
85 Housman in “Integrating Concerns” supra note 67 at 746-748.
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a scientific review board on any factual issue concerning environmental, 
health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing Party in a 
proceeding, subject to such terms and conditions as such Parties may 
agree.
2. The board shall be selected bv the panel from among highly qualified, 
independent experts in the scientific matters, after consultations with the 
disputing Parties and the scientific bodies set out in the Model Rules of 
Procedure established pursuant to Article 2012(1).
3. The participating Parties shall be provided:
(a) advance notice of, and an opportunity to provide comments to the 
panel on, the proposed factual issues to be referred to the board; and
(b) a copy of the board's report and an opportunity to provide comments 
on the report to the panel.
4. The panel shall take the board's report and any comments by the 
Parties on the report into account in the preparation of its report”. 86
The only concern voiced by some authors about the dispute settlement process 
is the limited role of the review board. The review board can review factual 
questions but not give suggestions or contribute recommendations that may 
bring about an environmentally sound decision. Also, some feel that the panel 
members may not understand clearly the environmental concepts or issues in
86 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 2015 [emphasis added].
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dispute, since most of them will be experts on trade or international law but not 
on environmental law.87
1.3 Conclusions.
Despite many concerns, major advances have been made. NAFTA is the first 
major trade agreement that takes into consideration the relationship between 
trade and the environment, and recognizes the importance of this relationship.
Not only does NAFTA recognize the important relationship between trade and 
the environment, it is the first trade agreement to recognize that it is important to 
protect certain international environmental agreements from trade challenges. 
Before NAFTA, environmental agreements were often sacrificed in the name of 
free trade. However, in NAFTA the parties recognized that the commitments 
established in other environmental agreements must be protected from any 
dispute related to trade in order to reach the goals of these agreements.
NAFTA’s dispute settlement process recognizes that some measures that a 
Party may take are taken to fulfill its obligations with other agreements, especially 
environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. This has been 
achieved by creating special rules and exceptions to deal with these measures 
and protect them and thereby ensure their effectiveness. One of the special rules 
permits a panel to seek information and technical advice from experts, helping
87 Housman in Integrating Concerns supra note 67 at 748.
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the panellists who are generally experts on trade but not on the environment. 
These advances will permit the parties to deal better with S&P measures in the 
case of a dispute, prevent the elimination of valid environmental measures and 
detect artificial and technical measures which are an unnecessary barrier to 
trade.
Nevertheless, the Parties agreed that additional steps needed to be taken to 
protect the environment and therefore created an environmental side agreement 
to deal with the environmental concerns raised by NAFTA.
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CHAPTER 2 THE NAAEC AND THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION.
2.1 The NAAEC: The Historical Background.
The historical background of the NAAEC is understandable only in the context of 
NAFTA’s historical and political development in the three countries, especially 
the United States. American NGOs, labour unions and other groups criticized the 
Bush administration for not addressing more environmental issues in NAFTA. 
This was an important issue during President Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign; 
he stated that in order to support NAFTA it was necessary to resolve outstanding 
environmental and labour issues.
The Bush plan to resolve environmental issues with the creation of the Response 
of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a 
North American Free Trade Agreement8 was not enough for many 
environmentalist groups in the United States; one, the Public Citizen, even 
started a lawsuit against the United States Offices of Trade Representative 
(USTR), because the USTR did not make an environmental impact statement. 
Although the District Court and the Appeal Court dismissed the case89 the 
opposition to NAFTA within some groups was clear.
88 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89 Dimento J. & Dougham P.M., “Soft Teeth in the Back Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement Implemented", (1998) 10 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. at 663.
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Environmentalists criticized Bush for taking a minimalist approach on the 
environment and relegating the environmental issues in NAFTA to a “parallel 
track” that would not slow or even stop any trade negotiations.90 This difference 
in opinion between the Bush administration and the environmentalist groups 
involved in the NAFTA discussions left the environmentalists three options to let 
their voice be heard.
The first was to take a position of total opposition to the trade agreement as 
proposed by Bush, but this was not really viable, since the negotiations were very 
advanced. Second, was to use NAFTA as a vehicle to implement environmental 
principles. However, with the lack of real participation by environmentalists in the 
NAFTA negotiations, that was not possible. Finally, the third option was to try to 
establish a more important role in working with the government and thereby find 
the appropriate strategy to implement NAFTA and minimize the possible harm to 
the environment.91
This third option, to take a more active role in the implementation of the NAFTA 
legislation and to try to create an environmental side agreement that would help 
to make the whole NAFTA package” greener”, was accomplished by the creation 
of a Trilateral Commission for the Environment. This was the only possible
90 Audley, supra note 20 at 193.
91 Ibid.
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solution since by mid-1992 the NAFTA negotiations were almost finished92 and 
both Mexico and Canada were reluctant to re-open NAFTA for further 
discussions.93 The side agreement was a separate agreement and was 
considered the last opportunity to address all the environmental issues.
On September 17, 1992, the discussion started between the parties to develop a 
trilateral commission on the environment that would help in the implementation of 
the environmental side agreement94 and also help facilitate the approval of 
NAFTA before the U.S Congress. Pressure came from several environmentalists, 
NGOS, and unions, especially in the United States and Canada, and this 
pressure was evident during the presidential campaign. It was not until October 
1992 that Governor Clinton mentioned at North Carolina University that he 
supported NAFTA, but only if this agreement was accompanied by two side 
agreements on the environment and labour matters.95 This position gave Clinton 
the support from several NGO’s that helped him to eventually win the presidential 
campaign; however, the pressure from NGO’s, unions and other political players 
continued.
A reflection of this pressure was the decision of President-elect Bill Clinton, that 
he would not press for the adoption of NAFTA without concluding complementary
92 Dimento supra note 89 at 665.
93 Johnson & Beaulieu supra 9 at 30.
94 Winham, R. G., “Enforcement of Environmental Measures: Negotiating the NAFTA 
Environmental Side Agreement", (1994) 3 J.Envt. & Dev. 1 at 31.
95 Audley supra note 20 at 199.
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agreements to protect environmental and labour interests.96 Members of the U.S 
Congress who said NAFTA would not be approved unless environmental and 
labour side agreements were included supported him.97 However, Clinton made 
the decision to not reopen NAFTA and even made such promises to Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari on January 199398; however, he left open the 
option to create a strong North American Commission on the Environment and 
argued that this agreement would green NAFTA from the outside, not from the 
inside.
The critiques from several NGO’S were that despite attempts to address 
environmental issues in NAFTA, the green language in NAFTA was still 
inadequate.99 Therefore, public support in the three countries was low. Clinton 
was pressured in his political campaign to commit to creating an environmental 
protection commission with power to prevent and clean up pollution and allow 
citizens to challenge objectionable environmental practices by the parties.100 
Clinton’s position was clearly reflected in the United States’ draft of the side 
agreement.
A draft prepared by the National Economic Council (NEC) proposed to create a 
trilateral environmental commission to promote environmental cooperation rather
96 Ibid.. at 30.
97 Dimento supra note 89 at 667.
98 See Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 31
99 Ibid. at 122.
100 Winham supra note 94 at 31.
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than have any powers to enforce the law or establish sanctions.101 Later, in May 
1993 the parties met again to discuss a new project for the proposed North 
American Commission on the Environment (NACE)102 that established six 
elements necessary to implement President Clinton’s ideas to protect the 
environment. These elements are the following103:
1) Establish a tri-lateral commission composed of a ministerial council with a 
relatively independent director and a secretariat with fact-finding powers.
2) The members of the Commission and the Secretariat receive immunity 
and privileges necessary to independently perform their functions.
3) Citizens receive the power to submit complaints that a Party has failed to 
enforce its environmental legislation and in such cases the Secretariat 
would have the power to prepare reports on citizens’ submissions and to 
initiate dispute settlement proceedings.
4) In the case of dispute settlement proceedings, the Secretariat and any 
Party would need to prove that another Party had demonstrated a 
persistent and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement of its internal 
environmental legislation.
5) The scope of the dispute settlement process would include only the 
domestic environmental legislation.
101The NEC suggestion gave powers to the Commission only to receive citizen’s complaints or 
report on NAFTA objectives, see Winham ibid.
Patton, K.W., “Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation”, (1994) Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. at 96.
103 Winham supra note 94 at 32.
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6) If the parties or the council are unable to resolve a dispute, a Party would 
be able to suspend an appropriate level of benefits under NAFTA.
This proposed draft reflected the common practice of the United States to impose 
unilateral trade sanctions on its trade partners. Sanctions were rejected by 
Canada and Mexico, whose trade is basically with the United States. Such an 
agreement would leave them eventually open to suffer trade sanctions principally 
generated by the American environmental NGOs. Both countries suggested a 
different approach for the creation of the NACE. The suggestion to impose trade 
sanctions was described by Canadian and Mexican negotiators as well as by 
U.S. critics as overly aggressive and counterproductive, because it would create 
more tension between the parties.104
Both Canadians and Mexicans suggested a weaker and less independent 
commission which involved not giving immunities to the Secretariat members and 
did not include the possibility for the citizens to file before the Commission any 
petition or concern. Mexico proposed that only the Parties, not the Secretariat, 
should be able to bring an allegation that a Party had unjustifiably, persistently 
and systematically failed to enforce its domestic legislation “ in order to attract or 
retain investment.”105 The Mexican position was clear in opposing giving power to
104 Patton supra note 102 at 97.
105 Ibid. The Mexican proposal seemed to be aimed at any possible sanctions by American 
NGO’S. Its proposal made it very difficult to impose possible sanctions to any Party, since it was 
necessary to prove an unjustifiable, persistent and systematic failure to enforce its law and that it 
was done with the purpose to attract or retain investment, either, which would be impossible to 
prove.
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a supra national entity to interfere with a national government’s duty to enforce 
national laws. Mexico also opposed renegotiating any NAFTA provision.106
The Canadian proposal also included the idea that the agreement should be 
enforced by promoting within the Party’s jurisdiction access to administrative, 
quasi-administrative or judicial procedures. These procedures included some 
rights: to request that an investigation be initiated, to bring suit for damages, to 
pursue injunctions, to initiate private prosecutions, and to seek review of tribunal 
action.107 The Canadian draft also included a proposal on transboundary 
pollution and application of the side agreement to the sub-national level.108
Regarding the scope of the legislation covered by the agreement, the Canadian 
document suggested including an annex that detailed every law affected by the 
agreement. Canada suggested the creation of an enquiry committee nominated 
by the Parties to investigate when the Parties were unable to resolve their 
differences about the consistent pattern of violations. Mexico suggested that the 
Secretariat could make public recommendations to a Party and Canada did not 
support any sanction for the persistent lack of enforcement of the internal 
legislation. In conclusion, both Canadian and Mexican drafts were considerably 
weaker than that suggested by the United States.
106 Patton supra note 102 at 98,
107 Ibid. at 99.
108 Ibid. This proposal was included by Canada because most of its the environmental laws are 
handled at the provincial level.
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Many environmentalist groups and business groups criticized the U.S. draft for 
different reasons. The environmentalists argued that the procedure to impose 
trade sanctions was flawed and that the necessity to obtain the vote of two 
parties to impose sanctions could make the imposition of such sanctions very 
difficult in reality.109 However, the power to impose trade sanctions was also 
considered counterproductive, because penalizing a Party for not enforcing its 
environmental legislation could result in that country not creating stricter 
environmental laws or standards.110
The business coalition criticized the trade sanctions proposal. They suggested 
that trade sanctions could lead to harassment of private companies by 
governments. They also suggested reducing the powers of the Commission and 
not giving investigative powers to the Secretariat. They suggested that the role 
the Commission should play in the side agreement be more of a cooperative one 
rather than a role that might cause a confrontation between the parties. As a 
commentator mentioned, while many environmentalist groups supported the use 
of sanctions to enforce environmental law, much of the trade policy community 
and business community was opposed to the use of trade sanctions to enforce a 
parties’ internal legislation. In addition, they believed that the supra-national 
enforcement of the parties’ domestic laws is not an appropriate role for the
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. at 100.
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NACE.111 In May 1993 the Clinton Administration reversed its position on 
including enforcement measures in the agreement.112
By June, the Canadian government called for another round of negotiations and 
suggested that instead of trade sanctions, fines against the governments could 
be a better alternative. The alternative of fines received a good response from 
the business community.113 However, this proposal started a new discussion to 
decide how to enforce payment of the fines.114 In Canada it is possible since 
Canadian courts have the power to enforce international orders; in Mexico and 
the United States, that was not possible for constitutional and political reasons.115 
Nevertheless, Canada succeeded in establishing the imposition of fines only in 
the case of Canada, instead of possible trade sanctions by the Commission.
However, because of the pressure from the U.S. government and in order to 
avoid compromising the negotiations any further, Mexico accepted the trade 
sanctions proposal, but with the condition that before imposing any trade 
sanctions the parties should be involved first in a more cooperative process. 
Sanctions would only be used if there was no other solution to the dispute
111 Snape. W, “NACE: Some Functions and Form", in “Shaping Consensus: The North American 
Commission on the Environment and NAFTA” Workshop April 7 1993 (Sarah Richardson Ed. 
1993) at 37.
112 Dimento supra note 89.
113 Winham supra note 94 at 34.
114 Raustiala, Kal, “The Political Implications Of The Enforcement Provisions Of The NAFTA 
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC As A Model For Future Accords", (1995) 25 Envt. L. at 
38.
115 Ibid.
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between the parties. It was agreed that an arbitration panel is the only way to 
decide if trade sanctions should be imposed on a Party.
Further, the power of the Commission and the Secretariat was lessened 
considerably, since the commission can only make public a factual record and 
cannot initiate any dispute settlement or sanction process. However, the draft 
agreed upon allowed citizens and NGO’s to file complaints against any Party for 
lack of enforcement.
Finally, on August 13,1993 the trade ministers of the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico announced that they had completed the environmental side 
agreement.116 On September 13, 1993 the environment ministers of the three 
countries signed the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation117 in Washington.
2.2 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation118 is comprised 
of a Preamble and seven parts. Part one is related to the general objectives of 
the NAAEC. Part two contains the Obligations that the three parties agreed to 
fulfil in order to accomplish the NAAEC objectives. Part three deals with the
116 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 123.
117 Supra note 2.
118 Ibid.
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creation and organization of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation and 
its structure, which includes the Council, the Secretariat and the Joint Public 
Advisory Committee, as well as the procedures of each body of the Commission. 
In Part four the NAAEC establishes the obligation of the parties to cooperate for 
the interpretation and application of the agreement itself as well as to provide 
information that the Council or the Secretariat may require.
Part five establishes the Consultation and Resolution of Disputes process. In this 
part the parties agreed to follow the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute resolution 
process which establishes several steps, such as consultations, request for 
arbitration panel, selection of an arbitration panel, monetary sanctions and finally 
trade sanctions. Part six “General Provisions” deals with enforcement principles, 
protection of information, funding of the Commission and general definitions. 
Finally, part seven “Final Provisions”, establishes the final provisions of the 
NAAEC such as the date of entry into force, the process of accession and 
amendments. There are also five annexes regarding the enforcement of the 
dispute settlement process and specific rules for each country.
In order to give an idea of the general content of the NAAEC, I will analyze each 
part of the agreement, including the Commission of Environmental Cooperation 
and its structure and objectives, and give some comments and critiques on each 
section.
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2.2.1 Preamble.
In its preamble, the NAAEC establishes several of the intentions of all the parties 
to be accomplished with this agreement. The preamble recognizes that the 
agreement was created as a complement to the NAFTA or, as it is known, as a 
NAFTA side agreement. The agreement recognizes that the parties are 
convinced of the importance of the environment and its protection as a main goal 
in their territories, and the important role of cooperation between the Parties in 
achieving sustainable development.119
The agreement also recognizes the sovereignty and the environmental 
differences between its parties. The Parties recognize that, according to the 
general principles of international law120, every state has the sovereign right to 
exploit its own resources pursuant to its own environmental policies121 and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.122
119 Ibid. preamble paragraph 1.
“CONVINCED of the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of the 
environment in their territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in 
achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations.”
120 Ibid.
121 This principle is also mentioned in several treaties such as the Stockholm Declaration adopted 
by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5 June 1972, UN. Doc. A/Conf. 
48/14 Rev. 1, reprinted in (1992) 11 I.L.M. 1416 hereinafter Stockholm Declaration.
122 NAAEC supra note 87, Preamble paragraph 2.
“REAFFIRMING the sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and development policies and their responsibility to ensure that
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This intention is also connected to two other intentions as established in the 
Preamble. Paragraph seven establishes the following:
“NOTING the existence of differences in their respective natural 
endowments, climatic and geographical conditions, and economic, 
technological and infrastructural capabilities.”123
By recognizing the differences between the Parties, the Parties took an important 
step toward creating a better context for cooperation.
This precept recognizes that each Party is different, not only with respect to its 
environment but also in its capacity to address environmental problems that may 
arise. The economic differences that exist between the Parties may affect how 
each country solves any given environmental problem.
Paragraph 8 of the NAAEC preamble establishes its recognition of the Stockholm 
Declaration and Rio Declaration as important environmental declarations.124 By 
recognizing the importance of both the environment and trade some 
commentators125 mention that the NAAEC expresses a commitment to inherently
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. paragraph 8 “REAFFIRMING the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 
1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992.”
125 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 141.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
conflicting principles which reflects the intrinsic difficulty of integrating 
environmental concerns into the law of international trade and the environment. 
The essence of the conflict may be that to promote industry and trade will 
inevitably hurt the environment.
The NAAEC’s preamble takes into consideration the importance of public 
participation in conserving, protecting and enhancing the environment. 
Additionally, the NAAEC recalls the tradition of environmental cooperation 
between the parties126 in creating a Commission to facilitate the conservation, 
protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories.127 These 
steps are especially important. The Commission may both help the parties to 
reach their goals and allow the public to participate in the process.
There are a couple of important points to make with respect to the preamble. 
First, by recognizing in the preamble the importance of public participation to 
conserve and protect the environment, the parties addressed some of the main 
concerns many NGO’s and politicians had during the discussion of the creation 
of the NAAEC, especially in the United States and Canada.
126 Ibid. paragraph 9 “ RECALLING their tradition of environmental cooperation and expressing 
their desire to support and build on international environmental agreements and existing policies 
and laws, in order to promote cooperation between them. “
127 Ibid. paragraph 10 “CONVINCED of the benefits to be derived from a framework, including a 
Commission, to facilitate effective cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement 
of the environment in their territories.”
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Second, it is important to mention that some of the intentions established in the 
preamble are no more than good intentions since instruments such as the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations are not treaties but international declarations. 
Therefore, there is not any legal obligation to accomplish such intentions and 
declarations.
2.2.2 Part One: Objectives
In Part One, the Parties established ten objectives that they are seeking to 
accomplish with the NAAEC. These objectives are as follow:
a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories 
of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations;
b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually 
supportive environmental and economic policies;
c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and 
enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna;
d) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
e) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
f) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of 
environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and 
regulations;
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h) promote transparency and public participation in the development of 
environmental laws, regulations and policies;
i) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and 
j) promote pollution prevention policies and practices.128
Of the ten objectives mentioned above, we can divide them into four major areas: 
1) Environment, Economy and Trade; 2) Conservation of Biodiversity; 3) 
Pollutants and Health and; 4) Law and Policy. In my opinion, the most notable 
are those related to the environment and the protection of each Party’s 
environment and the participation of the three parties in achieving sustainable 
development. Also significant are those related to the trade relationships 
between the countries, namely to support the environmental goals and objectives 
of the NAFTA, and avoid the creation of trade distortions or new trade barriers.
The objective of avoiding trade distortions or new trade barriers is important to 
note. As a side agreement of NAFTA, this agreement recognizes that the 
protection of the environment should not be used to create trade barriers, and 
this is in accordance with NAFTA chapters 7 and 9.129 This means that the scope 
of NAAEC’s environmental protection goals are restricted by trade, economy, 
efficiency concerns and the sovereignty of its parties. In other words, the goals of 
free trade are more important than the environmental goals in the NAFTA and 
NAAEC legal regime.
128 NAAEC supra note 2, Article 1.
129 Supra notes 64 and 70 and accompanying text.
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All of the mentioned objectives are in one way or another addressed in the 
NAAEC body itself; however, it is relevant to mention that this agreement is one 
of the first to recognize the importance of public participation in the development 
of environmental laws, regulations and policies. This is, in the author’s opinion, 
the main advance of this agreement. However, this public participation is not as 
effective as it could be, as I will discuss later.
2.2.3. Part Two: Obligations
In Part Two, the agreement establishes the general obligations that all parties 
have in the agreement. They are divided as follows: a) general commitments that 
each Party agreed to with respect to its territory; b) to establish their own high 
levels of protection; c) to promote the publication of their own environmental 
legislation; d) to effectively enforce their own environmental laws; e) to permit 
interested persons private access to remedies and; f) to respect certain 
procedural guaranties.
A) General Commitments
In Article 2, the parties established their general commitments and the activities 
each Party agreed to perform with respect to its territory. The general
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commitments are focused in several subjects such as publicity, environmental 
education, environmental research and environmental policy.130
In the case of publicity, each Party shall prepare and make publicly available 
reports of the state of the environment. This commitment is, in the opinion of the 
author, an advance since in this way the general public can know the 
environmental situation of its city or country and this may indirectly promote 
public participation. Related to publicity, is the commitment from the parties to 
promote education on environmental matters. This objective is clearly aimed at 
preventing pollution by creating an environmental awareness among the 
population.
In the case of environmental policy, each Party shall review its environmental 
emergency preparedness measures, assess environmental impact procedures 
and promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of 
environmental goals. This policy is directly related to environmental emergency 
preparedness measures that the parties may review in order to prevent, not only 
damages to its own environment, but also to the other parties’ environment.
130 NAAEC supra note 117 and Article 2. However it is important to mention that according to 
Article 40,
“ Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and 
obligations of the Parties under other international environmental agreements, including 
conservation agreements, to which such Parties are Party.”
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Related to environmental policy, Article 2 (2), also establishes that the Parties 
agreed that each Party shall consider implementing in its law recommendations 
developed by the CEC’s Council as established in Article 10(5) B.131 The 
recommendations concern public access to information and the establishment of 
appropriate limits for specific pollutants. However, since every Party has the 
liberty to establish its own level of protection, this recommendation to establish 
limits for specific pollutants132 seems very unlikely to be achieved.
Besides the right to establish its own limits, the parties also agreed that each 
Party has the right to prohibit the export to the territories of the other Parties a 
pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party's territory, 
as established in Article 2 (3). However, in order to adopt such measures, every 
Party shall notify the other parties of the adoption of these measures, either 
directly or through an appropriate international organization. Also, parties should 
permit the adoption and adaptation of other measures established in other 
international environmental agreements.
As previously described, a key objective of the NAAEC is allowing public 
participation into environmental policy and law enforcement. This commitment, 
used in combination with the commitment of the parties to present a report on the 
general state of the environment, may create an environmental awareness in the 
public that will promote environmentally friendly industry. However, it is important
131 NAAEC supra note 2 Article 2 section 1.
132 Ibid. Article 10 5(B)
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to take into consideration that these reports are based on “official numbers”. Will 
they be accurate? The information in the reports could be very different from 
those in reality, since much information regarding illegal activities is not available 
to the authorities.133
B) Levels of Protection
Article 3 of the NAAEC recognizes the right of every Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic protections and environmental development policies and 
priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental law and 
regulations. In this way, the agreement recognizes the differences of each Party 
as set out in the Preamble. Also, Article 3 establishes that every Party shall 
ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental 
protection and shall strive to continue to improve such laws and regulations.134 
This addresses one of the main concerns that the American environmentalist 
community had with respect to NAFTA135: the possibility of a downward pressure 
on environmental laws and standards, and the creation of pollution havens.
The Mexican government estimates that in Mexico over 80,000 metric tons of municipal waste 
are generated every day, up by a factor of eight over just 15 years ago. Yet it is also estimated 
that only 70 percent of this waste is collected, and of this, only a small fraction is properly or 
adequately transported or deposited in a modern, sanitary landfill Online: SEMARNAT 
http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/sma/index.htm (dated accessed: December 8 2000).
134 NAAEC supra note 117Article 3.
135 Kelly, Michael J., “Bringing A Complaint Under The NAFTA Environmental Side Accord: 
Difficult Steps Under A Procedural Paper Tiger, But Movement In The Right Direction”, (1996) 24 
Pepperdine L. R. at 76.
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Nevertheless, as mentioned by some authors, the concept of “high levels” is very 
vague and undefined136 and for that reason it is possible that the goal is more to 
prevent a downward movement than to ensure enhancement of standards.137 It 
remains to be seen if the NAAEC will help to reach this goal.
C) Publication
In Article 4, the NAAEC establishes that each Party shall ensure that its laws, 
regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general application 
respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or 
otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and 
Parties to become acquainted with them .138 All parties must publish in advance 
any such measure that it proposes to adopt and provide to interested persons 
and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.
This commitment is directly related to promoting public participation on 
environmental decisions, and reflects the commitment of the U.S. government 
that any law or regulations should be publicized, not only to the other Parties but
136 Chamovitz, Steve, “The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for 
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty Making”, (1994) 8 Temple Intl. & 
Comp. L.J. at 261
137 Ibid.
138 NAAEC Article 4 (1) and (2) are identical to those established in NAFTA Article 1802 (1) and 
(2).
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also to the country’s citizens, non-governmental organizations139 or investors, 
and that there should be opportunity to submit comments.140
D) Government Enforcement Actions
In Article 5 141, the NAAEC establishes the obligation of each government to 
enforce its own legislation with the main goal of achieving high levels of 
environmental protection142. The term “appropriate governmental actions” is not 
defined. However those actions are listed in a non-exhaustive list in Article 5. The 
list of appropriate governmental actions can be divided first into those intended to 
have a better control of information about the pollutants: in -site  inspection, 
record keeping and using licenses, permits or authorizations and initiating, in a 
timely manner, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek 
appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and
139 NAAEC Article 45 section (1) establish the following definitions:
“1. For purposes of this Agreement:
"non-governmental organization" means any scientific, professional, business, non­
profit, or public interest organization or association which is neither affiliated with, nor 
under the direction of, a government.”
140 This changes the way environmental legislation has been created in North America, and 
especially in Mexico, where during 1996, the Mexican Government invited NGO’S, citizens, 
scholars, unions, investors and the industry to discuss and make recommendations and 
suggestions to reform the General Law (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al 
Ambiente). Many of those recommendations were included in the new law and many of the 
government suggestions that were criticized by the public were not included.
™ NAAEC Article 5.
142 Nevertheless there are concerns about the real power of this obligation under the NAAEC 
because this Article only forces the Parties to enforce their existing environmental laws and not to 
establish higher standards. As mentioned by Charnovitz a country that mindlessly enforces its 
inadequate environmental law would maintain conformity with this obligation, and moreover a 
Party that lowered its law to avoid NAAEC scrutiny would also remain in conformity. Charnovitz 
supra note 136.
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regulations, and issuing administrative orders of a preventive, curative and 
emergency nature.
Second, are those governmental actions seeking the voluntary participation of 
industry: promoting environmental audits, seeking assurances of voluntary 
compliance and compliance agreements, publicly releasing non-compliance 
information and issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement 
procedures.
Third, are instrumental actions looking for better-trained inspectors or arbitrators. 
Finally, are all governmental actions related to disseminating environmental 
information such as publicly releasing non-compliance information, and issuing 
bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement procedures.
In Article 5 section 2, the NAAEC establishes that all parties shall ensure that 
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are available 
under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws and 
regulations143. In addition, this Article in section 3 establishes that sanctions and 
remedies which provide for a violation of any Party's environmental laws144 and 
regulations shall, as appropriate, take into consideration the nature and gravity of 
the violation, any economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator, the
143 This obligation could be difficult to apply to Mexico, since the remedies under Mexican 
legislation could be administrative or judicial but not quasi-judicial.
In this case, “environmental law” should only be considered as the law established in Article 
45.2 in the General Provisions, a definition that is considered too narrow.
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economic condition f the violator, and other relevant factors. It also provides for 
compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, injunctions and the closure of 
facilities, and for the cost of containing or cleaning up pollution.145
The commitment by the parties to ensure enforcement of their own 
environmental law has been mentioned as the birth of a new international 
environmental law principle, that is, that each nation has the international 
obligation to each other to enforce its own internal law. However, this “new” 
obligation is an old principle. International treaties have always established the 
obligation to enforce the laws necessary to implement the treaty’s 
commitments.146
The way every Party addresses its commitments may vary. For example, it is 
difficult if not impossible to provide or encourage mediation and arbitration 
services within the environmental law in Mexico due to the nature of the 
environmental regulations. The Mexican government is responsible to apply the 
law of Mexico and is the only body allowed to determine any sanction or impose 
any remedy. The participation of arbitrators and mediators seems difficult, since 
the capacity to give a legal interpretation is reserved only to the environmental 
authorities and the judicial bodies. Moreover, since only environmental
145 NAAEC Article 5. Recognizes and gives effect to the parties internal legislation which sets at 
the several elements that should be taken into account to remedy any violation. For example, the 
Mexican Constitution established in its Articles 14,16,21 and 22 almost the same type of 
considerations that any authority should take before applying any administrative sanction, and the 
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection also recognizes these 
elements.
146 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 261.
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authorities can determine fines, remedial actions and in some cases, criminal 
actions, this will not permit arbitration, because all the mentioned actions can 
only be legally established by government and not by private means.
Nevertheless, there are concerns about the real force of this obligation under the 
NAAEC, since this Article only binds the Parties to enforce its existing 
environmental laws and not to establish higher standards. As mentioned by 
Charnovitz, a country that mindlessly enforces its inadequate environmental law 
would maintain conformity with this obligation, and moreover, a Party that 
lowered its law to avoid NAAEC scrutiny would also remain in conformity.147
E) Procedural Guarantees
The parties agree to ensure that all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative 
proceedings should be fair, open and equitable, and to this end shall provide that 
such proceedings comply with the due process of law.148 These proceedings 
must also be open to the public, entitle the parties to the proceedings to support 
or defend their respective positions, and to present information or evidence. 
There is also a commitment to make such proceedings the least complicated and 
to minimize delay149 and to have the right, in accordance with its law, to seek 
review and where appropriate, correction of final decisions. Also, all parties shall
147 Ibid. at 279.
148 NAAEC Article 7.
149 This obligation is more a goal than a reality. From my experience, I can confirm that many 
administrative and judicial proceedings in Mexico are taking more time than mandated by law, 
and therefore many of its resolutions are made too late to be useful.
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ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such proceedings are impartial and 
independent and do not have any interest in the matter in dispute.
Many of the procedural guarantees established in Article 7 are generally 
considered to be part of the due process of law. However, this concept of due 
process is vague and may be different in Mexico and in the United States or 
Canada150 in part because of the differences between Civil and Common Law 
systems.
F) Private Access to Remedies
NAAEC Article 6151 establishes the obligation that each Party shall ensure that 
interested persons may request the Party’s competent authorities to investigate 
alleged violations to its environmental law.152 This proposal is an advance toward 
the enforcement of the environmental legislation in all countries.153 However, it is
150 J.F. Smith, “ Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican legal Systems in the 
Area of NAFTA”, (1993) 1 US-Mex. L.J.
151 NAAEC Article 6.
“It is important to mention that according to Article 38, a private Party does not have a 
right of action against another Party: “ No Party may provide for a right of action under its 
law against any other Party on the ground that another Party has acted in a manner 
inconsistent with this Agreement."
152 NAAEC Article 7 establishes the general Procedural Guarantees to do so. See supra note 
165 and accompanying text.
153 In the case of Mexico, even before the NAAEC, in 1988 the General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection established the “denuncia popular" (public 
denouncement) that allows any citizen to denounce before the General Attorney for the 
Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) any possible violation of the federal environmental 
legislation. In many states the local environmental law also established a similar procedure. This 
procedure creates the obligation for the authority to investigate the possible violation upon 
litigious denouncement.
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limited to the persons who are legally interested under its law. It is not clear if 
citizens of the other two Parties may request an investigation even if not directly 
affected by the alleged environmental problem. It seem such remedies are 
restricted to those living nearby the contaminated area or only to nationals of the 
country that is accused of a lack of enforcement.154
Section 2 of Article 6 also establishes that each Party shall ensure that persons 
with a legal interest under its law have appropriate access to information 
regarding the enforcement of the Party’s environmental laws and regulations. 
This right is given only to those that are legally interested in a particular matter, 
and does not include every citizen, or social group or citizens from another Party, 
unless they have a direct legal interest in the issue, which is recognized by law or 
a court.155
These remedies include rights such as the right: (a) to sue another person under 
that Party's jurisdiction for damages;(b) to seek sanctions or remedies such as 
monetary penalties, emergency closures or orders to mitigate the consequences 
of violations of its environmental laws and regulations;(c) to request the 
competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce that Party’s 
environmental laws and regulations in order to protect the environment or to 
avoid environmental harm; or (d) to seek injunctions where a person suffers, or
154 For example, in the case of Mexican legislation, Article 189 of the General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection allows any person, social groups, non-governmental 
organization or association to denounce any possible violation of the environmental legislation.
1 In the case of Mexico, standing is given by law or recognized by a judge.
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may suffer, loss, damage or injury as a result of conduct by another person under 
that Party's jurisdiction, contrary to that Party's environmental laws and 
regulations or from tortious conduct.156
It is necessary to mention that in order to comply with such obligations, all parties 
are compelled, if they are not already fulfilling such obligations, to change not 
only their environmental law, but also other legislation. For example, in the case 
of Mexico, the environmental legislation indicates that whoever created the waste 
is responsible for handling and disposal of hazardous waste. The legal basis to 
sue the wrongdoers for any damage is contained in the Civil Code and in the 
Civil Procedure Code, which allows for the granting of injunctions157, both of 
which were amended to comply with the NAAEC.
2.2.4 Part Three: The Commission on Environmental Cooperation
In NAAEC’s Article 8 the parties created an international commission158, the 
Commission of Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC is a Commission
156 NAAEC Article 6 section 3.
157 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al Ambiente (General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection) Article 151 and 203. See also Codigo Civil para el 
Distrito Federal en Materia Comun y para todo el Pais en Materia Federal (Federal District Civil 
Code in Local Jurisdiction and in all the Country for Federal Jurisdiction) Chapter 10.
158 Professor Charnovitz mentions that the status of the CEC is not completely clear, since there 
is no provision stating that the Council or the Secretariat has legal personality, despite the fact 
that the CEC internal organization resembles an international organization. Charnovitz supra note 
136 at 265.
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similar to the Free Trade Commission, and is comprised of the Council, the 
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).159
2.2.4.1 The Council
A) Structure and Procedures
The Council shall comprise cabinet level representatives or their designees160 
and shall establish its own rules and procedures and meet at least once a year in 
regular session or in special session at the request of any Party and is chaired 
successively by each Party.161
The Council has the power to establish and assign responsibilities to ad hoc or 
standing committees, working groups or expert groups; to seek the advice of 
non-governmental organizations or persons, including independent experts; and 
to take such other action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree. 
All Council decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be taken by
159 NAAEC Article 8:
“The Commission
1. The Parties hereby establish the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.
2. The Commission shall comprise a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public 
Advisory Committee.”
160 NAAEC Article 9(1).
161 Ibid. Article 9 (2). And section 4 establishes also that the Council shall hold public meetings in 
the course of all regular sessions. Other meetings held in the course of regular or special 
sessions shall be public where the Council so decides.
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consensus, unless the agreement provides otherwise162, and such decisions or 
recommendations shall be made public, except as the Council may otherwise 
decide or as otherwise provided in this Agreement.163
B) Council Functions
The Council has several functions as the governing body of the CEC. It serves164 
as a forum for the discussion of environmental matters within the scope of the 
NAAEC, oversees the implementation and develops recommendations on the 
further elaboration of this Agreement, and eventually reviews its operation and 
effectiveness in the light of experience. As well, the Council oversees the 
Secretariat, addresses questions and differences that may arise between the 
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement, and 
approves the annual program and budget of the Commission.165 According to 
many people, the most important and successful function accomplished by the 
Council is to promote and facilitate cooperation between the Parties with respect 
to environmental matters.166
162 NAAEC Article 9 section 6.
163 One of the important decisions that the Council may decide is to make public a Factual 
Record, as established in Article 15.
16“ NAAEC Article 10(1).
165 The approval by the Council of the budget may be seen as another form of political and 
economic control of the Secretariat’s activities and thus it retains ultimate control of CEC 
activities. See Johnson and Beaulieu supra 9 at 135.
166 Dimento supra note 89 at 692-694.
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The Council embodies the delicate balance the NAAEC must achieve trying to 
reconcile the tensions between sovereignty and supranationality. Among its 
functions, the Council may consider and eventually develop recommendations 
regarding several topics,167 such as: comparability of techniques and 
methodologies for data gathering and analysis; data management and electronic 
data communications on matters covered by the NAAEC; pollution prevention 
techniques and strategies; and the use of economic instruments for the pursuit of 
domestic and internationally agreed environmental objectives. A very important 
function is the promotion of public awareness regarding the environment, 
transboundary and border environmental issues, such as the long-range 
transport of air and marine pollutants, among others.
The Council, according to Article 10 (3), has a very important function in 
strengthening cooperation on the development and continuing improvement of 
environmental laws and regulations, including the promotion of the exchange of 
information on criteria and methodologies used in establishing domestic 
environmental standards. Without reducing levels of environmental protection, 
the Council shall establish a process for developing recommendations on greater 
compatibility of environmental technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures in a manner consistent with the NAFTA. The former 
function addressed concerns that some environmentalists had over the possibility 
of reducing levels of protection to achieve for compatibility. As a result, the
167 NAAEC Article 10 (2).
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Council shall look for compatibility of environmental technical regulations and 
standards without lowering standards.
The Council shall encourage effective enforcement by each Party of its 
environmental laws and regulations. This may be accomplished as result of the 
named citizen submission process, the dispute settlement process168 or by other 
means, as far as these means do not interfere with the sovereignty of the Parties. 
Preserving sovereignty was an important subject during the drafting of the 
NAAEC.169 The Council shall also encourage compliance with those laws and 
regulations and technical cooperation between the Parties.170 The Parties are not 
under any obligation to accomplish any of these recommendations, since this is 
only a topic for Council consideration.
The Council also shall promote and develop recommendations regarding public 
access to information concerning the environment held by public authorities of 
each Party. This activity is contradictory, since the same Council may vote to 
prohibit the CEC’s Secretariat from publishing a factual record as established by 
Article 15. Another function that the Council has is promoting the establishment 
of limits for specific pollutants, taking into account differences in ecosystems. It is 
important to notice that the Parties recognize their environmental differences, 
since, in order to promote the establishment of limits to specific pollutants, it is
168 Both processes are an important part of internal legislation enforcement, one with the 
participation of NGOs and the other by the Parties.
69 See Section 2.1.
170 NAAEC Article 10 (4).
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necessary for example, to observe the differences between the rain forest in 
Chiapas or the rain forest in British Columbia.171
In the more trade-related matters, the Council shall cooperate with the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission to achieve the environmental goals and objectives of 
NAFTA, acting as a point of inquiry and receipt for comments from NGO’s and 
persons concerning those goals and objectives, providing assistance in 
consultations under Article 1114 of the NAFTA, and thereby contributing to the 
prevention or resolution of environment-related trade disputes.172
As well, the Council shall assist the Free Trade Commission to achieve the 
environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA by: (a) acting as a point of inquiry 
and receipt for comments from non-governmental organizations and persons 
concerning those goals and objectives; (b) providing assistance in consultations 
under Article 1114 of the NAFTA when a Party considers that another Party is 
waiving or derogating from, or offering to waive or otherwise derogate from, an 
environmental measure as an encouragement to establish, acquire, expand or 
retain an investment of an investor, with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement, considering on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of
171 Johnson and Beaulieu suggest that this function may be used in the future to allow the CEC to 
represent the three Parties in an international conference regarding pollution control and to 
present a NAFTA-NAAEC system or standard for certain pollutants, which the Parties chose as a 
role model, supra 9 at 145.
172 This can be reached by (i) seeking to avoid disputes between the Parties, (ii) making 
recommendations to the Free Trade Commission with respect to the avoidance of such disputes, 
and (iii) identifying experts able to provide information or technical advice to NAFTA committees, 
working groups and other NAFTA bodies.
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the NAFTA and; (c) otherwise assisting the Free Trade Commission in 
environment-related matters.
In contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related trade 
disputes, the Council shall seek to avoid disputes between the Parties, make 
recommendations to the Free Trade Commission with respect to the avoidance 
of such disputes, and identify experts able to provide information or technical 
advice to NAFTA committees, working groups and other NAFTA bodies.
The Council also has the power to develop recommendations in the following 
areas: (a) transboundary environmental impacts on certain proposed projects 
that are “likely to cause significant adverse transboundary effects”;(b) notification, 
sharing of relevant information and consultation between the Parties with respect 
to such projects; and; (c) on measures to mitigate the adverse environmental 
potential effects.173 As a result, in June 1997, the parties resolved to complete a 
“legally-binding” agreement consistent with their Article 10 (7) obligations.174
173 Also Article 10 sections 8 and 9 establish other power, which allows the Council to develop 
recommendations on transboundary pollution. As follows:
“8. The Council shall encourage the establishment by each Party of appropriate 
administrative procedures pursuant to its environmental laws to permit another Party to 
seek the reduction, elimination or mitigation of transboundary pollution on a reciprocal 
basis.
9. The Council shall consider and, as appropriate, develop recommendations on the 
provision by a Party, on a reciprocal basis, of access to and rights and remedies before 
its courts and administrative agencies for persons in another Party's territory who have 
suffered or are likely to suffer damage or injury caused by pollution originating in its 
territory as if the damage or injury were suffered in its territory."
174 Commission of Environmental Cooperation, Council Resolution No. 97-03, Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment (June 12,1997). The first draft was published on fall of 2000.
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2.2.4.2 The Secretariat
The CEC Secretariat is the “executive arm” of the CEC, whose activities are 
under the control of the Council. An Executive Director, who is chosen by the 
Council for a three-year term, which may be renewed by the Council for one 
additional three- year term, heads the Secretariat. This position is supposed to 
rotate between the nationals of each Party, and the Council retains the power to 
remove the Executive Director.175 The Executive Director has the power to 
appoint and supervise the staff of the Secretariat, regulate their powers and 
duties and fix their remuneration in accordance with general standards176 
established by the Council. The Council also has the power to reject potential 
appointments by a two-thirds vote. Despite the fact the NAAEC establishes that 
the Executive Director and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from 
any government or any other authority external to the Council, its is clear that 
with the veto power that the Council has over the proposals, the Council remains
175 NAAEC Article 11 (1).
176 NAAEC Article 11 (2) establishes that “the standards shall provide that:
(a) staff shall be appointed and retained, and their conditions of employment shall be
determined, strictly on the basis of efficiency, competence and integrity;
(b) in appointing staff, the Executive Director shall take into account lists of
candidates prepared by the Parties and by the Joint Public Advisory Committee;
(c) due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting an equitable proportion of
the professional staff from among the nationals of each Party; and
(d) the Executive Director shall inform the Council of all appointments.”
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a powerful influence over the Secretariat’s personnel, and indirectly exercises 
control over the Secretariat.
A) Functions
The Secretariat has four major functions assigned to it under the Agreement: 1) 
preparation of the annual report for the Commission; 2) preparation of reports on 
other matters; 3) certain duties relating to submissions on enforcements matters; 
and 4) providing technical, administrative and operational support to the Council 
or any committees or groups established by the Council and such other support 
as the Council may direct.177
To perform all these activities the Secretariat shall submit for approval of the 
Council the annual program and budget of the CEC, including provision for 
proposed cooperative activities and for the Secretariat to respond to
•  17 flcontingencies.
B) Annual Report of the Commission
An important function of the Secretariat is to prepare an annual report of the CEC 
in accordance with instructions from the Council. The Council revises a draft 
report from the Secretariat. This is another mechanism of the Council’s control
177 Article 11 (7) Also establishes that: The Secretariat shall, as appropriate, provide the Parties 
and the public information on where they may receive technical advice and expertise with respect 
to environmental matters.
178 NAAEC Article 11 (6).
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over the Secretariat. This report covers not only the activities and expenses of 
the Commission during the previous year but also the approved program and 
budget. Moreover, it also covers actions taken by each Party in connection with 
its obligations, relevant information submitted by NGO’s and persons179 as well 
as any other recommendations made on any matter within the scope of this 
Agreement, and any other matter that the Council instructs the Secretariat to 
include.180
This report shall periodically address the state of the environment in the 
territories of the Parties; however, there is not any clarification of the content of 
the report or how often the Secretariat shall make such a report.
C) Secretariat Reports
One type of report that the Secretariat may prepare on its own initiative is a 
report regarding any matter within the scope of the annual program as 
established in Article 13. Since there are no restrictions on the matters that this 
report may include, as long as it is within the scope of the annual program, this 
could constitute an important power of investigation, and theoretically, in the 
event of a rejection of an Article 14 submission, the Submitter still has this
,79 The annual report may include citizen submissions or other relevant information that the public 
in general had submitted to the CEC for consideration.
180 NAAEC Article 12(7).
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recourse under Article 13.181 Due to the lack of explicit language and guidelines, 
it remains unclear when a submission may merit the preparation of a report or 
what should be the scope of the report if required. Nevertheless, all this will 
depend on the willingness and independence of the Secretariat’s Executive 
Director.
Another type of report that the Secretariat may prepare regards any other matter 
related to the cooperative functions of the NAAEC. The Secretariat should report 
to the Council of its intention to prepare such a report and it may proceed, 
unless, within 30 days of such notification the Council objects by a two-thirds 
vote to the preparation of the report.182 This Council veto control constitutes 
another break in the Secretariat’s power. An indirect control over this report is 
that the report shall not include issues related to any Party’s failure in enforcing 
its environmental law and regulations, since such matters are addressed by way 
of a different process.183
The NAAEC opens the door for the participation of NGO’s, academic persons or 
experts in the preparation of this report, since the Secretariat shall obtain the 
assistance of one or more independent experts of recognized experience in the 
matter to assist in the preparation of the report as well as gathering any relevant 
technical, scientific or other information, including information that is:
181 Gal-Or, N., “Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental Protection: The Grace Period 
of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?”, (1996) 9 Geo. Intn’l. Envt. L.R. 53 at 74.
182 Ibid. Article 13(1).
183 The so-called “Citizen Submission Process" of Article 14 and 15 is analyzed in the next 
chapter.
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(a) publicly available;
(b) submitted by interested non-governmental organizations and 
persons;
(c) submitted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee;
(d) furnished by a Party;
(e) gathered through public consultations, such as conferences, 
seminars and symposia; or
(f) developed by the Secretariat, or by independent experts engaged 
pursuant to paragraph 1.
After finishing the report, the Secretariat shall submit its report to the Council, 
which shall make it publicly available, normally within 60 days following its 
submission, unless the Council otherwise decides.
As an example, under this Article, the Secretariat published a report about the 
deaths of tens of thousands of migratory birds at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico’s 
Turbio River Basin, following a submission filed on June 6 1995 by an NGO
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requesting an investigation into the cause of such deaths.184 These reports may 
have some influence in the policies or decision-making within the countries, or at 
least bring attention to the specific environmental problems or priorities.185 
However, there is no obligation of any kind for the parties regarding these 
reports.
2.2.4.3 The Joint Public Advisory Committee
The NAAEC created an interesting body, the Joint Public Advisory Committee 
(JPAC) that opens the door for the participation of NGO’s or the public in general. 
This advisory group186 is composed of fifteen members, with equal number of 
members for each Party and whose members the parties appoint. However, 
there is not any clarification about how the members are selected or appointed.
184 See Gal-Or supra note 181 at 74.
185 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 152.
186 The NAAEC in its Articles 17 and 18 also establishes the creation of two other committees,
the national advisory committee and the governmental committees:
“ Article 17: National Advisory Committees
Each Party may convene a national advisory committee, comprising members of its 
public, including representatives of non-governmental organizations and persons, to 
advise it on the implementation and further elaboration of this Agreement.
Article 18: Governmental Committees
Each Party may convene a governmental committee, which may comprise or include 
representatives of federal and state or provincial governments, to advise it on the 
implementation and further elaboration of this Agreement.”
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The Council shall establish the rules of procedure for the Joint Public Advisory 
Committee; however, it will choose its own chair. The Joint Public Advisory 
Committee shall meet at least once a year at the same time as the regular 
session of the Council and at such other times as the Council, or the 
Committee’s chair with the consent of a majority of its members, may decide.187 
Since the JPAC meets at the same time that the Council meets, it gives them the 
opportunity to at least make the Council hear their opinion on topics that may be 
important.188
The main role of the JPAC is to provide advice to the Council on any matter 
within the scope of this Agreement, including the annual program and budget of 
the Commission, the draft annual report, and any report the Secretariat prepares 
pursuant to Article 13. As well as reporting on the implementation and further 
elaboration of this Agreement, it may perform such other functions as the Council 
may direct.189 The JPAC also may provide relevant technical, scientific or other 
information to the Secretariat, including for the purposes of developing a factual 
record under Article 15.190 However, only if the Council allows will a factual 
record be available to JPAC.
2.2.4.4 Conclusions
187 NAAEC Article 16 (2) and (3).
188 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 139-140.
189 NAAEC Article 16 (4) and (6).
190 ibid. (5)
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In order to provide a general opinion about the CEC as an international 
organization, it is necessary to mention some concerns about the CEC bodies 
and its functions.
The Council, the body that rules and controls the CEC, has been highly criticized 
by many authors and environmentalists. One of the main criticisms is that the 
Council191, which rules and controls all the CEC's decisions, is composed of 
political appointees rather than being an independent judicial body. However, 
some commentators mention that the ministerial quality of the Council is an 
important element for its credibility and success.192 The Council plays a political 
role within the CEC and also exercises a control over the Secretariat’s activities, 
and in general has several instruments to control all the CEC in general and the 
Secretariat’s activities in particular.
Some of the powers that the Council has over the Secretariat and the CEC in 
general are used to control their activities. For example, the Council must 
approve many of the Secretariat’s activities, even those related to the Citizen 
Submission Process. Despite the fact that the budget and the annual program 
are prepared by the Secretariat, it is the Council who approves it. The members 
of the Secretariat are civil servants that are supposedly free of any influence
191 Baron, D.S., NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side Agreement Work, (1995) 12 Ariz. 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. at 604.
192 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 132.
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external to the Council; however, the Council has the power to veto any 
nomination.193 Also, the Council reviews and approves the CEC Annual Report.
The way the members of the JPAC are selected is a main concern, due to the 
fact that each Party appoints the members, as is the lack of any basic provision 
about their independence and qualifications.194 For example, the Mexican 
appointees to the JPAC include environmentalists, business leaders, academics 
and representatives from the industry; however, the qualifications of some of 
them are not as good as one would expect, and the knowledge that some of 
them have regarding international environmental law or the environment is 
minimal at best.
The consensus on the JPAC among many commentators is that the role the 
JPAC may play with the Council and the Secretariat is poorly defined and such 
ambiguity could be used to control the JPAC’s activities within the CEC. 
However, this same lack of definition could give the JPAC the opportunity to 
provide the necessary information, advice and general input to the Council and 
the Secretariat to help them better accomplish their goals.195
The CEC, is not really an independent body since its Council members are 
members of the government, and therefore fully responsible to them. Further,
193 aSee supra note 203 and accompanying text.
194 J. Owen Saunders, “NAFTA and The North American Agreement On Environmental 
Cooperation: A New Model For International Collaboration On Trade And The Environment”, 
(1994) 5 Colo. J. Int’l. Envtl. L. Pol’y. 273 at 296.
95 As mentioned by Dimento, the opinion that the general public has about the Secretariat is, in 
general, better than their opinion of the Council. Dimento supra note 89 at 700.
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these officials chose the Secretariat’s Executive Director and even the members 
of the Joint Public Advisory Committee. Therefore, many of its decisions may be 
more informed by politics than by the protection of the environment.
In conclusion, the CEC is not as independent as some may want, and even if the 
Secretariat was composed of independent civil servants and advised by an 
independent non-governmental Joint Public Advisory Committee, the CEC is still 
controlled by a Council comprised of the three environmental ministries, which 
will each likely follow their government’s policies.
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CHAPTER 3 NAAEC: DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEES
3.1 Introduction.
From the beginning of the discussions to create a NAFTA environmental side 
agreement196, the Dispute Resolution Regime was a crucial part of such 
discussions.197
The approach taken by the parties is a typical process to resolve controversies 
within an international agreement. This process includes gradual steps beginning 
with consultations, then moving to other attempts to resolve the controversy, and 
then to arbitration panels, implementation of the arbitration panel and finally, as a 
last resort, penalties for non-compliance. This process is, in general terms, 
almost identical to that used in NAFTA chapter 20 that establishes the provisions 
for dispute settlement between the parties. The NAAEC dispute settlement 
process has two main distinctions: 1) The limited scope of environmental 
disputes it covers, restricted to those where there has been “a persistent pattern 
of failure “ by a Party “to enforce its environmental law”198; and 2) Its availability 
only to the Parties of the NAAEC. In other words, the participation of any NGO’s
196 Saunders supra note 192 at 297
197 Ibid. Canada suggested a different approach that was included in the final draft of the NAAEC 
that will include fines but not trade sanctions.
198 NAAEC Article 22 (1).
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or private citizen is not allowed, a departure from the previously mentioned 
provisions199, which allow public participation within the CEC.
3.2 General Definitions.
The process to resolve any dispute begins with consultations between the 
parties. Any Party may request, in writing, consultations with another Party 
regarding whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by that other 
Party to effectively enforce its environmental law.200 Such a request for 
consultations must be delivered not only to the Party but also to the CEC’s 
Secretariat.201 In order to understand the process it is necessary to define exactly 
what “persistent pattern of failure” means, and what exactly “environmental law” 
means and includes.
A) Environmental Law Enforcement
It is important to emphasize that measuring “environmental law enforcement” is 
extremely difficult. Many of the numbers published by the environmental
199 See generally sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
200 NAAEC Part Five.
201 NAAEC Article 22 (1) and (2) The consultation process established in Article 22 sections 1 to 
4 also permits that:
“Unless the Council otherwise provides in its rules and procedures established under 
Article 9(2), a third Party that considers it has a substantial interest in the matter shall be 
entitled to participate in the consultations on delivery of written notice to the other Parties 
and to the Secretariat. The target of the consultations is to invite the consulting Parties to 
make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through 
consultations under this Article.”
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authorities are not accurate, since many of the violations are not detected.202 And 
sometimes a determination is quite subjective and raises certain questions. For 
example, if there are many fines and closings of industries due to violations of 
the environmental regime in one country does this indicate a lack of enforcement 
in that country? Or on the contrary, if there are few fines or closings does this 
indicate a lack of enforcement? 203 The answer to these questions may vary from 
country to country and even from person to person. To avoid any 
misunderstanding, the NAAEC established a series of practices that constitute 
enforcement and describes other practices, which do not constitute lack of 
enforcement.
First of all, Article 5 establishes that in order for all parties to achieve high levels 
of environmental protection and compliance, each Party shall effectively enforce 
its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental actions 
such as appointing and training inspectors, monitoring compliance and 
investigating suspected violations, on-site inspections and by seeking 
assurances of voluntary compliance and compliance agreements.204
In general, the actions mentioned in Article 5 include not only governmental 
actions to directly enforce the law but also actions to promote voluntary
202 For example, in Mexico City the environmental authorities estimate that there are at least 1000 
illegal smelters which do not comply with any air emissions standards or any environmental 
regulations. SEMARNAT supra note 133.
See generally Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 192 for an interesting discussion about 
the difficulty to establish a parameter for lack of enforcement or enforcement, since such activities 
may be influenced by economic, social or political decisions.
204 See supra 131 and accompanying text for the entire list of actions.
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compliance by the subjects of the environmental legislation. In addition, it also 
states that to establish the appropriate sanctions and remedies for any violations, 
the authorities should take into consideration the nature and gravity of the 
violation, any economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator, the 
economic condition of the violator, and other relevant factors.
In order to clearly understand the meaning of such a failure, it is necessary to 
relate Article 5 with Article 45 in order to clarify the dispute settlement process,
and to find a definition. However, the NAAEC does not establish an exact
definition of what is meant by a failure to effectively enforce environmental laws, 
although Article 45 (1) established a negative and indirect one, a contrario 
sensus definition. This definition is as follows:
“Article 45: Definitions
1. For purposes of this Agreement:
A Party has not failed to “effectively enforce its environmental law” or
to comply with Article 5(1) in a particular case where the action or inaction 
in question by agencies or officials of that Party:
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters; or
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(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined 
to have higher priorities.”205
The first exclusion that the Secretariat and eventually any arbitration panel will 
face is whether any action or inaction by the authorities or agency reflects a 
reasonable exercise of discretion. This Article recognizes that discretion plays an 
important role in enforcement and compliance negotiations, in many areas of law 
and environmental laws in particular. As mentioned by some authors, most of the 
discovered infractions do not lead to legal actions by the regulating authorities206; 
therefore the use of discretion is unavoidable. In dealing with some 
environmental law violations the authorities often use their discretion and 
sometimes negotiate with the violators in order to reach the ultimate goal of the 
law, the protection of the environment.
It is also important to take into consideration that many laws, environmental or 
non-environmental, establish some level of discretion that the authorities may 
use, known as explicit discretion.207 However, there are some cases or situations 
in which the authorities do not have that explicit discretion but where they have 
an implicit discretion, and the authority is exercised de facto. Therefore, any
205 NAAEC Article 45 (1)
206 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 199.
207 Ibid. at 202.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
arbitration panel also may take into consideration these concepts in order to 
establish the existence of reasonable discretion.
However, the NAAEC does not establish an exact definition of what is meant by 
reasonable discretion. It is necessary to analyze case by case to find if any of the 
appropriate governmental actions established in Article 5 to achieve high levels 
of environmental protection and compliance were undertaken, and if those 
actions really meet the goal of enforcing the environmental law and achieving 
high levels of protection.
On the other hand, the analysis may determine whether the discretion used by 
the authorities to implement or not implement an action was reasonable or not. 
As mentioned by Johnson and Beaulieu, the arbitration panel “will have much 
leeway in determining what constitutes a “reasonable exercise of discretion.”208
The second exception to the application of the NAAEC enforcement provisions is 
for government inaction based on “bona fide decisions to allocate resources to 
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher 
priorities”. This exception has been described not only as innovative but also 
as puzzling209 since it is not clear whether it means that a Party complained 
against can justify a poor level of enforcement activity for the following reasons: 
1) that the overall level of resources that can be devoted to enforcement is
206Ibid. at 203.
209 Ibid. at 204.
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limited210; 2) that within the environmental protection budget there is a set 
financial amount allocated to enforcement; or 3) that within the environmental 
enforcement budget the government chooses other more important priorities than 
the subject matter of compliance. This last justification is especially difficult to 
argue against, since every country has the sovereignty to determine the 
importance of every project and establish priorities among them.
Despite its mention as an exception, it is naturally expected that every country in 
determining its priorities and therefore establishing the budget to accomplish its 
priorities is doing that in the hope, bona fide, to accomplish its goals and not 
intentionally damaging other important aspects of its obligations. In other words, 
it will be difficult to prove that any Party is not acting in good faith when 
establishing its environmental priorities. Some authors211 and environmental 
groups are concerned about the possibility that because of a smaller budget the 
Mexican government will be allowed to achieve lower levels of environmental 
enforcement compared to the United States or Canada.212 In the event of a
210 Ibid. My experience as a practitioner in Mexico helped me to realize that many of the violations 
of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley General del 
Equilibrio Ecologico y  Proteccion al Ambiente) and its regulations, cannot be prosecuted due to 
the lack of resources. I experienced such a problem especially in the Quintana Roo state in the 
south east of Mexico, where its landscape with tropical forest, the Caribbean sea and some small 
rivers and wetlands made it very difficult for the environmental authorities to verify many 
violations regarding flora and fauna protection. Until May 2000 the federal environmental authority 
in that state did not have sufficient boats to cover and reach several parts of the state as I was 
told “unofficially" by the delegate of the Procuraduria Federal de Proteccion al Ambiente 
(PROFEPA).
11 Nicolas Kublicki, “ The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law and 
Debt Exchange for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development" (1994), 19 Columbia J. of 
Env. L. R. 59 at 80-100. Prof. Kublicki establishes that all three parties should be subject to a 
uniform standard of review of their enforcement performance.
212 See generally Raustiala, Kal, “International Enforcement Of Enforcement” Under The North 
American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation", (1996) 36 Va. J. Int’l. L.
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dispute, any panel will face an almost impossible task to determine whether a 
particular government decision was not made in good faith.
B) Persistent Pattern
Finally, in order to initiate the dispute settlement process it is necessary to prove 
the existence of a “persistent pattern” of ineffective environmental enforcement, 
defined as a “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction beginning after 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement”.213 This means that persistent 
patterns before January 1,1994 will not be under review, although some authors 
believe that such acts should be considered.214 Failure by a Party to enforce its 
laws after January 1 1994 or a lack of enforcement before January 1994 could 
both provide evidence of a persistent pattern. Overall, the word ’’persistent’ 
implies an element of duration over time, the meaning of the word “pattern" is not 
clear.
The panel may need to review each case on an individual basis. A pattern of 
ineffective enforcement may be indicated by a failure to enforce a particular law 
through out the country. Or a pattern may be established by evidence of a failure 
to enforce environmental laws or regulations in a particular region. The lack of 
clarity about this concept will allow the settlement panels to establish the general 
rules, or to establish rules on a case-by-case basis. And since this procedure can
213 NAAEC Article 45 (1).
214 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 208.
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potentially yield monetary penalties or trade sanctions, the threshold 
requirements to begin this process should be met without any doubt. However, 
because of the lack of clarity in its definitions, the standard required seems very 
difficult to determine.215
C) Environmental Law
Finally, to initiate the dispute settlement procedure, it is necessary to determine 
the meaning of "environmental law”. Environmental law is defined in Article 45 
of the NAAEC as follows:
“For purposes of Article 14(1) and Part Five:
(a) “ environmental law” means any statute or regulation of a Party, 
or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection 
of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or 
health, through
(i) the prevention, abatement or control of the release, 
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental 
contaminants,
215 Kelly supra note 135 at 82.
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(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, 
substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of 
information related thereto, or
(iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including endangered 
species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas
in the Party's territory, but does not include any statute or 
regulation, or provision thereof, directly related to worker safety or 
health.
(b) For greater certainty, the term “environmental law” does not 
include any statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary 
purpose of which is managing the commercial harvest or 
exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of natural 
resources.
(c) The primary purpose of a particular statutory or regulatory provision 
for purposes of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be determined by 
reference to its primary purpose, rather than to the primary purpose 
of the statute or regulation of which it is part”.216
216 NAAEC Article 45. [ emphasis added]
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This definition merits some comments. First, the definition excludes any codes of 
conduct and other non-binding guidelines, which do not have the legal force of 
statute or regulation. Second, the definition does not include any international 
treaty that is not self-executed as environmental law217, at least in the United 
States and Canada. On the contrary, in Mexico, according to the Mexican 
Constitution, any international treaty signed by the President and ratified by the 
Senate Chamber is considered enforced law in Mexico and therefore self -  
executed in Mexico.218 Third, the parties did not include any provision that 
regulates the managing of commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or 
aboriginal harvesting of natural resources, despite its environmental content. The 
reason may be economic or political, economic independence in the case of 
natural resources and political concerns in the case of aboriginal people.
3.3 Initiation of Procedures.
The process is initiated by requesting consultation before the Council where the 
parties are obligated to make every effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the matter. If the consulting Parties fail to resolve the matter 
pursuant to Article 22 within 60 days of delivery of a request for consultations, or 
such other period as the consulting Parties may agree, any Party may request in 
writing a special session of the Council. The requesting Party shall state in the
217 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 180.
218 Constitution Politics de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexican Constitution) Article 133. 
See also L. Ortiz Ahlf, Derecho International Publico, 2 Ed. (Mexico Oxford University Press, 
2000) at 9.
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request the matter complained of and shall deliver the request to the other 
Parties and to the Secretariat. The Council has twenty days in which to
21Qconvene.
In this stage of the process the Council may: (a) call on such technical advisers 
or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems necessary; (b) have 
recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or such other dispute resolution 
procedures; (c) assist the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute, or ;(d) make recommendations. Such recommendations shall be made 
public if the Council decides by a two-thirds vote. The Council also has the 
power to decide that a matter is properly covered by another agreement or 
arrangement to which the consulting Parties are Party. If so, it shall refer the 
matter to the consulting parties for appropriate action under that agreement or 
arrangement.220
If the matter has not been resolved between the parties within sixty days after the 
Council has convened, the complaining Party may request in writing that the 
Council convene an arbitral panel. Such a decision should be made by a two- 
thirds vote. This panel should consider the matter when the alleged persistent 
pattern of failure to enforce environmental law relates to a situation involving 
workplace, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services: 
(a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the
219 NAAEC Article 23 (1) and (2).
220 Ibid. (3) and (4).
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territory of the Party complained against, with goods or services produced or 
provided by persons of another Party.
3.4 The Trade Relationship
This procedure has an important characteristic--a closer relationship to trade 
than to the environment, despite the fact that this dispute settlement procedure 
was created under the umbrella of an environmental agreement. The dispute 
settlement process can only be initiated by a Party, and only in the case where a 
trade relationship exists which relates to the alleged persistent pattern of failure. 
In other words, only when the environmental misconduct can be related to trade. 
If there is no trade connection, no panel can convene and no formal dispute 
settlement can take place.221
The trade connection is the main difference between the formal dispute 
settlement process established in Article 22 and the one mentioned in Articles 14 
and 15 of this agreement, and this difference is the main reason that in the formal 
dispute settlement process only the Parties can participate. On the other hand, 
any NGO’s or private persons can participate in the citizen submission process 
because there is no trade connection requirement.
Another important characteristic of the dispute settlement procedure is that it is 
not necessary to prove that because of the persistent pattern of failure in
221 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 178.
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enforcing its environmental law one Party is actually harming the industry of 
another Party and therefore receiving more benefits because of its lack of 
internalization of the environmental cost. Some authors have defined this 
practice as ecological dumping, because the exports are sold below their true 
cost since the environmental costs are not properly internalized through 
adequate government enforcement.222
However, despite the fact that the dispute settlement process is aimed directly at 
the so-called “environmental dumping”, it has an important difference from others 
which deal with dumping, such as those mentioned under NAFTA or WTO. It is 
not necessary for the complaining Party to show any injury to its producers of 
goods or services in the sector where the lack of enforcement by another Party is 
alleged, only the potential damage.
Because the dispute settlement procedure is narrowed to those cases of 
“environmental dumping” and not to other important environmental cases, there 
is the possibility of developing a double standard practice.223 This double 
standard practice consists of the creation of two types of classes under 
environmental laws: 1) that which includes industries or companies producing 
goods and sen/ices that compete with those of the NAAEC parties, and 2) that 
which comprises those industries or companies that do not. This unfair practice 
may evolve within the partners to NAFTA and that will obviously constitute not
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only an advantage in trade with others like the European Union but also, and 
more importantly, have disastrous consequences to the environment in the 
territory of that Party.
3.5 The Panel.
A) Panel Selection
The panellists are selected from a roster established and maintained by the 
Council. The roster is constituted by up to 45 individuals appointed by consensus 
for terms of three years and they may be reappointed. In order to be appointed 
as a possible panellist, each individual shall have expertise or experience in 
environmental law or its enforcement, or in the resolution of international disputes 
or arbitration or other relevant scientific, technical or professional expertise or 
experience. Panellist are selected only on the basis of objectivity, reliability and 
sound judgment; they must be completely independent and not affiliated with any 
Party, the Secretariat or the JPAC, and shall comply with the code of conduct 
established for such purpose by the Council.224
In order to select the five-member panel, both parties must agree on the 
selection of the chairman within 15 days after the Council voted to convene the 
panel. If the parties do not agree within this period of time, the complaining Party 
shall select the chair from a list of panellists who are not citizens of that Party.
224 NAAEC Article 25.
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After the chair has been selected each Party shall select two panellists who are 
citizens of the other disputing Party. If a Party does not select its panellists within 
15 days, such panellists shall be selected by lot from among the roster.225
Despite the fact that there is a roster of panellists, every Party may suggest other 
panellists that comply with the requirements of Article 25. However, any disputing 
Party also has the power to challenge any individual not on the roster who is 
proposed as a panellist by a disputing Party within 30 days after the individual 
has been proposed. If a disputing Party believes that a panellist is in violation of 
the code of conduct, the disputing Parties shall consult and, if they agree, the 
panellist shall be removed and a new panellist shall be selected in accordance 
with this Article.226
B) Panel Procedure
225 Ibid. Article 27. In the case that a third Party participates, Article 27 section 2 establishes that 
the following procedures shall apply:
“(a) The panel shall comprise five members.
(b) The disputing Parties shall endeavour to agree on the chair of the panel within 15 
days after the Council votes to convene the panel. If the disputing Parties are unable 
to agree on the chair within this period, the Party or Parties on the side of the dispute 
chosen by lot shall select within 10 days a chair who is not a citizen of such Party or 
Parties.
(c) Within 30 days of selection of the chair, the Party complained against shall select two 
panellists, one of who is a citizen of a complaining Party, and the other of whom is a 
citizen of another complaining Party. The complaining Parties shall select two 
panellists who are citizens of the Party complained against.
(d) If any disputing Party fails to select a panellist within such a period, such panellist 
shall be selected by lot in accordance with the citizenship criteria of subparagraph 
(c>-"Ibid. sections 3 and 4.
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Once the arbitration panel is selected, the panellists must follow the Model Rules 
of Procedure established by the Council. Such procedures shall provide a right to 
at least one hearing before the panel and the opportunity to make initial and 
rebuttal written submissions. No panel may disclose which panellists are 
associated with majority or minority opinions, although the disputing parties may 
agree otherwise.227
The terms of reference for the arbitration panel shall be to examine, in light of the 
relevant provisions of the Agreement, including those contained in Part Five, 
whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained 
against to effectively enforce its environmental law, and to make findings, 
determinations and recommendations in accordance with Article 31(2). These 
terms of reference can change if the disputing Parties otherwise agree within 20 
days after the Council votes to convene the panel, or if requested by a Party or if 
the panel decides it is necessary to seek information and technical advice from 
any person or body that it deems appropriate, provided that the disputing Parties 
so agree.228
Unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, the panel has 180 days after the 
last panellist was selected to present an initial report. Such report should be 
based on the submissions and arguments of the parties and on any information 
that the experts may submit to them. The initial report may contain the finding of
227 NAAEC Article 28 sections 1 and 2.
228 NAAEC Article 30.
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facts, its determination as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of 
failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental 
law, and any other determination requested by the terms of reference. If 
requested, its recommendations for the resolution of the dispute normally “shall 
be that the Party complained against adopt and implement an action plan 
sufficient to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.”229
The parties have thirty days to submit written comments to the panels on its initial 
report, which should be taken into consideration by the panel before presenting 
to the disputing parties the final, report including any separate opinions on 
matters not unanimously agreed. The final report has to be completed within 60 
days of the presentation of the initial report.230 The Council shall publicize the 
Final Report five days after receiving it.
3.6 Implementation and Enforcement of Final Report.
The initial objective of the dispute settlement process, where a panel determines 
that there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained 
against to effectively enforce its environmental law, is to develop a satisfactory 
plan to resolve the enforcement failure. The disputing Parties may agree on a 
mutually satisfactory action plan, which “normally shall conform with the
229 NAAEC Article 31.
230 NAAEC Article 32.
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determinations and recommendations of the panel”.231 The disputing Parties 
shall promptly notify the Secretariat and the Council of any agreed resolution of 
the dispute.
If the parties fail to agree on the action plan, an action plan can be designated in 
one of two ways. First, where a disputing Party requests that the panel be 
reconvened, the panel must determine whether any action plan proposed by the 
Party complained against is sufficient to solve the pattern of non-enforcement. If 
it is sufficient, then the panel must approve the plan. If not, the panel must 
suggest a plan according to the law of the Party complained against. The panel 
may, where warranted, impose a monetary enforcement assessment in 
accordance with Annex 34. Second, where none of the disputing parties request 
that the panel be reconvened, the last action plan submitted by the Party 
complained against is deemed to have been adopted by the panel.232
The Parties shall agree whether the action plan is properly implemented. Either 
Party may reconvene the panel to determine if the action plan is being properly 
implemented or not within 180 days after the adoption of the final action plan.233 
If the panel determines that the plan is properly implemented, the dispute is
231 NAAEC Article 33.
232 NAAEC Article 34 (1)b and (3)
233 NAAEC Article 35.
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finalized. If not, the panel is required within 60 days after it has been reconvened, 
to impose a monetary assessment on the Party complained against.234
The Party complained against has 180 days to pay the monetary assessment to 
the Council, money that the Council shall use to improve the environmental law 
enforcement of the Party complained against. In the event of continuing non- 
compliance, either with respect to paying the penalty or with respect to 
implementing the final action plan, a complaining Party may suspend NAFTA 
benefits against the offending Party235 unless that Party is Canada, where the 
panel decision may be filed by the CEC before a Canadian Court for 
enforcement. It will be treated as a court order, not subject to review or appeal.236
In the case of trade suspension, in other words in the case of disputes between 
Mexico and the United States, in considering what tariff or other benefits to 
suspend pursuant to Article 36(l) or (2), the complaining Party shall first seek
234 The amount is equivalent to up to 0.007 percent of the total trade in goods between the 
parties. NAAEC Annex 34(1).
35 NAAEC Annex 36 B. establishes that:
“1. Where a complaining Party suspends NAFTA tariff benefits in accordance with this 
Agreement, the Party may increase the rates of duty on originating goods of the Party 
complained against to levels not to exceed the lesser of:
(a) the rate that was applicable to those goods immediately prior to the date of entry 
into force of the NAFTA, and
(b) the Most-Favored-Nation rate applicable to those goods on the date the Party 
suspends such benefits,
and such increase may be applied only for such time as is necessary to collect, through 
such increase, the monetary enforcement assessment.”
236 NAAEC Annex 36 A.
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suspended benefits in the same sector or sectors as that in respect of which 
there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to 
effectively enforce its environmental law. If the complaining Party considers it is 
not practicable or effective to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors, 
benefits in other sectors may be suspended, in an amount not greater than the 
amount of the monetary enforcement assessment originally imposed.237 A 
complete diagram of the process is in Appendix 1.
3.7 Criticisms of the Dispute Resolution Process.
After reviewing the NAAEC’s dispute settlement process, some comments about 
the process are appropriate. It is important to mention that the process is almost 
identical to that established in NAFTA chapter 20, and therefore follows the same 
procedure to resolve any dispute that may arise between parties to an 
international treaty. This process starts with consultations then establishes an 
arbitration panel and eventually allows for the imposition of fines and trade 
sanctions. However, some authors have criticized the way the CEC dispute 
resolution process deals with the environment.
237 NAAEC Article 36.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
1. Use of Sanctions
The most widely debated issue among the parties and commentators during the 
discussions to create NAFTA’s side agreement was whether the dispute 
settlement process would utilize trade sanctions. The process represents one of 
the first attempts to enforce environmental legislation, not only in domestic fora, 
but also at the international level, and establishes real sanctions for the violations 
in the form of fines or even trade sanctions. However, despite the fact that the 
possibility to trigger the dispute settlement process and to eventually impose 
trade sanctions is very remote, the utilization of trade sanctions to reach 
environmental goals has been described as potentially problematic.238
First, in the event that a Panel imposes a fine or imposes duties on exports, the 
price would be paid by the consumers and not by the governments, who are 
responsible.239 However, the fines are not really penalties since they are returned 
to the same Party complained against to improve the environment or the 
environmental law enforcement in that country. The money does not really leave 
the country. 240
Second, the allocation of such fines will be decided by the CEC and not by the 
local authorities, despite the fact that those authorities are the experts in the
238 Johnson, Richard, “ Commentary: Trade Sanctions and Environmental Objectives in the 
NAFTA", (1993) Geo. Int’l. L. Rev. at 577.
239 Bugeda, Beatriz, “Is NAFTA up to its green expectations? Effective law enforcement under 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation", (1999) U. Richmond L. R 1591 at 
1596.
240 Kelly supra note 135 at 89.
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application of its own law and have knowledge about the best allocation for any 
money. By interfering with this process, the CEC will prioritize certain domestic 
programs, ignoring local political and cultural concerns for the environment, 
thereby interfering with the nation’s free exercise of sovereignty.241 The drafters 
of the agreement forgot to recognize that any government is the expert on its 
own law, and any CEC’s interpretation and judgement of a domestic law may not 
be accurate.242
Third, trade sanctions may have unequal effects between the parties, since 
Mexico and Canada rely more heavily on trade with the United States than vice 
versa243 The effects of trade sanctions would have more discouraging effects in 
Mexico than in the United States, since a larger part of Mexico’s economy will be 
affected.244
Fourth, the Commission has very little power. Contrary to what Mr. Clinton 
suggested during his presidential campaign245 the Commission only has a limited 
power to provide remedies and does not have any power to stop pollution. The 
NAAEC provides for panels with the authority to impose monetary “assessments” 
but there is no power to stop pollution.
242 Chamovitz supra note 136 at 268.
243 Patton, supra note 102 at 111.
244 Johnson R. supra note 238 at 588.
245 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 275.
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Also, not only does the CEC not have any power to stop pollution but it also does 
not have any power to clean up any pollution. If the CEC collects monetary 
assessments, it may be used to enhance environmental law enforcement, but not 
to pay for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites.
2. Clarity of the Process
The process has been classified as lengthy, cumbersome and full of legal 
uncertainties246, for its jumble of procedural hurdles and political trap doors.247 
The process is full of ambiguities in many important definitions, like “pattern”, 
obligations like “effectively enforce” and exceptions such as “bona fidef decisions 
or “reasonable exercise of discretion”. Many of those terms are left to the 
arbitration panel to define, and the possible determinations that such panels may 
reach are unpredictable, and in some cases may be different from those goals 
that the parties were seeking during the negotiation of the agreement.
Because the process is sharply circumscribed and only applies to domestic laws 
and only in those cases in which there is a trade relationship, there are several 
other concepts that are not defined. For instance, it is not clear if the panel’s 
decisions should be taken into consideration for future dispute settlements or not. 
Since the panels are selected case by case, there is the danger that the panels
246 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 238.
247 Kelly supra note 135 at 96.
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may reach different conclusions about the definitions of the same ambiguous 
concepts, thus creating uncertainty.
It is a protracted and cumbersome process. It will take at least 755 days from the 
initiation of a complaint to the eventual determination of a trade sanction, when 
the same procedure under NAFTA chapter 20 takes only 255 days. This long 
procedure may allow the Party complained against to “artificially” end the alleged 
violation, by imposing a major fine or closure to an industry. Some countries use 
this practice especially when they are accused of violating human rights; in order 
to avoid international criticism or trouble they liberate a political prisoner.248
3. Panels Power
The panels do not have subpoena power to help them obtain the information 
necessary to resolve the controversy.249 The absence of the power to collect 
information on-site will leave the panels hoping that the parties involved supply 
the necessary information. That will depend on the good will of the parties 
involved, especially the Party complained against, which may not submit all the 
information necessary to prove the existence of a consistent pattern of lack of 
enforcement. That lack of power will leave the CEC and the Panels second-
24aCharnovitz supra note 136 at 284
249 Ibid. at 281.
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guessing local decisions, raising concerns about accountability and risking 
harmonization to the lowest common denominator.250
The restricted power of the panels to obtain information may be especially 
problematic since many of its findings may not be accurate and therefore create 
problems about the correct interpretation and application of any environmental 
law and standards. It may also prevent knowing the truth about a particular 
environmental problem since all the facts may not be known.
4. Public Participation
The dispute settlement process in the NAAEC is almost identical to that 
established in NAFTA chapter 20, including consultations, arbitration panel and 
eventual fines and trade sanctions. This is similar to most international dispute 
settlement processes. On the other hand, the main difference between the 
NAAEC’s dispute settlement process and that established in Article 14 and 15 of 
the NAEEC is that it is limited only to parties and not open to the general public. 
On the contrary, the Citizen Submission Process established in Articles 14 and 
15 is open only to the general public, including citizens and NGO’s who are 
allowed to make submissions before the Secretariat and criticize a Party for 
failing to enforce its environmental law.
250 Patton supra note 102 at 110.
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Since the arbitration process is only open to parties and not citizens or NGO’s, 
they are not allowed to submit or present before the CEC or arbitration panels 
any important information, proofs or other documents that may be useful to 
determine the truth behind the dispute.
In conclusion, it is important to mention that because of the difficulties of proving 
a “persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to effectively 
enforce its environmental law” as well as to establish a trade connection, it 
seems that it will be very difficult to initiate any dispute settlement process. 
Moreover, in the improbable event of a dispute settlement process being 
initiated, it seems unlikely that trade sanctions or fines will be imposed on any 
Party. As mentioned by one author, the “teeth” that were provided to the NAAEC 
may never bite.251
251 Saunders supra note 192 at 302.
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CHAPTER 4. NAAEC- CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
4.1 Introduction.
The NAAEC establishes a process that allows any citizen or NGO to participate 
in environmental law enforcement and indirectly to help the Parties to reach the 
Agreement’s goals. This process permits the CEC’s Secretariat to investigate 
when a Party is accused of failing to enforce its own environmental laws, and has 
captured the most attention of environmental groups, private sector and legal 
specialists in North America.252
First, I will describe the Article 14 and 15 process in order to determine what the 
requirements are to file a citizen submission before the CEC and to determine 
how the process develops to its final stage. Later, I will evaluate the process and 
give some suggestions for its improvement.
4.2 The Submission: Article 14 (1).
Pursuant to Article 14 of the NAAEC, any nongovernmental organization or 
person253 may file a submission with the Secretariat claiming that a Party to the
252 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1596.
253 Any non-governmental organization or person established or residing in the territory of a Party 
to the Agreement may make a submission on enforcement matters for consideration by the
106
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NAAEC is “failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws.” The scope of the 
Article 14 process is limited in three ways: 1) it is related only to environmental 
laws; 2) it is related to failures to “effectively enforce” such environmental laws; 3) 
it applies only to failures fitting into the first two categories that are ongoing. 
These three concepts are reviewed only briefly below, as they were discussed 
earlier.254
A) Environmental Law
The agreement defines environmental law to include laws whose primary 
purpose is the protection of the environment or the prevention of a danger to 
human life or health, as established in Article 45 (2). It excludes at least two 
types of provisions from treatment under the citizen submission process. The first 
is the exploitation and harvesting of natural resources. Despite the fact that these 
activities may have significant adverse impact on the environment 255, they are 
excluded.
The second type of provision excludes consideration of whether international 
instruments qualify as environmental law. The Secretariat has concluded that 
international treaties should not be taken in consideration unless they have been
Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (“Secretariat”). The term “non­
governmental organization” is defined in Article 45(1) of the Agreement.
See chapter 3 section 3.2.
255 Markell, L.D.,” The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission 
Process”, (2000) 12 Geo. Intl. Envtl. L.R., 54
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imported into domestic law by way of a statute or a regulation pursuant to a 
statute.256
B) Effective Enforcement
The NAAEC does not establish a definition of what is considered a “failure to 
effectively enforce” environmental laws. However, there is a definition a contrario 
sensus of what is not considered a failure to enforce environmental laws. As 
established in Article 45(1), these are defined as actions that reflect a reasonable 
exercise of discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, and regulatory or 
compliance matters, or actions that result from bona fide decisions to allocate 
resources to enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined 
to have higher priority. If a Party complies with Article 45(1), they will be 
considered to have effectively enforced their environmental law.
C) Temporal Requirement
The submission should assert that a Party “is failing" to effectively enforce its 
environmental law. To prove such a requirement it is necessary to establish only 
those acts that occurred after January 1 1994, since the agreement does not 
apply retroactively. However, if an alleged violation of an environmental law 
occurred pre-1994, it may be a relevant focus for a factual record if the alleged 
violation is relevant to whether a Party effectively enforced its environmental law
256 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.




In addition to the three limitations Article 14(1) contains in its opening sentence, it 
lists six threshold criteria that a submission must meet in order to trigger further 
consideration. A submission must:
A) be in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to 
the Secretariat;
B) clearly identify the person or organization making the submission;
C) provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the 
Submission;
D) appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing 
industry;
E) indicate that the matter has been communicated in writing to the 
relevant authorities of the Party and indicate the Party’s response; and
F) be filed by a person or organization residing or established in the 
territory of a Party.257
257 The Submission should be in English, Spanish or French and any Submission should not 
exceed 15 pages of typed, letter-sized paper, excluding supporting information.
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The submission must assert that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its 
environmental law and should focus on any acts or omissions of the Party to 
demonstrate such failure. 258 In doing so, the Submitter must detail a succinct 
account of the facts on which such an assertion is based, and must provide 
sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, including 
any documentary evidence on which the submission may be based.
As established in the Revised Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation259 (Guidelines), the Submitter must also identify the 
applicable statute or regulation, or provision thereof, as defined in Article 45(2) of 
the Agreement. A requirement of the General Ecological Equilibrium and 
Environmental Protection Law of Mexico, is that the Submitter must identify the 
applicable chapter or provision of this law as required by the Secretariat.260
Any submission must “appear” to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather 
than at harassing industry. In determining this, the Secretariat will consider 
such factors as whether or not the submission is focused on the acts or 
omissions of a Party rather than on compliance by a particular company or
258 For purposes of determining if a submission meets the criteria of Article 14 (1) of the 
Agreement, the term “Environmental Law” is defined in Article 45(2) of the agreement.
Council Resolution 99-06 Adoption of the Revised Guidelines for the Submission for 
Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation Article 5.2
260 The Secretariat even requested that the Submitters of the Rio Magadalena submission further 
specify which laws were allegedly not being effectively enforced. See Markell supra note 255 at 
557.
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business, especially if the Submitter is a competitor that may stand to benefit 
economically from the submission, or if the submission appears frivolous.
As established in NAAEC Article 14(1), before filing any submission before the 
CEC, the Submitters must indicate that the matter has been communicated in 
writing to the relevant authorities of the Party in question, indicate the Party’s 
response, if any, and if applicable present a copy of such response. The 
Submitter must include, with the submission, copies of any relevant 
correspondence with the relevant authorities.261
If the Secretariat determines that all formal criteria have not been satisfied, it 
shall issue a notification to the Submitter asking for a new Submission that 
conforms to the formal requirements within 30 days. During this period, the 
Secretariat may consider new or supplemental information from the Submitter. If no 
new or supplemental information is received by the Secretariat within this time 
period, or if the Secretariat determines that no response from the Party is merited in 
light of the additional information provided by the Submitter, the process will be 
terminated and the Secretariat will so notify the Submitter. However, if the 
Secretariat determines that the Submission meets the formal requirements, it 
conducts a second review to determine whether the Submission merits a 
response.262
261 The relevant authorities are those agencies of the government responsible under the law of 
the Party for the enforcement of the environmental law in question. Guidelines 5.5.
262 NAAEC Article 14 (2).
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4.3 The Party’s Response to The Submission Article 14 (2) and (3).
Under Article 14(2), the Secretariat must consider whether the Submission 
alleges harm to the Submitter. In determining if the submission alleges harm to 
any person or the organization that filed the submission, the Secretariat should 
take into consideration whether the alleged harm is due to the asserted failure to 
effectively enforce environmental law. The Secretariat should also consider 
whether the alleged harm relates to the protection of the environment or the 
prevention of danger to human life or health (but not directly related to worker 
safety or health), as stated in Article 45(2) of the Agreement. Some 
commentators have suggested that the notion of harm should be interpreted 
broadly for purposes of the Agreement.263
The Secretariat should also review whether the Submission would advance the 
goals of the NAAEC and determine if all private remedies have been pursued. To 
determine this, the Secretariat will be guided by: (a) whether requesting a 
response to the submission is appropriate and whether the preparation of a 
factual record on the submission could duplicate or interfere with private 
remedies that are being pursued or have been pursued by the Submitter; and (b) 
whether reasonable actions have been taken to pursue such remedies prior to 
making a submission, bearing in mind that barriers to the pursuit of such 
remedies may exist in some cases.
263 Professor Gal-or suggests that “ [B]y recognizing the public nature of the environmental 
concerns and harms as well as the public interest to legal standing, the Secretariat has met the 
expectations of many environmental activists.” Supra note 181 at 89.
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Finally, the Secretariat should review whether the Submission is drawn 
exclusively from mass media reports. If so the submission should be terminated. 
Again, there is no time limit for the Secretariat in making this determination.
If the Secretariat determines that no response is merited, it may consider asking 
for new or supplemental information during this period or terminate the process. 
It is important to note the large discretionary authority given to the Secretariat, 
since the Secretariat has the option to simply not consider a submission without 
justifying its decisions.264
On the other hand, if the Secretariat determines that the requirements of Article 
14(2) are met, according to Article 14 (3), the Secretariat should request a 
response from the Party accused. It should notify the Council and the Party and 
forward to the Party a copy of the Submission and any supporting documents. 
The Party shall advise the Secretariat within 30 days, or in exceptional 
circumstances, within 60 days: (1) whether the matter was previously the subject 
of a judicial or administrative proceeding; and (2) of any other information the 
Party wishes to submit, such as whether private remedies in connection with the 
matter are available to the person or organization making the Submission and 
whether they have been pursued265. If the matter raised is the subject of a
264 Kelly supra note 135 at 80.
265 NAAEC Article 14 (3).
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pending judicial or administrative proceeding, the Secretariat will terminate the 
process.
4.4 Preparation of a Factual Record.
After the Party has responded (or failed to respond within the 30-day response 
period), the Secretariat will then consider both the submission and the response 
to determine whether it will recommend to the Council the development of a 
factual record.266 Again, there is no deadline for this decision. There is no 
opportunity for the Submitter to reply to the Party’s response and no formal 
criteria for the Secretariat’s decision, although the Guidelines do require the 
Secretariat to state the reasons for its decision.267 If the Secretariat decides that 
no development of a factual record is warranted, it can terminate the process. 
However, if the Secretariat recommends the preparation of a factual record, it 
must seek Council approval, which must in turn be by a two-thirds majority 
vote.268
If the Council approves preparation of a factual record, the Secretariat is directed 
to consider any information that is (a) publicly available; (b) submitted by 
interested nongovernmental organizations or persons; (c) submitted by the
266 Guidelines 9.5.
267 Guidelines 10.1.
268 NAAEC Article 15 (1) and (2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
JPAC; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or by independent experts as 
established in NAAEC.269
A factual record is similar to a report on the whole situation aimed at helping the 
environmental community become aware of the complaint and problems 
submitted before the CEC. The factual record should contain: a summary of the 
submission that initiated the process; a summary of the response, if any, 
provided by the concerned Party; a summary of any other relevant factual 
information; and the facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the 
matters raised in the submission270 and will incorporate, as appropriate, the 
comments of any Party.
After the preparation of the factual record, the Council may, by a two-thirds 
majority vote, make the factual record publicly available, normally within 60 days 
following its submission to the Council271 However, if the Council decides not to 
make the factual record available to the public, there is no access to the factual 
record by any member of the public including the Submitter.
4.5 The Process.
There are two ways to evaluate the process: by evaluating the process itself or 
by analyzing the submissions filed before the CEC.
269 Ibid. Article 15(4).
270 Guidelines 20.
271 Ibid. See appendix 2 for a complete diagram of the Citizen Submission Process.
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4.5.1 Evaluation of the Process
Among the formal requirements, one that is especially complicated and not 
defined by NAAEC is the requirement that the complaint be “aimed at promoting 
enforcement rather than at harassing” leaving the Secretariat to determine with 
all the information available if any citizen submission is “frivolous.”272 The term 
frivolous is not defined and it is not clear how the Secretariat will determine 
whether the submission is frivolous.
There is no time limit regarding the preparation of the factual record, and no 
provision specifically allowing the Submitter to provide additional information. The 
lack of time limits is an important failure since in the case of environmental 
damages a quick response is critical. Many of the submissions have been waiting 
too long for a response from the accused Party, the Secretariat or the Council. 
The period of time between the dates a Submitter filed a submission and the final 
decision from the Council could take as long as two years.
The lack of deadlines makes the process too long and sometimes the 
environment will suffer if decisions or actions are not taken promptly. The period 
of time since the beginning of a submission and the decision of the Council on 
whether open or not a factual record has been increasing since 1996, from 22 
months in the case of the Cozumel Reef submission to 37 months in the Quebec
272 Guidelines 5.4. (B).
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Hog Farms case. The increased time could be explained by two factors, one the 
increasing complexity of submissions or by the increasing number of 
submissions filed before the Secretariat since 1998. Whatever the case, 36 
months is too long a time. It is necessary to reduce the period of time by creating 
deadlines to submit a response from the Party accused and also deadlines for 
the Secretariat’s activities to review the response, to prepare a factual record and 
for the Council to decide whether to open a factual record or not.
Another criticism that the Submission process has received273 concerns its 
transparency and openness for participation. The Submitter participation in the 
process starts and finishes when a citizen submission is filed before the 
Secretariat. After the submission is filed the Submitter can participate only if the 
submission is not clear or requires more information. However, once the 
Secretariat decides to request a response, the Submitter is not allowed to 
participate any further. Only the Secretariat and the Party accused are entitled to 
participate in the process. However, in the last phase of the process the other 
Parties of NAFTA are allowed to participate, but not the Submitter or any third 
person that may have an interest, such as the owner of the industry or project 
under review.
Not only is the Submitter not allowed to participate but also most of the important 
decisions are made behind closed doors and without providing any reasons. For 
example, if the Council decides to not open a factual record despite the
273 Bugueda supra note 239.
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Secretariat’s suggestion, the Council is not obliged to give any particular reason 
for its decision. Also, the Party accused is allowed to vote on whether or not to 
open a factual record and whether to publicize the factual record. The lack of 
transparency may create suspicion about the process and make people think that 
the decisions are more political than environmentally oriented. It may be 
necessary to change the way the Council reaches its decisions or at least make 
them more open.
Another important concern about the process is the effectiveness of the factual 
record. The factual record is nothing but a simple report. The Secretariat does 
not make a judgement or determine if the Party accused failed to properly 
enforce its environmental law. The factual record is only a summary of the facts 
presented by the Submitter and the Party involved and the process finishes with 
the publication of the factual record. This is unlikely to be an effective sanction.
The only sanction that a Party may suffer from the publication of a factual record 
is “criticism” from the general public who become aware of the factual record. 
However, the possible benefit that the environment may receive is uncertain. It is 
not possible to stop any project pending completion of the citizen submission 
process. In the event that a factual record is opened it is likely that by the time 
the process is finished the project may also have finished, and the harm to the 
environment will have already occurred.
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It is necessary to give a more powerful effect to a factual record since even if a 
factual record is opened for an alleged failure of enforcement of a country’s 
environmental laws, the record seems difficult to use against the accused Party 
given the restrictions inherent in the dispute resolution process established in 
NAAEC’s section Five. As mentioned by Bugueda274, to use a factual record in 
the dispute resolution process, it is necessary that one Party request its initiation; 
secondly, the dispute resolution process is limited to “situation^] involving 
workplace, firms, companies, or sectors that produce goods or provide services” 
275. In other words, the factual record must be related to trade and the 
environment. On the other hand, the citizen submission process is open to 
cases where there is no trade relationship and the submission therefore should 
be focused on the acts or omissions of a Party rather than on compliance by a 
particular company or business, especially if the Submitter is a competitor that 
may stand to benefit economically from the submission. Therefore the possibility 
of using a factual record as proof in a dispute resolution process is limited and to 
use a factual record to start the process is likely impossible.
4.5.2 The Submissions
Another way to evaluate the Public Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 
and 15 is by reviewing the submissions submitted before the CEC. We will
"'Ib id . 1603.
275 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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analyze the process by analyzing some of the most important submissions filed 
as of October 25, 2001.
Since the establishment of the CEC in 1994, 29 Submissions have been filed 
with the Secretariat, of which 18 have been terminated and 11 are still pending. 
Of the 18 terminated cases, the Secretariat terminated six Submissions because 
they did not satisfy the formal requirements under Article 14(1). Three 
Submissions were terminated under Article 14(2)276 since in the opinion of the 
Secretariat the submissions did not merit a response from the accused Party. In 
five cases the Secretariat did not recommend the preparation of a factual record. 
In two cases, BC Hydro and Cozumel, the Council instructed the Secretariat to 
prepare a factual record. While in one case (Quebec Hog Farms) the Council 
refused to prepare a factual record despite the fact that the Secretariat 
recommended that it do so. Finally, the Submitters withdrew their Submission in 
one case. Of the 11 pending cases, the Secretariat is currently reviewing the 
Submissions with respect to the Article 14(1) requirements in two cases. In five 
cases, the Secretariat has not yet decided whether to recommend the 
preparation of a factual record under Article 15(1). The Council is currently 
reviewing three Submissions in which the Secretariat has recommended 
preparation of factual records. Preparation of one factual record by the 
Secretariat is pending.
276 See Appendix 3 for a description of the submissions as of October 25,2001.
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In order to assess the results generated by the citizen submission process thus 
far we will analyze three submissions filed before the CEC and analyze the 
results of each submission.
4.5.2.1 Submission 96-001 on Protection of Reefs in Cozumel, 
Mexico
On January 18, 1996, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (Mexican 
Center for Environmental Law) and two other environmental organizations, the 
Comitd para la Proteccidn de los Recursos Naturales (Natural Resource 
Protection Committee) and the Grupo de los Cien Internacional (International 
Group of One Hundred), filed a submission against Mexico.277 The submission 
concerned the construction of a cruise ship pier on the island of Cozumel in the 
Mexican State of Quintana Roo, in the Caribbean Sea.
The Submitters alleged that the construction and operation of the cruise ship pier 
would have significant adverse environmental impacts on nearby coral reef 
ecosystems, the best known of which is the Paraiso (Paradise) Reef. As such, 
the Submitters argued that, under Mexico’s national ecology law, work on the 
cruise ship pier must be halted until a proper environmental impact assessment 
was completed.278
277 See CEC webpage SEM-95-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=3.
278 Ibid.
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The Secretariat determined that the Submitters had alleged a sufficient factual 
and legal basis to require Mexico to respond. Following a review of Mexico’s 
response, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the preparation of 
a factual record.279 On August 2,1996, the Council adopted the recommendation 
and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.280
The factual record, which was completed and released to the public on October 
24, 1997, provided a detailed account of the Mexican laws relating to the 
protection of Cozumel’s reefs, and of Mexico’s apparent disregard of those laws 
in its effort to approve and complete the Cozumel Pier Project. 281 The factual 
record, however, stopped short of expressly finding that Mexico had violated the 
NAAEC. It also failed to set forth any specific recommendations or requirements 
for Mexico.282 As a result, there is considerable debate and uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the findings and the significance of the factual record.283
The debate is especially important in measuring the actual value of the factual 





283 See Susan Ferris, “Oversight Groups Co-exist Uneasily with NAFTA Feeling Powerless, 
Environmentalists Grow Frustrated’, A t la n ta  J. and C o n s t., (August 2, 1998). This Article 
contains a quote from Dora Uribe, an attorney from Cozumel, which states that the “only 
conclusion [one] can make... is that this is another bureaucracy with no power.” On the other 
hand Gustavo Alanis, President of the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, has declared that 
the Cozumel record represented “an enormous victory for international environmental rights. 
Public Workshop on the Public History Submissions on Enforcement Maters under Articles 14 
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation” (Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal December 7 -8  2000) notes taken by the author during the 
workshop.
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general public. Contrary to what the environmental community may think or what 
the Director of the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental Gustavo Alanis 
said284 the impact of the factual record has been minimal.
As part of the experience I had as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I was 
involved with the Cozumel Pier Project between November 1999 and July 
2000.285 During that time, I had the opportunity to interact with the State 
Delegation of the PROFEPA. Until early July 2000 there were more than ten 
administrative files opened against the owner of the project. Of these 
administrative files more than eight were opened between 1995 and 1997, thus 
many of them were opened as a result of the factual record.
Nevertheless, the administrative files opened against the Cozumel Pier Project 
were still open at least until mid July 2000 because many of them were “cold 
files" or in other words they were inactive. It may be that they were literally 
“locked away” for political reasons and remerged when a new governor was 
elected. Neither the owner of the Pier Project or PROFEPA did anything to solve 
the environmental problems that were flagged by the Submitters. The inactivity of 
the authorities and the amount of files that were kept unfinished, leads one to 
believe that the effect of the factual record was almost nil. Moreover, the 
inactivity of PROFEPA is particularly shameful, if we take into consideration that
284 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1611.
285 This experience allowed me to find out the response the authority had to the Cozumel Pier 
situation. However, the author does not have the documents necessary to support all assertions 
made by the authority, the General Attorney of Environmental Protection (herein after PROFEPA)
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many of those files were directly related to the environmental impact 
assessment, which was the main point of critique that the Submitters alleged 
against the Mexican government. Not only did the former owner of the project do 
nothing to improve the situation he even stopped some activities that a university 
laboratory was doing to prevent any harm to the coral reefs, activities that were 
part of the conditions established in the environmental impact authorization for 
the project.
As a corollary to this submission it is important to mention that when I became 
aware of these problems with the Cozumel Pier Project I asked why PROFEPA 
did nothing for two years. I was not given an answer. Nevertheless, one answer 
is clear: What has been the result of the factual record opened against Mexico? 
The answer is very little that is positive.
4.5.2.2 Submission 97-003 on Pollution from Hog Farms in
Quebec, Canada
On April 9, 1997, the Centre Qu6b£cois Du Droit de L’ Environment (CODE) and 
other NGOS filed a submission against Canada and the Province of Quebec 
alleging non-enforcement of Quebec’s Environmental Quality Act and Quebec’s 
Regulation Respecting the Prevention of Water Pollution in Livestock 
Operations.286 The Submitters alleged that the government of Quebec had failed
286 Ibid.
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to enforce certain environmental protection standards regarding agricultural 
pollution originating from animal production facilities, mainly hog farm s.287
On May 8, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission complied with 
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. On July 9, 1997, the Secretariat made the Article 
14(2) determination and requested that Canada file a response. Canada’s 
response included two main arguments.288
First, Canada asserted that Quebec was effectively enforcing its Environmental 
Quality Act and the Regulation Respecting the Prevention of Water Pollution in 
Livestock Operations.269 Second, Canada maintained that the preparation of a 
factual record by the CEC would be inappropriate because: Canada, particularly 
Quebec, effectively enforces the Environmental Quality Act and the Regulation 
Respecting The Prevention Of Water Pollution In Livestock Operations-, all the 
environmental measures put forward in the agricultural sector met the objectives 
and obligations contained in the NAAEC, particularly Articles 2, 4 and 5; the 
government of Quebec had just adopted new regulations with respect to 
agricultural pollution and new measures to improve the enforcement of the 
Environmental Quality Act. In this context Canada argued that, it is not 
appropriate to prepare a factual record since the new measures were part of the 
process to improve the Act and the regulations in accordance with Article 3 of the 
Agreement. Finally, preparing a factual record would not produce any new
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information nor would it shed any new light in view of the information provided in 
the response.
On October 29, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the 
preparation of a factual record290 On May 16, 2000 the Council decided by a two- 
thirds vote against preparing a factual record regarding this submission. This 
decision was highly criticized during the JPAC meeting on December 2000 
because the Council did not give any particular reasons for the decision.
This decision to not open a factual record despite the Secretariat’s 
recommendation can be considered a step back for the NAAEC’s credibility. 
Previous commentators had thought that the possibility of not opening a factual 
record after a Secretariat’s recommendation would be “highly unlikely in practice, 
given the voting procedure and the expectations raised by previous public input 
into the process.”291 However, contrary to what many authors and 
environmentalist opined, the Council decided to not open a factual record and 
opened the door to suspicion of political deals and cover-ups.
In order to prevent the public losing confidence in the citizen submission process 
all the decisions should be made as open as possible. This can be achieved by 
permitting the public to known the reasons behind any decisions to open or not
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open a factual record or by allowing them to request clarification of the 
Secretariat’s or the Council’s activities or decisions.
Another important lesson learned form this submission is that it is necessary to 
establish deadlines for the Secretariat, the Party accused and especially the 
Council to reach its decisions or perform its activities. The Council took almost 
seven months to reach a controversial decision in this case. Seven months is too 
long to reach any given decision, especially regarding environmental matters. It 
is necessary to establish strict deadlines for such decisions
4.5.2.3 Submission 98-007 on an Abandoned Lead Smelter in 
Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico.
On October 23,1998, the Comite Ciudadano pro Restauracion del Canon del 
Padre y  Servicios Comunitarios, A.C., filed a submission against Mexico, alleging 
that the government failed to enforce its environmental laws with respect to an 
abandoned lead smelter in Tijuana in the State of Baja California.292 The 
Submitters stated that Metales y Derivados, failed to repatriate to the United 
States the hazardous waste that it generated in Tijuana and that its owners and 
operators abandoned their company and left behind approximately 6000 metric 
tons of lead slag, by-product waste piles, sulphuric acid and heavy metals from
292 See CEC webpage SEM-98-007 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=44
SEM-98-007.
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battery recycling operations.293 The Submitters asserted that Mexico had failed 
to enforce its environmental laws through its failure to criminally prosecute the 
owner and through its lack of efforts to contain or neutralize the hazardous 
waste.294
On March 5,1999 the Secretariat issued determinations under Articles 14(1) and 
14(2) and requested a response from Mexico295, On June 1,1999 Mexico filed its 
response. However its response was submitted as confidential. Although Mexico 
is encouraged by Guideline 17.3 to provide the CEC with a summary of its 
response and an explanation of its claim of confidentiality, it does not appear that 
Mexico did so.
The Secretariat on March 6, 2000 recommended to the Council to elaborate a 
factual record, and on May 16, 2000 the Council decided in a unanimous 
decision to instruct the Secretariat to elaborate a factual record regarding the 
submission.296 However as of October 25, 2001 the Secretariat has not 
elaborated the factual record. Again the lack of deadlines is evident.
Between November 1999 and July 2000, as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I 
had the opportunity to advise a company that had a facility where Metales y 
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the property, the company performed a phase I and II analysis of the soil, and 
they found after digging down through one concrete layer, through more soil and 
then through a second concrete layer, waste that included lead slag and residues 
of piles and sulphuric acid.
When they unofficially reported their findings, the Mexican authority said that the 
company must clean up the land despite the fact that they did not generate the 
waste. It was clear at that moment that the authority knew that Metales y  
Derivados was responsible but they were trying to avoid further involvement with 
Metales y  Derivados. Not only did the Mexican authorities fail to enforce its 
environmental law but also the American authorities failed to notify Metales y  
Derivados that the hazardous materials temporally exported to Mexico must be 
returned to the United States for its final disposal, nor did the United States do 
any follow up. It remains to be seen if the American authorities will be accused in 
the future.
4.6 Conclusion.
The citizen submission process marks an advance in the protection of the 
environment because it allows citizen participation, albeit limited. Chapter 5 will 
discuss further criticisms of the process and suggest changes to improve it.
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CHAPTER 5: SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS.
5.1 Introduction.
The NAAEC is an important step toward achieving a balance between free trade 
and the protection of the environment. However, finding the appropriate balance 
between sometimes contradictory matters is not easy. Nevertheless, the drafters 
of the agreement tried to find a balance by allowing some limited participation of 
the general public in the protection of the environment in North America and by 
creating a special dispute resolution process where environmental matters can 
be considered. Neither approach is perfect and both can be improved.
The NAAEC as an international agreement was negotiated by governments, and 
therefore is not easy to modify, since the parties and their respective legislative 
bodies must approve any modifications. Nevertheless, as part of this thesis the 
author suggests several ways to improve the citizen submission process.
First, it is necessary to perform an analysis and critique of the process.
5.2 The Lack of Deadlines in the Citizen Submission Process.
The citizen submission process timeline has been too long. The process lacks 
deadlines to move the process forward or deadlines for providing a final decision
130
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at each of the mandatory stages set out in Articles 14 and 15. This problem is 
particularly significant because time plays an important role in the protection of 
the environment and the enforcement of environmental legislation.
In the case of Article 14 (1) the agreement states that the Secretariat may 
consider a submission from any non-governmental organization or person 
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law if the 
Secretariat finds that the submission meets all the criteria established in 
paragraph 1. However, there is no specific deadline that the Secretariat must 
comply with to verify the relevant criteria. It is clear that given the complexity of 
the submissions the Secretariat may need a significant period of time to study it. 
However, that period should be limited.
For example, in the case of the submission SEM-01-001 filed on February 14, 
2001 by the Academia Sonorense de Derecho Ambiental A.C. (submission 
known as Cytar II), the Secretariat determined that the submission met the 
criteria established by Article 14 (1) on April 24 2001. It took only two months to 
make this decision. However in the case of the submission SEM-00-01 filed by 
the Maria Rosa Escalante de Fernandez (submission known as Molymex I), filed 
on January 27, 2000 the Secretariat took more than two months to determine 
that the submission did not fulfill the criteria established in Article 14. The 
Secretariat did not reach its decision until April 25, 2000. However, in the
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Cozumel Pier submission the Secretariat only took 20 days to reach a decision 
about Article 14 (1).297 The timeline is entirely different in each case.
As a result of this review, it is clear that the time to reach a decision about Article 
14 (1) was between 20 to 60 days. It is important to mention that it is to be 
expected that some decisions would take more time than others due to 
complexity or the amount of information available. Nevertheless, it is important to 
establish a deadline for the Secretariat to determine whether a submission fulfills 
the Article 14(1) criteria.
Further, as established in Article 14 (2), where the Secretariat determines that a 
submission meets the criteria set out in paragraph 1, the Secretariat shall 
determine whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party. 
Again, there is no deadline for the Secretariat to reach such a decision. Similarly, 
there is no time limit on the Secretariat’s internal review of any response received 
from a Party. For example, in the case of the Great Lakes submission SEM-98- 
003 the Secretariat received the response from the United States on November 
15, 2000 and took almost eleven months to decide to not open a factual 
record.298
Even when the Secretariat has reached the decision to recommend opening a 
factual record, the Council can take up to six months to decide on the
297 A complete review of the status of the submission can be seen at www.cec.org, visited on 
September 2,2001.
298 The Secretariat reached its decision on October 5 2001.
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recommendation, as in the case of the Quebec Hog Farms where the Secretariat 
suggested opening a factual record on October 29,1999, and the Council did not 
reach its decision until May 16, 2000.299 That is more than six months. The time 
to reach a decision of this importance should not be that long, because of the 
significant ramifications.
The procedure can only be effective if it resolves all submissions without delay. 
The results of the CEC’s activities regarding the citizen submission process have 
been mixed. The Secretariat resolved the first six submissions, filed in 1995 and 
1996, promptly within a few months. In the only case in which the Secretariat 
recommended the preparation of a factual record, SEM-96-01, the Cozumel Pier 
case, it did so only five months after the submission was filed. During 1995-1996, 
only six submissions were filed. That may be the reason why these cases were 
dealt with relatively promptly.
Nevertheless, during 1997 and 1998 fourteen submissions were filed and the 
pace of processing the submissions slowed considerably. On September 1998 
the Secretariat created a separate unit on submissions and in 1999 only two 
submissions were received, allowing the Secretariat to work on those previously 
submitted. By September 2000, the Secretariat’s decision on whether to
299 As mentioned by Gustavo Aianis-Ortega and Ana Karina Gonzalez on Comentarios del Centro 
Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C. (CEMDA) sobre las Lecciones Aprendidas en Relacion 
con las Peticiones Ciudadanas Contenidas en los Articulos 14 y 15 del Acuerdo de Cooperacion 
Ambiental de America del Norte,(Written Comments on the Public History of Submissions made 
under Articles 14 and 15 of the North Agreement on Environmental Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, Montreal Canada, December 6, 2000)
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recommend a factual record on submissions SEM Nos. 97-02, 98-04 and 98-05 
was still pending.300
It is important to mention that the delay is not only because of Secretariat 
inactivity, but also because of delay by the parties and Council. In the case of 
SEM-97-02, Mexico delayed its response to submit additional information for 
more than one year. It is clear that one reason for the delays is that the 
defendant Party is often slow in submitting its response and stricter deadlines 
should therefore be imposed to accelerate the process. However in the case of 
SEM nos. 97-03 and 97-06, the Council delayed its decision to open a factual 
record seven and ten months respectively, after the Secretariat had made the 
request. It is essential to establish deadlines for the Council’s activities also.
As mentioned, there is no time limit for the Secretariat to prepare a factual 
record.301 The lack of a deadline and the eventual delay may have severe 
consequences on the environment. For example, in the Cozumel Pier case, the 
Secretariat’s delay in elaborating a factual record allowed the owner of the pier to 
finish its construction, and eventually harming the coral reef. By the time the 
factual record was published, the project was already finished.302 As mentioned
300 As mentioned by Carla Sbert Legal Officer Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit during 
the Public Workshop held on Montreal on December 6 and 7 2000. In the case of the submission 
SEM-98-03 as of September 2001, the decision to whether to open a factual record is still 
pending. See the CEC web page at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?varlan=espanol&submissionlD=41 
(as visited on September 2,2001).
301 NAAEC Article 15(1).
302 The Cozumel Project's first phase was finished by mid summer 1996 and is still functioning.
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by some commentators, over half of the active submissions remained pending for 
approximately two years303 or more. In the case of submission SEM-97-003, 
three years elapsed between the time the submission was filed and Council’s 
decision not to develop a factual record.304
Moreover, there is a requirement that a Secretariat recommendation to the 
Council and the information that it is based upon be withheld from the public for 
30 days after its submission to the Council.305 However, this provision is 
impractical and there is not a good reason for its existence, except to delay even 
more the preparation of a factual record.
In order to prevent more delays in the submission process and to maintain 
credibility with the public and to increase its effectiveness, the process must be 
more timely. Reducing the timing required for reviewing, responding to and 
processing a submission, and eventually for preparing a factual record is 
essential. To accomplish this goal, the suggestions of this author are twofold.
First, it is necessary to establish a 45- or 60- day deadline for the Secretariat to 
decide if the submission complies with the criteria established in Article 14, (1)
303 John H. Knox, “Comments on the Lessons from the History of the 14/15 Submissions 
Procedure”, (Written Comments on the Public History of Submissions made under Articles 14 and 
15 of the North Agreement on Environmental Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
Montreal Canada, December 6,2000).
304 Herve Pegot, “ Comments on the Mechanism for Citizen Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters, A Report by the Quebec Environmental Law Centre, (Written Comments on the Public 
History of Submissions made under Articles 14 and 15 of the North Agreement on Environmental 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Montreal Canada, December 6,2000)
Guidelines 10.2.
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and (2). There should also be a stricter deadline for a defending Party’s 
response to the Secretariat about a submission. Although Article 14 (3) 
establishes a 30-day and 60- day deadline in some cases, that deadline is not 
always respected. If a Party does not respond within the deadline, the Secretariat 
should be able to continue with the next step of the process. In other words, the 
Secretariat should be able to suggest to the Council the preparation of a factual 
record. This will force the Party accused to submit its response promptly in order 
to avoid the opening of a factual record.
It is also necessary to establish a strict deadline for the Council for voting on 
whether or not to open a factual record or to make the final factual record public. 
In general, the Council should be able to authorize or decline to develop a factual 
record within 60 days and in exceptional circumstances within 90 days. This will 
give the Secretariat nine months from the decision to open a factual record to 
prepare and develop it. This deadline will permit the reduction of the timeline 
from between 18 and 38 months to an average of between 14 and 18 months.
Second, it is necessary not only to establish such deadlines but also to give more 
resources to the Secretariat to comply with these deadlines. Two staff members 
in the Secretariat assigned to the submissions unit are not enough, and if the 
popularity of the process continues to grow, two persons will not be able to 
handle the process expeditiously. It is clear that the human and financial 
resources assigned to the Secretariat must increase. The Secretariat must have
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adequate resources to attract and retain consistently high-quality staff and 
specialized consultants. With enough resources the Secretariat will be able to 
fulfill it responsibility and be able to meet its deadlines.
Reducing the timelines will create an expedited citizen submission process and 
will maintain the CEC’s high level of credibility in the international community, 
since the international community will believe that the Secretariat is doing its 
activities in a prompt and diligent way.
5.3 Transparency and Openness of the Process.
The citizen submission process is not characterized by its transparency and 
access to the public. Once the submission is filed, all the activities, decisions and 
votes are kept behind closed doors and secret from the Submitter and other 
citizens that may be interested. The lack of transparency and openness in the 
process may harm the credibility of the process and therefore its future.
Once the submission is filed, during its development to the eventual publication 
of a factual record, it is not open either to the general public or the Submitter. 
Only the Secretariat, the Council, and the Party accused have access to the 
information. Moreover, the Party accused has access to a draft factual record 
and may even provide comments on the accuracy of the draft.306 Even if the 
submission involves a third Party, as in the case of submission SEM-96-001
306 NAAEC Article 15 (5).
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where the allegations involved the developer of the Cozumel Pier, the third Party 
is not allowed to submit any allegations to the Secretariat.307
Article 15 (7) establishes that the Council may, by a two-thirds vote, make the 
final factual record publicly available, normally within 60 days following its 
submission. However one question arises: What are the possible reasons that a 
factual record will be kept secret? The factual record might contain confidential 
information, such as industrial secrets or infromation related to national security. 
However even if that were the case this confidential information could be omitted 
and the balance of the factual record made public. Apart from concerns about 
confidentiality, it is difficult to suggest any persuasive reasons for not making a 
factual record public. If not made public, the factual record has no purpose. Once 
a factual record is elaborated, all the records should be public. If this not done, 
the record has little or nor purpose.
Another part of the NAAEC that is directed more to keeping the process behind 
closed doors than to promoting its transparency is the Council's power to not give 
any particular reason for not opening a factual record. Many of those involved 
and other interested persons, are concerned about this lack of transparency.
For example, during the Public Workshop on the Public History Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation held in Montreal, on December 7 and 8, 2000,
307 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1604.
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members of the Quebec Environmental Law Centre requested several times to 
be given a reason why the Council decided not to open a factual record308 on the 
submission SEM-97-003 filed before the CEC.
The Council’s power to not open a factual record, a power that appears absolute, 
is one of the major criticisms that the citizen submission procedure received 
during the Montreal workshop. As mentioned by the Quebec Environmental Law 
Centre, this absolute power raises several questions309: Should the Council have 
the last word? While Council does direct NAEEC, should it be permitted to 
disregard the Secretariat’s conclusions? Is not the Secretariat, which examines 
and analyzes submissions, better placed to decide whether a factual record 
should be developed? It seems difficult to find any good reason to not open a 
factual record. However, I would amend the agreement to make it mandatory for 
the Council to give reasons for not opening a factual record. This would prevent 
the suspicion of cover ups.
It is clear that any decision from the Council to not open a factual record or 
certain other decision-making points within Article 14(1) and (2) should be open 
to the public and all its decisions should be reasoned and informed. In order to 
maintain the confidence in the process, the parties, the Council and the
308 In the case of submission SEM-97-003, the Council decided, contrary to the Secretariat's 
suggestion, to not prepare a factual record and did not give any reason for its decision. See 
Council Decision 00-01 dated May 16,2000.See
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=240.
Date accessed November 20,2001.
309 Quebec Law Centre supra note 28 at 11.
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Secretariat must act openly and on a reasoned basis. During the submission 
process the Secretariat should allow the Submitters to submit rebuttal or 
additional information, and permit the submitting of information or comments on 
the preparation of a factual record. All Secretariat recommendations to open a 
factual record should be made public as soon as the recommendations are 
made.
Moreover, it is especially important to avoid any complex or intricate 
requirements that make it difficult to file submissions. The Guidelines should be 
reformed to simplify and clarify the process. They should not be reformed with 
the intention to require additional information or create additional conditions to 
filing a submission. An example of such additional and unnecessary conditions is 
the creation of a page limit on a submission or creating a 30-day period after the 
Secretariat submits a recommendation to the Council to open a factual record. 
These requirements should be eliminated.3’0
It is also important to mention that the Secretariat, its members and the Council 
should try to work in a more independent manner without looking for guidance 
from the parties. An independent Secretariat is necessary for the credibility of 
the process and especially so that it will not be perceived as biased in favour of 
either Submitters or Parties. All Secretariat decisions should be based on 
carefully reasoned legal interpretations of the Agreement or any Party’s 
environmental law rather than the fear of possible adverse reactions or
310 Alanis supra note 299.
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favouritism by one side or the other. The Secretariat must continue to be 
independent and work to improve the independence of its staff.
5.4 Effectiveness of the Factual Record.
When the Council authorizes the Secretariat to open a factual record, the 
Secretariat shall consider any information furnished by a Party and may consider 
any relevant technical, scientific or other information that is publicly available, 
submitted by the interested non-governmental organizations or persons, by the 
JPAC, or developed by the Secretariat. After gathering all the information 
submitted, the Secretariat shall submit a draft factual record to the Council and 
any Party may provide comments on the accuracy of the draft within 45 days 
thereafter.311
According to Article 12 of the Guidelines a draft and final factual records 
prepared by the Secretariat will contain:
(a) a summary of the submission that initiated the process:
(b) a summary of the response, if any, provided by the concerned 
Party;
(c) a summary of any other relevant factual information: and
311 NAAEC Article 15 (4) and (5).
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(d) the facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the matters 
raised in the submission.
The final factual record will incorporate, as appropriate, the comments of any 
Party. The final factual record may be public if the Council instructs the 
Secretariat to make it public.312
The Agreement and the Guidelines can be criticized on several grounds. First, it 
is important to mention that during the Public Workshop313 many commentators 
criticized how the decision to open a factual record is reached, and the content of 
the factual record. The decision to open a factual record has been highly 
criticized314 because the fact that the Party accused of not enforcing its 
environmental law can vote in such decisions is contrary to the principles of 
natural justice. As mentioned by Baron “ a decision to not open a factual record 
will invariably lead to suspicion of cover-ups and political deal-making that could 
seriously undermine the Commission’s credibility315”. By allowing the Party 
accused to vote on whether or not to prepare a factual record, the Agreement is 
allowing possible political cover-ups or the appearance of a cover-up.
312 Ibid.
313 See generally Written Comments supra note 283.
3™ See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
Baron supra 191 at 611.
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The content and how the information is gathered have also been criticized. 
Although the Secretariat can prepare the factual record only from the information 
submitted by the parties, the JAPAC, NGO'S or interested persons, it does not 
have subpoena power to obtain information. There is no obligation to submit any 
information and the Secretariat depends on the good will of the Party or Parties 
and others to cooperate with them.
The Party involved in the investigation is not compelled to respond to the 
Secretary’s request for more information needed for the preparation of a factual 
record. Any information submitted is voluntary. Since much of the information 
gathered by the Secretariat is submitted voluntarily this could prevent the 
Secretariat from determining whether a violation had occurred. As mentioned by 
some authors316, the Party accused could submit information of a vague and 
unsatisfactory nature in order to complicate the investigation and make it 
impossible to evaluate the facts alleged in a submission. Even worse, Article 21 
provides that a Party may notify the Council that any request for information from 
the Secretariat is excessive or otherwise unduly burdensome or can even refuse 
to submit information by simply providing to the Secretariat written reasons.
On the other hand, the Submitter and third parties involved, such as the owner of 
the project involved in the submission, are not allowed to participate or submit 
information unless the Secretariat requests it. Neither have they the opportunity
316 Sandra L Priol-Vrejan, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to 
Investigate Violations of Environmental Laws”, (1995) 23 Hofstra Law Review 483 at 502.
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to comment on the Party’s response or the draft of the factual record. The lack of 
power to initiate its own investigation does not allow the Secretariat to ensure 
that the Parties are enforcing their environmental laws. Since the Secretariat 
depends on the information submitted by the public and relies only on the 
information publicly available or submitted voluntarily by the Parties or the public, 
it is susceptible to personal and political agendas.317
Another criticism of the process has been the content of the factual record. As 
mentioned by NAAEC Article 15 and Guidelines Article 12, the factual record will 
contain only summaries of the submission, and the response, if any of the Party 
and also a summary of other relevant information and the facts presented by the 
Secretariat with respect to the matter. However, the factual record cannot include 
an evaluation or judgment by the Secretariat. There is no recourse to an 
arbitration panel or the imposition of any fines.318 The elaboration of a summary 
of the submission can hardly be considered a true sanction.
Once the factual record is prepared, the Council must decide whether to make 
the factual record public. Even if the factual record is made available to the public 
there is no requirement to actually publish the factual record in a newspaper or 
anywhere else. The Council’s obligation is to make the factual record available to 
the public. However, since the only “sanction” to a Party for not enforcing its
317 Ibid, at 511.
318 Jared Brumfield, ‘1994: The year that Regional Environmental Enforcement Gets Tough? An 
Analysis of NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and Maastrich Treaty",(1993) 16 Int’l. Envtl. 
Rep. 959 at 963.
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environmental law is to attract the attention of the general public, how can this be 
accomplished if the factual record is not published? If the factual record is not 
published it seems very unlikely to generate the public pressure necessary to 
force a Party to properly enforce its environmental legislation.
The effectiveness of the factual record was also criticized during the Public 
Workshop319. The factual record is only effective because of the impact that this 
record may have on the public and the pressure that the public may have on the 
Party responsible to enforce its environmental legislation or to change its policy. 
Even more, the possible use of a factual record to initiate the formal dispute 
resolution process also seems difficult, if not impossible, since this mechanism is 
limited to situations involving a trade relationship. Therefore the factual record 
appears to be only a symbolic sanction.
Many suggestions have been submitted to the CEC to modify the process. Some 
have suggested that the Council should consider a factual record in light of the 
CEC’s environmental cooperation programs in order to address possible 
solutions to the factual record as established by NAAEC’s Article 10 section 2.320 
Another suggestion is to create a mechanism that will permit the Council to 
suspend a project at the time the Council instructs the Secretariat to prepare a 
factual record.321 Another more aggressive suggestion is the imposition of
319 Public Workshop supra note 283.
320 See Chapter 2 section 2.2.3.1 and accompanying text.
321 Alanis supra note 283.
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monetary penalties322, but this will require a modification to the Agreement, 
something that the Parties are unlikely to do. Monetary penalties would create a 
hostile and confrontational process, which is not desirable.323
The suggestion of this author is the creation of a follow- up program after the 
publication of the factual record. In other words, after the Council has decided to 
open a factual record, the Council should invite the Party accused to submit 
within six months or a year after the publication of the factual record a program to 
address the problem or periodical information on how the problems are being 
addressed. This will permit the Council to follow up the case and avoid any 
possible restriction on the sovereignty of the parties or interference by the CEC.
Since the Council will invite the Party involved in the factual record to participate, 
the decision to participate or not will be voluntary. This will avoid any interference 
by the CEC on any internal environmental decisions or policies. After this 
invitation, the general public and NGOS need to create the necessary pressure 
on the Party to submit a solution plan or to submit annual or bi-annual reports of 
the situation. This modification will allow a more active participation from the 
general public.
323 As mentioned by Hector Sepulveda of the Confederation Patronal de la Republica Mexicans 
(COPARMEX) at the Montreal Public Workshop which was attended by the author.
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In order to permit such follow up, it will be necessary to modify Article 15 of the 
NAAEC to permit the Council to invite the Party involved to participate in the 
factual record. This modification is not as difficult as some have suggested since 
it leaves the enforcement of environmental laws to the Parties and not to the 
private citizens or NGOS. It also respects the sovereignty of every Party to 
decide how to address problems of lack of enforcement and whether they want to 
participate with the CEC. At the same time it will permit private citizens and 
NGOS to play their roles by bringing social pressure to bear within their own 
territory.
Another important modification that should be made is to allow the use of a 
factual record in the Parties Dispute Resolution Process established in NAAEC’s 
section Five. As it stands now, to start the Parties Dispute Resolution Process, 
first it is necessary that one Party request its initiation. However, this process is 
limited to “situation^] involving workplace, firms, companies, or sectors that 
produce goods or provide services.” 324 It is therefore limited to disputes related 
to trade and the environment. However, the citizen submission process is open 
only to cases where there is no trade relationship. Therefore, the use of a factual 
record in the parties dispute resolution process is difficult since the two 
processes are based on divergent principles.
This should be modified. The NAAEC and its guidelines should permit the use of 
a factual record as proof in a dispute resolution process or even to initiate the
324 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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process itself. Any Party that decides to start the dispute resolution process 
should be able use a factual record in order to prove that the Party accused is 
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. This will give the factual record 
a real and tangible effect, rather than simply affording temporary public exposure 
and perhaps bringing pressure to bear on a government.
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CONCLUSIONS
In order to address the environmental concerns raised by the existence of a 
continent-wide free trade zone, Canada, United States and Mexico created an 
environmental side agreement, the NAAEC. Although imperfect, the NAAEC 
embodies several processes which were innovative and which have the potential 
to resolve difficult conflicts that arise when countries try to maximize trade 
without sacrificing the environment. The key innovation is the Citizen Submission 
Process, a process that allows citizens and NGOs to make submissions to the 
Secretariat asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental 
laws. This is a tremendous advance, which for the first time in the history of such 
agreements allows public participation in the enforcement of international 
environmental law.
In general, the process has been well received and praised by environmentalists, 
academics and others. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
process has several important flaws. First the participation of the Submitter is 
limited to the presentation of the submissions, not allowing any further 
involvement. Only the Secretariat and the Party accused are entitled to 
participate during the first phase of the process and in the last phase of the 
process the other Parties of NAFTA are allowed to participate, but not the 
Submitter or any third person that may have an interest, such as the owner of the 
industry or project under review.
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Second, the process is not sufficiently transparent. All the proceedings and 
decisions are made behind closed doors. The lack of openness and transparency 
in the process fosters distrust and suspicion of political deal-making and cover- 
ups. Also, since the Council has several ways to control the Secretariat’s 
activities and in general to control and direct the CEC, the decisions of the CEC 
could be subject to political and economic influences brought to bear by the 
Council.
Third, the process takes too long. There are not strict deadlines for the 
Secretariat, the Party accused or the Council’s activities. Given that time is often 
of the essence when dealing with the environment, this is a significant flaw. 
Decisions should be made quickly in order to prevent further damage to the 
environment. Another flaw is the lack of effectiveness of the factual record. After 
the publication of the factual record, which temporally creates social pressure on 
the Party accused, there is no other significant effect. The factual record itself 
does not bring with it any legal consequences, and it can’t be used in the Dispute 
Resolution Process.
It is necessary to improve the process in order to reach NAAEC ‘s goals and fulfill 
the Parties’ commitment to the environment. First, it is important to increase the 
participation of the Submitter. During the submission process, the Secretariat 
should allow the Submitter to submit rebuttals or additional information, as well
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as to permit the submitting of information or comments on the preparation of a 
factual record.
Second, it is necessary to improve the transparency of the process. All the 
Secretariat’s and Council’s activities and decisions must be made openly. 
Reasons should always be given and made public. Third, the Secretariat, its staff 
and the Council must try to work more independently and base their decisions on 
the facts and the Agreement and avoid any political or economic influences in 
favour of any Party or Submitter.
Fourth, the process should have strict deadlines for all the parties involved, the 
Submitter, the Party accused, the Secretariat and especially the Council. Fifth, it 
is important to improve the effectiveness of a factual record. The mere 
publication of a factual record is not enough. It is necessary to create a follow-up 
plan in order to verify the actions taken by the Party accused to address the 
environmental problems set out in the factual record.
Despite its flaws, the Citizen Submission Process was a groundbreaking 
innovation and is a model for public participation in any environmental 
agreement. The participation of the public in general and the NGO’s in particular 
could help the Parties to identify its flaws and improve their enforcement activities 
as well as to create a stronger environmental conscience among the citizens of 
the three countries.
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The Citizen Submission Process in the NAAEC is likely to remain the same as it 
is for the next few years. However, with the discussions of a new Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas, and the concerns about the environment these 
discussions have raised, a new agreement may contain a better and more 
effective citizen submission process.
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Appendix 1: CONSULTATION AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
(a) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Consultations
(b) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Burden o f Proof
(c ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Initiation o f Procedures
(d ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Request for an Arbitral Panel
(e ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Implementation o f Final Report
(f )  Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Review o f Implementation










Request of consultation 
Art.22:1
Deliverance to other 
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Appendix 1 (b)
Table 2. Criteria for Request of Consultation and Resolution of Disputes
Means
The complaining Party must establish 
that the ineffective enforcement began 
after January 1st, 1994, and that it 
formed a consistent pattern over a 
certain period of time.
The complaining Party must 
demonstrate, if the legislation in 
question allows for discretion as to 
compliance matters, that such 
discretion was exercised unreason­
ably by the public authorities of the 
Party complained against.
If the defense it to the effect that non- 
enforcement is due to allocation of 
resources, then the complaining Party 
must prove that such allocation does 
not follow from a bona fide decision 
by the public authorities of the Party 
complained against, 
its environmental laws The complaining Party must establish
that the primary purpose of the law, 
regulation, or provision is the 
protection of the environment.
Burden of proof
Persistent pattern of failure
by other Party 
to effectively enforce
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Appendix 1(c)




Request of special 
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Appendix 1 (d)
CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION OF DISPUTES






15 days 20 days
The parties may 
establish panel’s 
term o f reference
15 dayi i f  two parties
30 days i f  more than two parties__












Publication o f Final 
report 
Art. 32:3
Presentation o f panel’s 
Initial report 
Art. 31:2
Presentation o f panel’s 
Final report 
Art. 32:1
Vote o f the parties for 
chairing of panel 
Art. 27:1 (b)
Each party selects 2 
panelists 
Art. 27:1 (c)
Need a 2/3 vote o f Council 
Matter relate to trade of 
goods or services 
At. 24:1
Transmission to Council by 
Parties o f Final report + written 
views
Art. 32:2
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Appendix I  (e)
CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION OF DISPUTES





Shall the panel be 
reconvened?
See Step 5
Shall there be review of 
implementation?
See Step 5
Following Final report, Parties 
try to agree on an action plan 
Art. 33
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Appendix 1 (f)




A request under (a) shall be 
made within 60 to 120 days 
after Final report.
A request under (b) may be 
made no earlier than 180 






I f  Party fails to pay i
within 180 days I f  Party fails to pay
■ within 180 days ■i i- 1 i _
or
I f  alleged Party is 
C A N A D A  Commission 
shall file in Court the 
panel’s determination
or
I f  alleged Party is 
C A N A D A  Commission 





Panel is reconvened under (a) Panel is reconvened 
under(b)
Complaining party may 
suspend the application of 
N A F T A  benefits (36:1)
Complaining Party may 
suspend the application of 
NAFTA benefits (36:1)




appropriate action plan 
-Panel may assess 
monetary enforcement
(a) Parties did not 
agree on action plan
(b) Parties can’t agree 
on whether the plan is 
fully implemented
-Determination as to 
whether the Party is 
enforcing action plan 
- I f  not, panel may impose 
monetary enforcement 
assessment
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Appendix 1 (g)











Party is fully implementing 
the action plan
Panel’s determination
on delivery o f the 
requpst f
Council shall reconvene the 
panel
The complaining party may 
suspend the application to that 
party o f the NAFTA benefits 
(36:2)
Party is not fully 
implementing the action 
plan
Following panel’s 
determination by virtue of 
34:5(b)
At the request o f a 
party. Commission 
may file a copy o f 
panel’s determination 
in Court -  Annex 36 A
C a n a d ia n  do m estic  
e n fo rc e m e n t a n d  
c o lle c tio n  process
Legend
Request that the panel be 
reconvened 
whether the party complained 
against is fully implementing 
the action plan.
determine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I I
Appendix 2: THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
(h) Submissions on Enforcement Matters and Factual Records
(i) Requirements for Article 14 Private Submissions
Appendix 2 (a)
PRIVATE SUBMISSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS AND FACTUAL RECORDS












noEnd 2/3 vote by the 
council
Production of a defense
whether to consider 
submission
whether to request a response
Information 
provided to the 
Party
Whether to request a factual record
yes
 ± ________________
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Appendix 2 (b)
Table 1. Requirements for Private Submissions 
Requirements as to form
1. RESIDENCE (14:1 (f))
Submitter must be a person or an organization residing or established in the 
territory325 of any Party.
2. LANGUAGES (14:1 (a))
Submitter must have notified the Secretariat of the language to be used in the 
submission.
3. IDENTIFICATION (14:1 (b))
The submission must “clearly identify” the person or organization making the 
submission. Requirements as to content.
4. COMMUNICATION TO PARTY (14:1 (e))
The submission must contain proof that the matter has been communicated 
to the relevant authorities of the Party complained against and indicate its 
response if any.
5. INFORMATION (14:1 (c))
325 For a definition of territory see NAAEC’s Annex 45 regarding country-specific 
definitions.
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The submission must provide sufficient information including documentary 
evidence to “allow the Secretariat to review the submission.”
6. INDUSTRIAL HARASSMENT (14:1 (d))
The submission must appear to be aimed to promote enforcement rather than 
at harassment of industry.
7. HARM (14:2 (a))
The Secretariat will consider whether the Submitter alleges harm to itself.
8. PURSUING PRIVATE REMEDIES (14.2(c))
The Secretariat will consider whether the Submitter pursued private remedies 
available in the Party’s domestic forum.
9. MASS MEDIA REPORT (14:2 (d))
Another factor considered is whether the submission is “drawn exclusively 
from mass media reports.”
Objectives
10. ADVANCING THE GOALS OF THE AGREEMENT (14:2 (b ))
The Secretariat will consider whether the submission alone or combined with 
other submissions “raises matters whose further study in this process would 
advance the goals of the Agreement.” N.B. The objectives pursued by the 
Agreement are set out in Article 1 (a-j).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX 3: COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE NAAEC
3.1 Submission 95-001 on the United States’ Endangered Species Act.
The Biodiversity Legal Foundation, along with four other NGOs, including 
Mexico’s Consejo Asesor Sierra Madre, filed before the Secretariat the first 
submission on June 30,1995 against the United States.326
The Submitters alleged that the enactment of the 1995 Rescissions Act resulted 
in a failure to effectively enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because the 
new law expressly prohibited the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from 
listing new endangered species under the Act during the 1995 fiscal year.327 The 
Submitters alleged that the Act contained an unrelated amendment known as the 
“Hutchinson Rider” or “ESA Moratorium” and because of that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service determined that the Rider affected its enforcement of the ESA’s 
listing provision in two ways.
First the Rider prohibited the agency from making final determinations for species 
or critical habitat designations for the remainder of fiscal year 1995. Second, the 
Rider rescinded $1.5 million from the budget allocated to the program and
326 It is ironic that the first complaint was made against the United States and not against Mexico, 
as many NGO’s thought would happen.
327 See CEC webpage SEM-95-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=1
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prevented it from offsetting the loss from other programs. The Submitters alleged 
that the Rider should not be constructed as an amendment to the ESA, but as a 
suspension of the ESA’s enforcement provision, thus violating the NAAEC 
provision requiring each party to effectively enforce its environmental laws and 
regulations.
The Secretariat noted that although the 1995 Rescissions Act may have 
amounted to a breach of the obligation to maintain high levels of environmental 
protection, this breach did not provide an appropriate basis for an Article 14 
submission, which must be based on a “failure to effectively enforce” 
environmental laws.328 The Secretariat held that the phrase “failure to effectively 
enforce” referred only to action or inaction by agencies or agency officials, and 
not to legislative decisions to limit or suspend enforcement. 329Accordingly, on 
December 11, 1995, the Secretariat terminated the process, concluding: “Article 
14 was not intended to create an alternate forum for legislative debate.”330
By determining that a Party can diminish environmental legislation through a 
legislative decision, the CEC failed to take into consideration Article 3 which 
recognizes the right of each Party to set its own level of environmental protection 
but also establishes that the Parties should further commit to maintaining high 
levels of environmental protection and strive to continue to improve those laws 
and regulations. The Secretariat decision in this case is seen by some authors as
328 Ibid.
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a setback in the environmental movement and a rejection of the spirit of the 
NAAEC.331
3.2 Submission 95-002 on the United States’ Salvage Logging Rider.
On August 30, 1995, the Sierra Club, together with 27 other NGOs, filed a 
submission against the United States.332 The Submitters alleged that passage of 
the 1995 Salvage Logging Rider (the Rider) resulted in a failure to enforce all 
environmental laws mentioned within by eliminating private enforcement 
remedies for salvage timber sales.333 Specifically, the Rider provided that 
salvage timber sales would not be subject to administrative review and would 
automatically satisfy all federal environmental and natural resource laws. 334The 
Submitters asserted that the Rider’s language erected potentially 
“insurmountable obstacles to citizen enforcement of these environmental laws”335
331 Coatney, Jason, “The Council on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of "Effective 
Enforcement "Within the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation”, (1997) 
Tulsa L.J. 32 823-42 at 835.
332 See CEC webpage SEM-95-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=2 
The other co-Submitters were Alaska Center for the Environment, Ancient Forest Rescue,
Friends of the Earth, Headwaters, Hells Canyon Preservation Council, Idaho Conservation 
League, Inland Empire Public Lands Council, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Klamath Forest 
Alliance, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northcoast 
Environmental Center, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, Oregon Natural Resources Council,
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Pacific Rivers Council, Pilchuck Audubon 
Society, Portland Audubon Society, Seattle Audubon Society, Southern Rockies Ecosystem 
Project, Western Ancient Forest Campaign, The Wilderness Society, Earthlife Canada 
Foundation operating as BC Wild, Environmental Resource Centre of Alberta, Centro Mexicano 
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and essentially eliminated “the most effective (and often only) judicial remedies 
for [such] violations ....’,336
In a decision similar to that regarding the Endangered Species Act discussed 
above, the Secretariat held that “the enactment of legislation which specifically 
alters the [operation] of pre- existing environmental laws in essence becomes a 
part of the greater body of laws and statutes on the books, This is true even if 
pre-existing law is not amended or rescinded.”337 The Secretariat concluded that 
the “deemed to satisfy” language in the Rider did not constitute a “failure to 
enforce” under Article 14 of NAAEC. Thus, the Secretariat terminated the 
process on December 8 ,1995.338
3.3 Submission 96-002 on Wetlands Protection in Alberta, Canada.
On March 20, 1996, Mr. Aage Tottrup, a Canadian citizen, filed a submission 
against Canada and the province of Alberta, alleging that they had failed to 
effectively enforce water pollution laws in wetland areas 339 Tottrup asserted that 
this non-enforcement had resulted in significant adverse impacts on the habitat of 
fish and migratory birds.340
339 See CEC webpage SEM-96-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=4
340 Ibid.
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In considering whether the submission merited a response from Canada or 
Alberta, the Secretariat reviewed Article 14(2) of the NAAEC. 341 Article 14(2) 
provides, in relevant part, that uin deciding whether to request a response, the 
Secretariat shall be guided by whether...private remedies available under the 
Party’s law have been pursued.... 1,342 The Secretariat pointed out that Mr. 
Tottrup had already initiated proceedings against the Canadian federal 
government in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of 
Edmonton, and that the outcome of that suit was still pending. 343 Accordingly, 
the Secretariat determined, pursuant to Article 14(2), to take no further action in 
this matter, pending outcome the judicial proceeding in Canada.344
3.4 Submission 96-003 on Environmental Assessment of Fisheries in 
Canada.
The Friends of the Oldman River (FOR) a Canadian organization filed the fifth 
complaint on September 9, 1996, a submission against Canada.345 The 
Submitter alleged that the Government of Canada was failing to enforce the 
Canadian Fisheries Act (CFA) and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA). Specifically, the Submitter stated that there are very few prosecutions 
under the habitat provisions of the Fisheries Act, and the prosecutions that do
341 Ibid.
342 NAAEC Article 14(2).
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 See CEC wepage SEM-96-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=5
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occur are very unevenly distributed across the country. In fact, the Submitter 
alleged that there has been a de facto abdication of legal responsibilities by the 
Government of Canada to the inland provinces, and that the provinces have not 
done a good job of ensuring compliance with or enforcing the Fisheries Act.346
The Secretariat determined that the FOR submission satisfied the criteria under 
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC, and requested a response from Canada.347 In its 
response, Canada asserted that a second environmental organization, Friends of 
the West Country Association (FWCA), had filed suit in the Trial Division of the 
Federal Court of Canada in Alberta on November 7, 1996 sixty days after the 
filing date of the submission at issue. According to Canada, the allegations 
contained in FOR’s submission were essentially the same as those raised in 
FWCA’s lawsuit. As such, Canada contended that the Secretariat was required to 
terminate the review process until FWCA’s case was resolved.348
The Secretariat began evaluating Canada’s response by noting that, pursuant to 
Article 45(3) of the NAAEC, the term “judicial or administrative proceeding’’ only 
refers to actions brought by the Government, not by private parties such as
348 Ibid. Canada based its argument on Articles 14(2) and 14(3) of the NAAEC. As discussed 
above in the summary of Mr. Aage Tottrup’s submission, Article 14(2) provides, in relevant part, 
that “in deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided by 
whether...private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued..." Article 14(3) 
provides that if "the matter is the subject of pending judicial or administrative proceeding, [ ] the 
Secretariat shall proceed no further.”
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FWCA.349 Accordingly, the Secretariat rejected Canada’s argument that Article 
14(3) mandated that the review process be terminated. 350 Nonetheless, the 
Secretariat determined that Article 14(2) did provide discretionary authority to 
terminate the review process in a case such as this, even if an organization 
separate and distinct from a Submitter had filed the pending lawsuit. The 
Secretariat concluded that the matters raised in the submission bore a close 
resemblance to the issues then before the Federal Court of Canada.351 As such, 
the Secretariat was “reluctant to embark on a process which might unwittingly 
intrude on one or more of the litigant’s strategic considerations -  considerations 
which weigh in favour of allowing the domestic proceeding to advance without 
risking duplication or interference by considering parallel issues under the 
[NAAEC].”352 Accordingly, the Secretariat terminated the review process on April 
2, 1997. 353
3.5 Submission 96-004 on Military Base Expansion by the United States 
Army.
349 See NAAEC Article 45(3). Specifically, Article 45(3) provides that “judicial or administrative 
proceeding” means “a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued by the 
Party in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such actions comprise: mediation; 
arbitration, the process of issuing a license, permit or authorization; seeking sanctions or 
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On November 14, 1996, the Southwest Centre for Biological Diversity (SCBD), 
an American NGO, filed a submission against the United States.354 The 
submissions concerned the United States Army’s expansion of Fort Huahuca in 
the state of Arizona. The Army prepared an environmental impact assessment in 
connection with the proposed base expansion, but it did not address “cumulative 
impacts”, such as the effect of the expansion on regional water resources and 
the San Pedro River basin ecosystem.355 SCBD contended that the Army’s 
failure to assess these cumulative impacts constituted a failure to enforce and 
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act “NEPA”.356 SCBD originally 
filed a claim in a domestic court, but were barred by the statute of limitations 
under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.
The Secretariat found that the petition met the requirements of Article 14 (1) and 
Article 14 (2) and merited a response from the United States.357 The United 
States responded with several arguments. First, the United States argued that 
the alleged non-enforcement of NEPA occurred before the NAAEC entered into 
force and, thus, was not subject to an Article 14 challenge because the NAAEC 
was not intended to apply retroactively.358 Second, the United States maintained 
that the Army’s environmental impact assessment was consistent with the 
requirements of NEPA.359 Third, the United States contended that SCBD had
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failed to pursue private remedies under domestic law because the NEPA lawsuit 
had been untimely.360 Finally, the United States responded that the development 
of a factual record by the CEC could adversely affect SCBD’s pending judicial 
appeal of the dismissal of a suit brought under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).361 According to the United States, the ESA lawsuit was based on facts 
that were then the subject of its Article 14 submission.362
In its response the United States also cited the Secretariat’s determination in 
SEM-95-001, stating that the Article 14 process is not intended to be a forum for 
challenging legislative changes to the nature and scope of a Party’s 
environmental laws. Due to the United States response the SCBD withdrew their 
petition on June 6, 1997.363
3.6 Submission 97-001 on Impact of Canadian Hydroelectric Dams on Fish 
in British Columbia.
On April 2, 1997, the British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission (AFC), 
filed a submission against the Government of Canada, alleging a failure to 
enforce the Canadian Fisheries Act and National Energy Board Act.36* According 
to the AFC, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the
Article 14.1 provides that “ [l]f a Submitter informs the Secretariat in writing that it no longer
wishes to have the submission process continue with respect to its submission, the Secretariat
will proceed no further with the submission ” Articles 14 and 15 Guidelines.
364 See CEC webpage SEM 97-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=9
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National Energy Board (NEB) had failed to protect the fish and fish habitat on 
British Columbia’s rivers from ongoing environmental damage caused by 
hydroelectric dams.365 The AFC alleged that the DFO had refused to impose 
fines against private hydropower companies for damage to fish habitat and the 
NEB had refused to investigate the environmental impacts of hydropower 
generation.366 On May 15, 1997, the Secretariat determined that AFC’s 
submission satisfied the criteria of Article 14(2) and requested a response from 
the Canadian Government.367
On July 21, 1997, the Canadian Government filed its response with the CEC368, 
and in its response, Canada agued that a factual record should not be prepared 
for the following reasons: (1) the enforcement of the Fisheries Act was the 
subject of pending judicial and administrative proceedings; (2) the DFO’S and 
NEB’s actions were consistent with the agencies discretionary authority under 
Canadian environmental law: and (3) the non-enforcement alleged by the AFC 
took place before the NAAEC went into effect.
The Secretariat concluded that Canada’s arguments did not warrant terminating 
the Article 14 review process. Accordingly, the Secretariat recommended that the 
Council order the preparation of a factual record. On June 24, 1998, the Council 
adopted the recommendation and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft
365 Ibid. at 119.
366
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factual record369 and on June 11, 2000 the Council authorized the publication of 
the factual record.
3.7 Submission 97-002 on Water Pollution in Sonora, Mexico.
On March 15, 1997, the Comite Pro Limpieza del Rio Magdalena (PLRM) filed a 
submission against Mexico. The submission alleged that the municipalities of 
Imuris, Magdalena de Kino, and Santa Ana, located in the Mexican State of 
Sonora, were discharging untreated wastewater into the Magadalena River.370 
The CPLRM maintained that these discharges violated the Federal General 
Ecology Law, as well as Sonora’s Ecology Law and Sonora’s Water Law. 371 On 
June 2, 1997, the Secretariat asked the CPLRM to provide additional information 
regarding claims that Mexico and the State of Sonora had “failed to enforce” the 
mentioned laws372
On October 6, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission complied 
with Article 14(1) of the NAAEC.373 Seven months later, the Secretariat issued an 
Article 14(2) determination and requested a response from Mexico.374
369 Ibid.
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Mexico filed its response on July 29, 1998.375 Mexico argued that most of the 
facts contained within the submission occurred prior to the date the NAAEC 
came into force and therefore the Secretariat could not legally consider such 
facts. Mexico also contended that CPLR failed to exhaust available legal 
remedies prior to filing its submission. In response to the statutory violations 
alleged by CPLRM, Mexico asserted that it is effectively enforcing its 
environmental laws.376
On 13 September 1999, the Secretariat requested additional information from 
Mexico under Article 21 (1 )(b), concerning SEM-97-002. The Secretariat has not 
received a response. Pursuant to Article 15(1), the Secretariat is reviewing the 
submission in light of the Party's response of 29 July 1998 to determine whether 
a factual record is warranted.
3.8 Submission 97- 004 on Canada’s East Coast Fisheries.
On May 26, 1997, the Canadian Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) filed a 
submission against Canada, the Submitter alleges that the Canadian government 
has failed to enforce its law requiring environmental assessment of federal 
initiatives, policies and programs. In particular, the Canadian government failed 
to conduct an environmental assessment of The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy
375 Ibid.
376 See CEC webpage SEM-97-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=15
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(TAGS), as required under Canadian law. By its failure to do so, it is alleged that 
the Canadian government has jeopardized the future of Canada’s East Coast 
fisheries. Specifically, the EDF asserted that the Canadian government violated 
the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order 
(EARPGO) when it approved and implemented TAGS without first performing an 
environmental assessment.377 According to the EDF, at the time that TAGS was 
introduced in May 1994, EARPGO was the governing federal law for 
environmental assessment. Therefore, TAGS was subject to EARPGO’s 
requirements and Canada had no discretionary authority to avoid an 
environmental assessment.378
In evaluating the EDF submission, the Secretariat looked to the language in 
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. 379 The Secretariat found significant the fact that the 
language in Article 14(1) only refers to situations in which a Party “is failing to 
effectively enforce its environmental law.” 380 As such, the Secretariat concluded 
that the Article 14(1) submission procedures are not available to private parties 
alleging non-enforcement that occurred wholly in the past.
In the written determination on the matter, published on August 11, 1997, the 
Secretariat stated that:
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“The submission refers to an action, inaction or decision, which has already been 
completely acted upon over three years ago, with nothing about the decision left 
open or unfinished. The submission, filed three years after the decision on, and 
the entry into force of, the government’s strategy, provides no indication that the 
Party’s failure is continuing or recent. The Secretariat is not aware of any reason 
that would have prevented the Submitter from filing its submission at the time it 
became aware of the government’s alleged failure to enforce.”381
Therefore the Secretariat stated that the submission couldn’t solely allege a past 
failure to enforce environmental law; rather it must allege an ongoing and present 
failure to enforce environmental law. Second, if a Submitter does not file a 
submission in a “timely manner” , the submission may be deemed inconsistent 
with the “temporal requirements” of Article 14(1). Accordingly, the Secretariat 
terminated the review process on August 25,1997. 382
3.9 Submission 97-005 on the Biodiversity Convention under Canadian 
Law.
On July 21, 1997, three Canadian organizations, the Animal Alliance of Canada, 
the Council of Canadians, and Greenpeace of Canada, filed a submission 
against the government of Canada. The Submitters alleged that Canada had a
381 ibid.
382 Ibid.
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serious and growing endangered species problem, and that it has failed to enact 
federal legislation designed to protect endangered species. It also alleges that 
Canada's failure to enact such legislation has implications for the other signatory 
countries to the NAAEC. Specially by failing to enforce its regulations in ratifying 
the Convention on Biological Diversity signed at the Rio Earth Summit on June 
11, 1992 and subsequently ratified by Canada pursuant to an Order-in-Council 
on December 4, 1992.383
According to the Submitters, pursuant to an Order-in-Council, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention) is now a legally binding regulation 
under Canadian law .384 However, the Submitters alleged that Canada had failed 
to enforce Article 8 (k) of the Biodiversity Convention, which requires that each 
country must “develop or maintain necessary legislation and/or other regulatory 
provisions for the protection of threatened species and populations.385
On May 26, 1998, the Secretariat issued the Article 14(1) determination. 386 The 
Secretariat began by addressing the issue of whether the Ratification Instrument 
constituted “environmental law” for purposes of the NAAEC.387 The Secretariat 
acknowledged that the term “environmental law” should be interpreted
383 See CEC webpage SEM-97-005 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=17 
304 Ibid.
365 This submission represented the first time that the Article 14 process was used to seek 
enforcement of an international environmental treaty
386 Ibid.
387 See Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation for the SEM-97-005 dated May 26,1998. Visibly at: 
http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytest.cfm ?varlan=english&documentid=159&format=2.
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expansively. Nevertheless, the Secretariat found that the Submitters failed to 
make a critical distinction between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ legal 
obligations.388
Based on Canada’s long-standing constitutional principle that the ratification 
process does not import international obligations into domestic law absent 
implementation by way of statute and/or regulation, the Secretariat concluded 
that the Ratification Instrument could not be considered an “environmental law” of 
Canada for purposes of Article 14(1). Instead the Ratification Instrument simply 
evidenced and constituted “a one time administrative act by a representative of 
the executive branch of the Canadian government....” 389 Therefore the 
submission was precluded and the Secretariat terminated the process on May 
2 6 ,1998.390
3.10 Submission 97-006 on Environmental Assessment of Fisheries in 
Canada.
On October 4, 1997, The Friends of the Oldman River (FOR), a Canadian 




391 See Letter from Martha Kostuch, Vice President, The Friends of the Oldman River to Victor 
Lichtinger, Executive Director, Commission for Environmental Cooperation, dated Oct. 4, 1997 
http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=145&format=2> 
[hereinafter FOR Re-Submission Letter].
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Six months earlier, the Secretariat had determined that FOR’s submission did not 
warrant developing a factual record because legal issues similar to those rose in 
the submission were pending before the Federal Court of Canada.392 That case, 
brought by The Friends of the West Country Association (FWCAO against the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Attorney General of Canada, was 
apparently dismissed in September of 1997. 393 FOR stated that FWCA had 
abandoned its application based on information it received post filing.394
On May 8,1998, the Secretariat requested a response to FOR’s submission from 
the Government of Canada. 395 Canada submitted its response on July 13,1998. 
396 Canada maintained that the matter continued to be the subject of active 
litigation because appeals could still be considered397 and also argued that it was 
effectively enforcing its environmental laws and that the method by which it 
enforced Section 35 of the Fisheries Act and its implementing Directives was “ a 
legitimate exercise of its regulatory and compliance discretion.” 398 Canada 
stated that the pattern of program implementation and enforcement across the
Ibid. Also see NAAEC Article 15(1)).
393 See FOR Re-Submission Letter, at the CEC webpage at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=5
394 Ibid. The information indicated that of the 21 stream crossings contemplated by the project-in- 
question, 19 had never been the subject of authorizations or letters of advice and the remaining 
two would undergo an environmental assessment pursuant to the Navigable Waters Protection 
Act.
395 See Secretariat determination on Article 14(2) dated May 8,1998, 
at:<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=153&format=2>.
396 See Response of the Government of Canada to Submission on Enforcement Matters Under 
Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-Operation (NAAEC), 
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country was appropriate and that cooperation with provinces increased 
enforcement resources and allowed for more effective enforcement.399
On July 19, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the 
preparation of a factual record.400 However, almost one year later, on 16 May 
2000, the Council decided to defer consideration of the Secretariat’s notification 
with respect to SEM-97-006, and to direct the Secretariat to review expeditiously 
any relevant assertions of facts about other cases that the Submitter may 
provide, after having given Canada an opportunity to provide a response to those 
assertions and to convey its recommendation to Council for a decision. The 
Council has not yet voted on whether to adopt the Secretariat’s 
recommendation401 and there are not any reasons for the two year delay in this 
submission.
3.11 Submission 97-007 on the Hydrological Basin of the Lerma Santiago 
River, Lake Chapala, Mexico.
On October 10, 1997, the Institute de Derecho Ambiental (the Institute for 
Environmental Law or IDA) filed a submission against the Government of Mexico, 
alleging that authorities had failed to handle properly an administrative citizen
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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complaint by IDA.402 IDA filed a popular denounce, which sought a declaration of 
a state of emergency in the Lake Chapala ecosystem, on September 23, 1996. 
403 According to IDA, the Procuraduria Federal de Proteccidn al Ambiente (the 
Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection or “PROFEPA”) failed to follow the 
procedure required by the General Law on Environmental Equilibrium and 
Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) with respect to IDA’S popular denounce.404
On October 2, 1998, the Secretariat requested a response from Mexico. 405 
Mexico filed its response on December 16, 1998. 406 Mexico responded that it 
processed the citizen complaint at issue in accordance with the LGEEPA. 407 
Mexico also took the position that the function of the complaint is merely to 
inform an environmental authority of potential issues that might be investigated 
by that authority.408 Mexico further asserted that IDA’S petition was not properly 
before the Secretariat because IDA had failed to exhaust the administrative 
recourse provided under Mexican law. 409 In addition, Mexico stated that since 
IDA failed to state how the government’s alleged omissions affected or 
endangered the environment410 the submission dealt purely with procedure and




405 Ibid. The Secretariat’s Determination under Article 14(2) is not available for public viewing.
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not the environmental state of Lake Chapala, which was the focus of the citizens’ 
complaint.411
On July 14, 2001 the Secretariat determined that because Mexico had notified 
the Submitter of the existence of an internal decision regarding its popular 
denounce two years after they filed the submission the case was still open before 
the Mexican environmental authorities, and therefore the Secretariat cannot 
review the submission, and decided to terminate the submission.
3.12 Submission 98-001 on Explosions in the Reforma Sector of the City of 
Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
On January 9, 1998, IDA, together with some of the citizens affected by a series 
of explosions in Guadalajara, Mexico on April 2, 1992, filed a submission alleging 
that the Federal Attorney General and the Federal Judiciary failed to duly enforce 
the LGEEPA in relation to the explosions.412 The explosions, which occurred as 
a result of the presence of hydrocarbons and other highly explosive substances 
in the underground sewer, killed 204 people, injured 1,460 people, and destroyed 
or damaged roughly 1100 buildings. 413 The submission is based on a resolution 
dated 28 January 1994, which stayed the proceedings, and on a decision dated 8 
February 1994, through which the 6th district criminal court magistrate ruled that
411 Ibid.
412 See CEC webpage SEM-98-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=39.
413 Ibid.
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the resolution, against which there is no recourse, had definitively ended the 
case.
On September 13, 1999, the Secretariat rejected the initial submission in part 
because it failed to connect the incident with a violation of environmental law.414 
The Secretariat found that the dismissal of the criminal proceedings did not 
constitute a failure to enforce environmental law. 415 As provided by Guideline 
6.2, the Submitters filed a revised submission on 15 October 1999. The revised 
submission again failed to meet the requirements of Article 14(1) for the same 
reasons the original submission did not meet such requirements. The Secretariat 
pointed out that Article 14 of the NAAEC provides the “exclusive” process for 
NGOs and individuals alleging that a Party is not effectively enforcing its 
environmental laws.416 Thus, NGOs and individuals cannot seek enforcement of 
Articles 5(1)(j)(1), 6 and 7 via a submission under Article 14 417 and reached the 
same conclusion regarding the second submission and terminated the process 
on January 11, 2000. 418
3.13 Submission 98-002 on Forestry Operations in El Taray, Jalisco, 
Mexico.
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid. Interestingly enough, however, the Secretariat did not reach the issue of whether the 
dismissal constituted a failure to enforce against the nine defendants, nor whether failing to 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
184
On October 14, 1997, Hector Gregorio Ortiz Martinez (Martinez) filed a 
submission against the Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y 
Pesca (the Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries or 
“SEMARNAP”) and the PROFEPA, alleging various procedural violations in 
processes relating to forestry operations in El Taray.419 This submission, like the 
previous one, found its origin in the filing of a denuncia popular (a popular 
denounce).420
The Submission noted that further to the order of a "technical audit" to be carried 
out at the above-mentioned site, an "inspection visit" was performed, from which 
there arose penalties imposed on both the respondent named in the citizens’ 
complaint and the Submitter, who was found to be jointly responsible. The 
Submitter alleged that neither the technical audit nor the inspection visit 
constitute an adequate response to the citizens’ complaint filed. 421
The Secretariat found that Martinez’ complaint was more focused on the 
management of commercial natural resources -  a subject that, under Article 
45(2)(b) of the NAAEC, is excluded form the definition of “environmental law.” 422 
The Secretariat concluded that the submission failed to meet the requirements
419 See CEC webpage SEM-98-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=40
420 See Ibid. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation (June 23,1998)
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=165&format=2>.
421 Ibid. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation (June 23,1998)
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=165&format=2>.
422 Ibid.
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established in Article 14(1). 423 The Secretariat issued a final determination and 
terminated the process on March 18, 1999. 424
3.14 Submission 98-003 on Solid Waste and Medical Waste Incinerator Air 
Pollution and the Great Lakes.
On May 27, 1998, the Department of the Planet Earth, together with eight other 
NGOs, filed a submission against the United States.425 The Submitters alleged 
that certain EPA regulations and programs to control airborne emissions of 
dioxin, mercury and other toxic substances from solid waste and medical waste 
incinerators violated and failed to enforce various domestic laws and treaties with 
Canada. 426 They jointly alleged that the US EPA incinerator regulations 
specifically conflict with the 'virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances' and 
'zero emission' standards for Great Lakes pollution control of the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement. The Submitter argued that ratified treaties also 
constitute laws of the land by virtue of ratification by the US Senate. According to 
the Submitters, the regulations also violated provisions of the Clean A ir Act. 427
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 See CEC webpage SEM-98-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=41. 
The other NGOs were: Sierra Club of Canada; Friends of the Earth; Washington Toxics Coalition; 
National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides; WASHPIRG; International Inst. Of Concern 
for Public Health; Dr. J. Cummins, Genetics, U. of Western Ontario; and Reach for Unbleached.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
186
On December 14, 1998 the Secretariat determined that the issues raised in the 
submission could not be reviewed under the Article 14 process because the 
Party’s conduct did not qualify as “enforcement.” 428 The Secretariat determined 
that enforcement does not include government standard setting because the 
NAAEC’s purpose is not to set environmental standards for the Parties.429 The 
Secretariat found support for this determination in Article 3, which recognizes the 
right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental 
protection 430 and Article 5, which contains an illustrative list of government 
actions that constitute enforcement activities.431
On January 14, 1999, the Submitters amended their petition.432 The thrust of 
their argument was that the International Joint Committee (IJC) had “taken the 
point of view that ‘standard -  setting’ approaches for persistent toxic substances 
are inappropriate and unworkable.”433 The Submitters maintained that although 
end-of-the-pipe emission controls and best available technologies for such 
controls are standard-setting methods, none of the alternative programs 
contemplated by their submission involved standard setting. 434 Accordingly, the 
CEC should not be precluded from considering their submission.
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In its second Article 14(1) and 14(2) determination, the Secretariat reminded the 
Submitters that according to both Article 45(2), and the Secretariats previous 
determination, an international obligation must be imported into domestic law by 
way of statute or regulation before the Secretariat may consider it. 435 The 
Secretariat ultimately determined, however, that two of the Submitters’ three 
issues warranted a response from the United States. Accordingly, the Secretariat 
requested that United States respond only to the first two issues.
In its response, the United States asserted that the Submitters’ allegation 
concerning the EPA’s inspection and monitoring activities did not meet the 
NAAEC’s requirements because the Submitters failed to: (1) identify which law 
the United States was failing to enforce; (2) give the United States an opportunity 
to respond to the allegations; and (3) pursue available domestic remedies.436 The 
United States also asserted that the Submitters’ allegation concerning Section 
115 of the Clean Air Act misstates the law’s requirements.437 The response 
states, finally that the United States is taking significant action to reduce 
atmospheric deposition of dioxins and mercury from municipal waste combustors 
and medical waste incinerators, including deposition to the Great Lakes 
ecosystem.438
435 Ibid.
436 See Response of the United States of America to Submission on Enforcement Matters 98-003 
Made by the Department of the Planet Earth, Inc., et al. under Article 14 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, accessible from the SEM-98-003.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
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On October 15, 2001 the Secretariat decided to conclude this submission since 
in the opinion of the Secretariat there was not any sign of lack of enforcement, 
since all the incinerators had been visited and tested by the EPA and the EPA 
exercised its discretionary powers in a legal manner, and because there were not 
signs of any significant or repeated violations to the Clean A ir Act
3.15 Submission 98-004 on the Impact of the Mining Industry on Fisheries 
in British Columbia.
On June 29, 1998, the Sierra legal Defence Fund, on behalf of the Sierra Club of 
British Columbia, the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia and the 
Taku Wilderness Association, filed a submission against the Government of 
Canada.439 The Submitters alleged that the Canadian government had 
systematically failed to enforce a law that protects fish and fish habitat from the 
environmental impacts of the mining industry in British Columbia.440
On November 30, 1998 the Secretariat deemed the submission to have satisfied 
Article 140).441 Seven months later on June 25 1999, the Secretariat determined 
that the submission merited a response from the Canadian government.442 
Canada filed its response on September 8 ,1999.443
439 See CEC webpage SEM-98-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=42.
440 See submission dated June 29,1998.
441 See determination under Article 14 (1) November 30 1998.
442 See determination under Article 14 (2) June 25 1999.
443 Ibid.
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Canada contended that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and 
was in full compliance with its NAAEC obligations.444 Canada also alleged that: 
1) the assertions in the submission were the subject of pending administrative 
proceedings; 2) the Submitters failed to provide Canada with a reasonable 
opportunity to respond to the claims raised in the submissions; 3) the Submitters 
were attempting to apply the NAAEC retroactively; 4) the Submitters failed to 
pursue private remedies; and, 5) that the development of a factual record would 
not further the objectives of the NAAEC.445
On May 11, 2001 the Secretariat submitted to the Council its recommendation to 
elaborate a factual record. However as October 2001, the Council has not 
reached a decision on whether to open a factual record for this submission.
3.16 Submission 98-005 on Hazardous Waste Landfills in Hermosillo 
Sonora, Mexico.
On July 23,1998, Domingo Gutierrez Mendevil, President of the Academia 
Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., filed a submission against the 
government of Mexico446 in which he alleged that Mexico, through its 
authorization of the operation of a hazardous waste landfill less than six
444 See Response of the government of Canada to a Submission on Enforcement matters under 
Article 14 and 15 of the North American agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
http://www.cec.org/templates/06-res.cfm ?format=2.
445 Ibid.
446 See CEC webpage SEM-98-005 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=43
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kilometres away from Hermosillo Sonora, had failed to effectively enforce 
Mexico's environmental laws and specifically Mexican Official Standard NOM- 
CPR-004ECOL/1993 that set the appropriate distance at a minimum of 25 
kilometres.447
The Submitter alleged that the authorities intended to close the current landfill 
and build a new one, known as Cytrar in the territory of Sonora448, Moreover, the 
Submitter asserted that the authorities would simply abandon the current landfill 
without any remedies or clean-up actions required for contaminated areas.449 
Finally, the Submitter contended that the SEMARNAP, the State of Sonora, and 
the Municipality of Hermosillo had gotten approval without previously consulting 
the public in violation of the LGEEPA450
The Secretariat requested a response from Mexico on April 9.1999.451 Mexico 
filed its response, part of which it designated as confidential, on July 12 1999.452 
In its response, Mexico countered that the Submitter failed to exhaust all the 
administrative procedures available before filing his submission, and also 
asserted that the allegations in the submission were the subject of pending 
judicial or administrative action.453 Mexico also maintained that the 
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be applied retroactively and they also asserted that the Mexican government had 
not yet determined the location of a new site.454
On October 26, 2000455, the Secretariat determined that in light of the response 
of the Party, it was clear that the legal provision on which the Submitter founded 
his petition concerning the alleged lack of enforcement by the Mexican 
government was not in force when the site was authorized. Principally in view of 
that fact, in accordance with Article 15(1) of the NAAEC, the Secretariat found 
that Submission SEM-98-005 does not warrant the development of a factual 
record, and terminated the process in accordance with paragraph 9.6 of the 
Guidelines.
However on February 14, 2001, the Petitioners submitted a new revised 
submission regarding the same Cytrar landfill.456 In this submission knows as 
Cytrar II, the Submitter alleged the landfill was established without an 
environmental impact authorization, does not comply with the regulations for the 
construction of this type of confinements and received hazardous waste from an 
American company, activity that is prohibited by the LGEEPA. On June 4, 2001 
Mexico submitted a response to the petition requesting to terminate the petition 
since this landfill is part of an international arbitration between the Mexican
456 Submission SEM-01-001 visible a t :
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=63.
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government and a Spanish company regarding an international agreement 
between Mexico and Spain.
As result of Mexico’s response, the Secretariat decided on June 13, 2001 to give 
Mexico 30 days more to submit additional information to prove whether the 
submission is the same case as the alleged international arbitration.
3.17 Submission 98-006 on Shrimp Farms in Isla del Conde, Municipality of 
San Bias, Nayarit, Mexico.
On October 20, 1998, the Grupo Ecologico Manglar, A.C. filed a submission 
alleging that Mexico was failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws with 
respect to the establishment and operation of Granjas Aquanova S.A., a shrimp 
farm in Isla del Conde457 in the Mexican State of Nayarit. Specifically, the 
Submitter alleged that the Mexican authorities failed to enforce provisions 
regarding: (1) protecting jungles and tropical rainforests; (2) regulating 
wastewater discharge; (3) preventing and controlling water use and pollution; (4) 
relating to fisheries and the introduction of non-native species; and (5) 
environmental impact assessments requirements.458 The Submitter further 
alleged that Mexican authorities failed to prosecute Granjas for its environmental 
offences and did not follow up the administrative procedures contained within an 
agreement between the authorities and Granjas to access damages and
457 See CEC webpage SEM-98-006 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=49.
458 Ibid.
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remediation measures.459 Lastly, the Submitter contended that Mexico failed to 
protect migratory species and wetlands as mandated by three international 
conventions.460
On March 17, 1999, the Secretariat made the requisite Article 14 (10) and 14 (2) 
determinations and requested a response from Mexico.461 Mexico filed its 
response on June 15, 1999. In its response Mexico argued that the Submitter 
failed to exhaust all available legal remedies 462 Mexico reiterated that a popular 
denounce is not a remedy and, at any rate, Mexico had not yet completed its 
review of the one filed by the Submitter463 against Aquanova. Mexico maintained 
that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and that some of the 
provisions invoked by the Submitter were not applicable because they were not 
in effect at the time of Granjas’ offences. Mexico also alleged that the Submitter 
failed to cite the precise treaty provisions with which Mexico had failed to 
comply.464
Despite the response made by Mexico to the submission, on August 4, 2000 the 
Secretariat decided to recommend to the Council the elaboration of a factual 
record in response to this submission. As of October 2001, more than a year 
after the Secretariat’s recommendation, the Council has not decided whether to 
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3.18 Submission 99-001 on Underground Storage Tanks in the State of 
California.
On October 18,1999, the Methanex Corportation (Methanex), a Canadian 
methanol manufacturer, filed a submission against the State of California and the 
United States.465 Methanex alleged that the state and the federal government 
failed to enforce California’s environmental laws and regulations relating to 
underground storage tanks or “USTs” and water resource protection.466 
Methanex acknowledged, however, that not all USTs are regulated. Methanex 
asserted that California had failed to properly enforce its environmental laws 
related to environmental and water resource protection through its failure to 
regulate all USTs.467
Methanex’s submission relied largely on a report issued by the California State 
Auditor on December 17, 1998. The report heavily criticized state officials for 
failing to adequately protect California groundwater and address contamination 
from leaking storage tanks.468
On March 30, 2000 the Secretariat determined that the submission met Article 
14(1) and (2) and requested a response from the United States. On May 30,
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2000 the United States submitted its response before the Secretariat. In its 
response to the consolidated Methanex (SEM- 99-001) and Neste (SEM-00-002) 
Submissions, the American government argued that the matter alleged in both 
submissions is subject to a pending arbitration decision. Methanex is already 
challenging California’s enforcement of its Underground Storage Tanks 
regulations as part of its arbitration claim against the United States under NAFTA 
Chapter 11. The U.S.A. claimed that, in accordance with Article 14.3(a) of the 
NAAEC, the Secretariat should proceed no further with the consideration of the 
submission. The Secretariat decided on June 30, 2000 not to proceed further and 
concluded submissions SEM-99-001 and SEM-00-002 because they are subject 
of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding under NAFTA chapter 11469
3.19 Submission 99-002 on Migratory Birds in the United States.
On November 11, 1999 the Alliance for the Wild Rockies, together with eight 
other NGO’s from Canada, Mexico and the United States470, filed a submission 
against the United States alleging that the government is failing to effectively 
enforce Section 703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which prohibits the 
killing of migratory birds without a permit.471
470 See CEC webpage for SEM-99-02 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=56 
The other eight NGO’s are: The Centre of International Environmental Law, Centro Mexicano de 
Derecho Ambiental del Noreste de Mexico, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, The 
Friends of the Earth, The Instituto de Derecho Ambiental, The Pacific Environment and 
Resources Centre; the Sierra Club of Canada and the West Coast Environmental Law 
Association.
471 Ibid.
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Specifically the Submitters alleged that the United States has refused to enforce 
Section 703 as it relates to loggers, logging companies and logging contractors. 
According to the Submitters the Fish and Wildlife Services “FWS”, the agency in 
charge enforcing the MBTA has a longstanding, unwritten policy relative to the 
MBTA that no enforcement or investigative action should be taken in incidents 
involving logging operations.472 The Submitters contended that the relevant 
statutes and regulations do not contemplate such exemption.
The Secretariat made the requisite determinations under Article 14(1) and 14(2), 
and requested a response from the United States on December 23, 1999. The 
United States submitted its response on February 29, 2000. On December 15, 
2000, almost a year after the Secretariat requested a response by the United 
States the Secretariat recommended to the Council the elaboration of a factual 
record regarding this submission. The Council has not yet reached a decision.
3.20 Submission 00-001 on Air Pollution in Cumpas, Sonora, Mexico.
Rosa Maria Escalante de Feranandez filed the first submission of the year 2000 
in January 27473. She alleged that the government of Mexico has failed to 
effectively enforce the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y  la Proteccion a!
473 See CEC webpage SEM-00-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=57.
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Ambiente (LGEEPA) and certain Official Mexican Standards concerning 
environmental health in relation to air pollution from the Molymex S.A de C.V. 
plant in Campus in the Mexican State of Sonora. The Molymex plant produces 
molybdenum trioxide from molybdenum sulphide. The Submitter asserted that 
the pollution emitted by the plant causes irreversible and irreparable damage to 
the residents’ health and the environment by increasing mortality rates and 
affecting crops in Cumpas.474
On April 25, 2000 the Secretariat determined that the submission did not meet 
the criteria of Article 14(1) and terminated the submission. The Submitters filed in 
April 6, 2000 a new submission SEM-00-005 regarding the same matter. The 
Submitters allege that Mexico has failed to effectively enforce the LGEEPA with 
respect to: (i) operating without environmental impact authorization, (ii) land use 
which is incompatible with the cattle raising and use in the area; (iii) preservation 
and sustainable use of the land; (iv) zoning for contaminating industries in 
Cumpas; (v) the return to the country of origin of hazardous waste generated 
under the rules of temporary importation; and (vi) the importation of dangerous 
materials without ensuring compliance with the LGEEPA.
On October 19, 2000 the Secretariat decided that the submission met Article 14 
(1) and (2) criteria and requested a response from the Mexican government. 
Mexico submitted its response on January 18, 2000 and alleged that since the 
Molymex plant was established before the enforcement of the environmental
474 Ibid.
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legislation it therefore did not need to execute an environmental impact 
assessment. Also Mexico stated Molymex obtained and renewed several times 
its functioning licenses and that they met all the air pollution standards. The 
Secretariat is still reviewing Mexico’s response.
3.21 Submission 00-003 on Migratory Birds in Jamaica Bay.
On March 2, 2000 the Hudson River Audubon Society of Westchester, Inc. and 
the Save Our Sanctuary Committee, submitted before the Secretariat a 
submission alleging that the United States National Park Sen/ice475, is failing to 
enforce, and proposing to violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which prohibits 
the killing of migratory birds without a permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service. In addition they submitted that the U.S. is failing to enforce and 
proposing to violate of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, which prohibits the 
taking endangered and threatened species by proposing to construct a paved, 
multi-purpose bicycle path through the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, which is 
part of the Gateway National Recreational Area, located in Queens, New York. 
The Submitters alleged the construction would create an important risk to the 
habitat of several migratory birds.
On 12 April 2000, the Secretariat determined that SEM-00-003 does not meet the 
criteria of Article 14(1) of the NAAEC and therefore concluded the process.
475 See CEC webpage SEM-00-003 a t:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=59.
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3.22 Submission 00-004 BC Logging.
On March 27, 2000 the David Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace Canada, Sierra 
Club of British Columbia, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance and the National 
Resources Defence Council submitted before the Secretariat a submission 
alleging that Canada is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws and to 
provide high levels of environmental protection. They allege that the Fisheries 
Act is “routinely and systematically violated by logging activities undertaken in 
British Columbia.”476 Also, the Submitters alleged that the Canadian 
environmental authority has been denied the right to bring private prosecutions 
against violators of the Fisheries Act in violation of the obligation established in 
Article 7 of the NAAEC.
The Secretariat decided that the submission met Article 14 (1) and (2) criteria 
and requested a response from Canada on May 8, 2000. The Canadian 
response was filed before the Secretariat on July 6,2000 and recognized only 
three documented assertions of alleged failures to effectively enforce the 
Fisheries Act. In light of Canada’s response, the Secretariat recommended on 
July 27, 2001 that the submission warranted the developing of a factual record. 
The Council has not yet reached a decision.
476 See CEC webpage SEM-00-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=60.
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3.23 Submission 00-006 in the Indigenous Communities in the Sierra 
Tarahumara.
The Comision de Derechos de Solidaridad y  Defensa de los Derechos Humanos 
submitted on June 19, 2000 a submission alleging a failure by Mexico to 
effectively enforce its environmental law by denying access to environmental 
justice to Indigenous communities in the Sierra Tarahumara in the State of 
Chihuahua. In particular, they assert failures to effectively enforce environmental 
law relative to the citizen complaint process, to alleged environmental crimes and 
alleged violations with respect to forest resources and the environment in the 
Sierra Tarahumara.477 The Secretariat is still reviewing whether the submission 
meets the criteria of Article 14 (1).
3.24 Submission 01-002 the AAA Packaging Company.
On April 18, 2001 the Submitters, who asked to remain anonymous as 
established in Article 11 (8) section (a) of the NAAEC, alleged that the Canadian 
government is allowing the exportation to the territories of the other Parties a 
pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within its territory pursuant 
to Article 23(3) of the NAAEC 478 The Submitters assert that Canada has failed to 
issue a prohibitory and/or injunctive order halting the export to the United States,
477 See CEC webpage SEM-00-006 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=62.
478 See CEC webpage SEM-01-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201
by AAA Packaging, of products containing “isobutyl nitrite” which the Submitters 
claim is a “banned hazardous substance”. The Secretariat requested more 
information and when the Submitters did not submit additional information, the 
Secretariat on May 25, 2001 decided to terminate the submission.
3.25 Submission 01-003 on ground water contamination by the company 
DERMET in Guadalajara, Mexico.
On June 14, 2001 a Mexican company called Mercerizados y  Tenidos de 
Guadalajara S.A de C. V submitted that in a civil trial Mexico refused to recognize 
and give effect to a technical opinion issued by PROFEPA related to damages 
caused to Mercerizados. By doing so it was alleged that Mexico failed to 
effectively enforce Article 194 of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and 
Environmental Protection ‘LGEEPA", and keep its commitments concerning 
procedural guarantees and private access to remedies under Articles 5, 6 and 7 
of the NAAEC.479
On September 19, 2001 the Secretariat decided that the submission did not meet 
the criteria of Article 14 (1), since the final decision by the courts regarding the 
civil suit did recognize and give effect to the technical opinion issued by 
PROFEPA. Therefore the submission was terminated.
479 See CEC webpage SEM-01-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfm ?varlan=english&ID=2419.
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